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Abstract:  
In a period when “labor-based parties” in Europe had reached their “own ‘end of history’” 
with the rise of neoliberalism and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Keynesian 
consensus, influential union organizer Tony Mazzocchi of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic 
Workers Organization led a bold effort to build a workers’ party independent of the 
Democratic and Republican Parties in the United States from 1991 until his death in 2002. 
While the Labor Party never made its way into mainstream politics, it represented an 
important moment for organizing left of the Democratic Party in the United States. This 
thesis compiles the scant secondary sources and untapped wealth of primary sources 
concerning the Labor Party into the first full-length history on the subject, contextualizing it 
within U.S. political and Labor History. In addition, it argues that while former Labor Party 
leaders are partially correct in blaming economic and political conditions for the Labor 
Party’s decline in the 2000s after initial growth in the 1990s, their failure to engage 
concretely with electoral politics and unorganized workers impeded the party’s success. It 
also highlights the positive role played by revolutionary socialists, traditionally portrayed by 
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An image of Labor Party paraphernalia, including a button produced by the Massachusetts 
State Labor Party to promote the Just Healthcare campaign (top left), a copy of the Labor 
Party’s Program printed by the New York Metro Chapter (bottom left), and a draft of the 
curriculum developed by Tony Mazzocchi’s Labor Institute and the Oil Chemical and 
Atomic Workers to promote the idea of a Labor Party (right). The former items were 
provided by Jeff Booth, a former leader of the Labor Party’s Boston chapter, while the latter 
was purchased second-hand from an online bookseller. 
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Introduction 
In a period when “labor-based parties” in Europe had reached their “own ‘end of 
history’” with the rise of neoliberalism and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
Keynesian consensus, influential union organizer Tony Mazzocchi of the Oil, Chemical, and 
Atomic Workers Organization led a bold effort to build a workers’ party independent of the 
Democratic and Republican Parties in the United States.1 On June 6-9th 1996, approximately 
1,500 trade unionist delegates gathered in Cleveland, Ohio to found the Labor Party, one of 
several attempts made by workers, socialists, and social democrats at building an 
independent party of labor in the United States.2 Despite the party making national news and 
attracting the support of 80 unions, representing over one million workers in the United 
States, few remember it outside of older left-wing activists and union officials.3  
I first learned of the Labor Party on a crisp winter’s morning in Goddard Library 
during my Freshman Year, sitting across the table from Jeff Booth—the very picture of the 
classic American union member—for a discussion of “Programme of the International” by 
Ted Grant. This included a conversation on the Labour Party in Britain and prompted me to 
ask if anyone had tried to build such a party in the United States. It just so happened that 
Booth was the former general secretary of the Labor Party’s Boston Chapter, and drawing 
from his decades of union and socialist organizing, he relayed the story of Tony Mazzocchi, 
the OCAWO, and the party’s demise after its founder’s death. I left that day mainly 
 
1 Sean Sweeney, “The Labor Party’s Alternative Politics,” New Labor Forum 1 (1997): 46. 
2 Mark Dudzic and Derek Seidman. “What Happened to the Labor Party?” Jacobin, November 10, 2015. 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/10/tony-mazzochi-mark-dudzic-us-labor-party-wto-nafta-globalization-
democrats-union. 
3 McLure, Laura. “Labor Has a Party.” Dollars & Sense, September/October 1996. 
http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/1996/0996mcclure.html. 
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wondering how to spell Mazzocchi, but the idea of the Labor Party stuck in my mind and 
we’d frequently return to the subject in our study groups—the third member missed that 
particular discussion to attend a practice for his improvised comedy troop. 
The present should not dictate how historians view the past, but on occasion, it 
informs what questions they ask. The 2016 and 2020 elections have shaken the public’s faith 
in the political establishment, and many efforts to build a new party have emerged, including 
the Howie Hawkins campaign running to transform the Green Party into an eco-socialist 
workers’ party, former Sanders’ campaign manager Nick Brana announcing the Movement 
for a People’s Party, and several former labor party members convening to discuss launching 
the Labor Campaign for an Independent Party. In light of these events, it seems fitting to 
return to the perennial question of why the U.S. lacks a mass labor or socialist party. 
 Numerous historians and political scientists have dedicated their time to studying past 
attempts at building such a party in the United States, but the most recent chapter in this 
history has yet to receive academic treatment. This thesis intends to develop the first full-
length history of the Labor Party, drawing from numerous available documents, including 
mainstream press coverage, the party’s public-facing documents, retrospective journal 
articles, and radical newspapers, along with interviews with some of the party’s surviving 
members. The central task here is to compile information from such scattered accounts and 
documents into a coherent, mostly chronological, format which will provide the basis for 
workers, activists, politicians, and union officials to assess this most recent attempt at 
building a Labor Party in the United States, locate and engage with its documents, and apply 
the lessons they take away to the efforts of the working class to engage with politics today. 
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Survey of Secondary Literature and Historiography 
 As noted earlier, little has been written on labor history in the 1990s, let alone written 
about the Labor Party founded in 1996. Looking at labor history broadly, there is only one 
extended history of the American Federation of Labor-Council of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO) after the retirement of George Meany as president of the federation in 1979. 
Timothy J. Minchin’s Labor Under Fire presents a 315-page history of the AFL-CIO from 
1979 to 2015, focusing on the domestic actions of Lane Kirkland, John Sweeney, and 
Richard Trumka. Minchin introduces his text by noting his goal to give a more “balanced” 
treatment to his subject matter than previous scholarship critical of the AFL-CIO’s role in 
foreign policy, and overall the text comes off as sympathetic to Kirkland and other leaders, 
trying to highlight a decades-long trend of progress since Meany.4 Rather than portraying the 
AFL-CIO and its members as non-partisan organizations, as many popular commentators and 
even union representatives will try to do, Minchin highlights the political nature of the AFL-
CIO right off the bat, with the most relevant example to this project being the key role of 
organized labor in electing Bill Clinton in 1992.5  Minchin’s statistical and anecdotal insight 
into the role of organized labor in the 1992 presidential elections demonstrates the 
importance of the union vote and the AFL-CIO’s ability to mobilize members to campaign in 
U.S. politics, giving material reasons for why figures like Tony Mazzocchi saw the AFL-CIO 
as an important factor in building an independent party of the working class. 
 While Minchin’s history provides important contextual history about internal AFL-
CIO politics and the federations relationships with Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in the 
 
4 Timothy J. Minchin, Labor Under Fire (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 6.  
5 Minchin, Under Fire, 7, 185-6. 
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1990s and early 2000s, its top-down view tends to miss the growing radicalism of organized 
labor and the socialists and social democrats who gained substantial sway in the labor 
movement’s grassroots in the 1990s. It mentions neither the Labor Party nor the influential 
Tony Mazzocchi, although the exclusion of the latter may in part be due to his main work in 
passing the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA) being accomplished in the 1970s. 
The closest thing there is to an extended history of the Labor Party in the U.S. formed in 
1996 is Les Leopold’s biography of party founder Tony Mazzocchi, The Man Who Hated 
Work and Loved Labor. The majority of this text focuses on Mazzocchi’s earlier 
achievements, but the final two chapters, “Party Time” and “Stepping Stones” cover an 
overview of the Labor Party’s history and Mazzocchi’s vision for it. Les Leopold lays out 
how Tony Mazzocchi rejected the tactics of “fusion parties” which endorsed and ran as 
Democrats, “spoiler parties” which tipped the election in favor of the Republican Party, and 
broad progressive coalitions such as Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition which sought to 
organize activists and labor leaders while leaving the broader working class behind. Instead, 
Mazzocchi intended to “build a labor party that did not initially run candidates,” on a clear 
“program” that would “resonate” with workers.6 The idea being that the Labor Party should 
wait and gather strength and union endorsements for a period until it had the strength to run 
members in national races and win. 
 Leopold’s account complicates Minchin’s narrative about Kirkland’s ability to 
mobilize members and hold the AFL-CIO together. Whereas Minchin depicts the 1994-95 
leadership challenge within the AFL-CIO as a sudden result of NAFTA’s passage, Leopold 
 
6 Les Leopold, The Man Who Hated Work and Loved Labor (White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green 
Publishing, 2007), 439-40. 
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highlights how tensions between business unionist leadership and the more militant unions 
were brewing much earlier and started coming to a head as early as the 1980s with the 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization strike.7 While “Mazzocchi first seriously 
raised the idea of an independent party to OCAW [Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers 
Union] in 1972,” the idea for a labor party became more concrete for him following the 
PATCO Solidarity Day, where Mazzocchi witnessed 850,000 AFL-CIO members march 
only for Kirkland to tell them to go home and wait for election day, ending the possibility of 
further demonstrations and in Mazzocchi’s mind letting “eleven thousand workers get fired 
en masse.”8 Although Leopold’s work lacks the same academic publishing credentials as 
Labor Under Fire, his account of Mazzocchi’s life provides reason to be skeptical of 
Minchin’s positive view of Kirkland. Looking at both works together provides the context 
necessary for historicizing the Labor Party as it emerged in the aftermath of John Sweeney’s 
ascent to the AFL-CIO presidency on a wave of resurgent labor militancy in the 1990s, while 
the Lean Years under Reagan and the Clinton Administration’s betrayal of organized labor 
over NAFTA left a “legacy of bitterness” between organized labor and the establishment 
political parties.9 
 One thing Labor Under Fire and The Man Who Hated Work have in common is their 
top-down approach to the history of U.S. organized labor after George Meany, focusing on 
the leaders of unions and U.S. presidents rather than rank and file membership in the unions. 
This isn’t necessarily a bad thing, but they leave out the influence of small, but radical and 
well-organized groups in the labor movement and how the membership of the AFL-CIO and 
 
7 Minchin, Under Fire, 214. 
8 Leopold, The Man, 434, 436. 
9 Minchin, Under Fire, 203. 
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Labor Party felt about and influenced events as they unfolded.  Given the influence of 
revolutionary socialists in several chapters of the Labor Party leaving these perspectives out 
creates a somewhat incomplete history. Thankfully, socialist organizations participating in 
the Labor Party often published newspapers, and primary sources can help fill in the gaps in 
the secondary writings.10 
 Otherwise, secondary sources are sparse, save for what Sam Rosenfeld of Colgate 
University describes as “historically-minded” political science works in a review of Labor 
Under Fire for Labour/Le Travail, such as those by Taylor Dark and Daniel Schlozman.11  In 
this vein, the book Why Is There No Labor Party in the United States by Robin Archer looks 
at numerous attempts at building socialist and labor parties in the United States, comparing 
them to successful attempts to build such parties in other first-world former British colonies 
such as Canada and Australia to answer its titular question. While it only covers attempts 
from the late 19th through the mid-20th Century, it provides a useful point of comparison for 
exploring if the reasons for the lack of a successful labor party in the 19th century carried 
over to the failure of Mazzocchi’s Labor Party.12 Furthermore, “The Working Class in 
American History” series published by the University of Illinois Press includes a volume 
titled NAFTA and Labor In North America by Norman Caulfield with relevant information to 
contextualize the rise of the Labor Party alongside Minchin’s work.13 Although more 
explicitly a history than Why Is There No Labor Party in the United States, Caulfield’s work 
is less of a chronological history, and organizes its chapters by topic, tracing the effects of 
 
10 See the “Survey of Primary Sources” section for more discussion of socialists and internal tensions in the LP. 
11 Sam Rosenfeld, Labour / Le Travail 81 (2018): 293-96. 
12 Robin Archer, Why Is There No Labor Party in the United States (PRINCETON; OXFORD: Princeton 
University Press, 2007). 
13 Norman Caulfield, NAFTA and Labor in North America (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2010). 
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NAFTA on the labor movement and collective bargaining in the United States. Furthermore, 
although NAFTA and Labor in North America represents an important piece of labor history, 
much of its focus rests upon the 2000s, placing a considerable amount of the text outside the 
timeframe of this project. In short, while there are a few histories providing insight into the 
context of the Labor Party, the 1990s in the U.S. is still relatively uncharted territory for 
academic history, and this project will rely heavily on the primary sources to develop 
practically the first full-length history of the party. 
 
A Survey of Primary Sources 
 Articles on the U.S. Labor Party exist in peer-reviewed journals, but these tend to 
either be commentaries on the party written during its existence or brief essays and 
interviews looking back at the Labor Party. A few like this can be found in the New Labor 
Forum published by the CUNY School of Urban and Labor Studies, and due to their nature 
should be viewed more as primary sources and sometimes oral history, rather than true 
secondary sources, although their academic context separates them from usual primary 
sources—but perhaps not in terms of being unbiased or more or less credible. In any case, 
they will be included alongside primary sources in this section. 
 One of the more obvious primary sources among these journal articles is Sean 
Sweeney’s essay “The Labor Party’s Alternative Politics,” published shortly after the party’s 
founding convention.14 Following its introduction, Sweeney’s article can be divided into 
three distinctive sections: answering concerns about the racial and gender diversity of the 
 
14 Not to be confused with John Sweeney, AFL-CIO president elected in 1995. 
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Labor Party and whether it is made of the “usual suspects,” rebutting accusations in the 
1990s that traditional labor parties as seen in Europe were becoming irrelevant, and 
discussing the party’s relationship to the parallel reform movement in the AFL-CIO of John 
Sweeney and his “New Voice” leadership.15 All three of these topics will be addressed in this 
project and have been used to form questions for interviews with ex-Labor Party members to 
help fill the historical gaps left by the official accounts of Mazzocchi’s close associates. 
Sweeney’s article agrees with many of Mazzocchi’s ideas about offering something new to 
U.S. workers through a class-based approach and notably rejects the association between 
labor politics and Keynesianism which developed after World War II.16 This places the Labor 
Party in contention with the trend of neoliberal politics from the 1980s, but with the broader 
trends of labor politics in the U.S. supported by business unionists like Meany and Kirkland. 
Sweeney’s article describes the initial challenges faced by the Labor Party and many of the 
Party’s hopes at the moment, providing a somewhat academic written perspective untainted 
by hindsight. 
 Also, it is worth noting that Sweeney was a leader in the New York Metro chapter of 
the Labor Party, which had about 900 active members led a challenge to the Labor Party’s 
leadership in hopes of breaking with Mazzocchi’s electoral abstentionism and running 
candidates. This led to the chapter, which included several revolutionary socialists in its 
ranks, being suspended by the State Executive Committee after a series of bitter debates in 
2000. Sweeney is listed in articles from Justice, the newspaper of Socialist Alternative 
(which had been founded in 1984 and entered into the Labor Party in 1996 as Labor 
 
15 Sweeney, Alternative Politics,” 43-49. 
16 Sweeney, “Alternative Politics,” 46. 
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Militant).17 Whereas Sweeney describes the Labor Party as a forum where “union leaders and 
left activists are learning to work together” in 1997, over the course of three years tensions 
seem to have risen extensively with Sweeney in the middle of a battle between union 
bureaucrats and socialists over whether or not to run independent candidates and endorse 
Nader.18 
 The tensions between the more radical elements of the Labor Party and its more 
moderate (but by U.S. standards quite left-wing) members are often neglected in what little 
recent history has been written about the party. Les Leopold’s biography of Tony Mazzocchi 
touches on these debates, but Leopold’s disdain for “activists” and straw-manning of 
“sectarians” undermines the credibility of the source as he constantly makes digs he takes at 
progressives wanting to run candidates, and later against Ralph Nader and the Green Party, 
going so far as to say Nader helped sink the Labor Party.19 Mazzocchi’s successor in Labor 
Party leadership, Mark Dudzic, is more diplomatic towards the Green Party in his 2014 
interview with Derek Seidman for the New Labor Forum but ignores tensions within the 
party and the suspension of the New York Metro chapter, which came to a head amidst the 
turmoil of the 2000 election.20 This particular interview was published alongside a reflection 
by prominent political scientist and Labor Party founder Adolph Reed Jr., which commends 
the publication of the Dudzic interview while adding a few additional thoughts.21 Both 
 
17 Alan Jones, “New York Metro Chapter Suspended by State Executive Committee: How NOT to Build the 
Labor Party,” Justice (2000). Based on digital transcription published at 
http://markinbookreview.blogspot.com/2012/07/from-archives-of-socialist-alternative.html 
18 Sweeney, “Alternative Politics,” 44. 
19 Leopold, The Man, 441-2, 476-8. 
20 Derek Seidman, “Looking Back at the Labor Party: An Interview with Mark Dudzic,” New Labor Forum 23 
(2014): 63. 
21 Adolph Reed, Jr., “Adolph Reed, Jr. Responds” New Labor Forum 23 (2014): 65. 
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articles tend to agree with one another and put forward the idea that the time and conditions 
were not right for a Labor Party to launch, particularly after the “momentum” and militancy 
of the labor movement in the 1990s slowed down and U.S. politics took a turn to the right.22 
Reed’s article diverges from Dudzic’s in putting forward a much harsher critique of 
“activistism” in the U.S. left and stating that the conditions which led to the party’s collapse 
were “if not inevitable, not under our control.”23 The general trend in retrospective sources 
from Mazzocchi’s close associates is one of ignoring or treating with disdain the Labor 
Party’s revolutionary and activist elements. They also cover up the debates with and 
organizational actions taken against dissidents in the party, while blaming broader conditions 
for the party’s failure rather than closely examining possible errors they made as an 
organization between the founding conference in 1996 and the party’s third conference in 
2002. By including sources such as old articles and new interviews from opposition within 
the party, the narratives promoted by Leopold, Dudzic, and Reed, Jr. can be put to the test, 
and a fuller more accurate picture of the Labor Party’s rise and fall can be painted for the first 
time in the field of history. 
 As explored earlier, news articles for Labor Party participants such as Labor 
Militant/Socialist Alternative seem to be preserved here and there, providing interesting 
insights into the party’s radical wing. Meanwhile, the Labor Party’s website is still up and 
includes archived documents and articles from throughout the party’s history. This includes 
the full run of the Labor Party Press, which, although seemingly deleted before 2020, is 
preserved in captures from the Wayback Machine service hosted by the Internet Archive.24 
 
22 Seidman, “Looking Back,” 64. 
23 Reed, Jr. “Responds” 66-7. 
24 http://www.thelaborparty.org/index.html 
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Alongside the Labor Party’s occasional appearances in the mainstream press, including 
newspapers like the New York Times, there is a strong body of original documents archived 
in various parts of the internet on which this thesis can draw.25 Additionally, two former 
members of the Labor Party, Gary Olson, Chair of the Lehigh Valley Chapter, and Jeff Booth 
General Secretary of the Boston Chapter, agreed to interviews on their experience in the 
labor party—included in the appendices of this thesis for ease of access—and their accounts 
help to paint a more detailed picture of the Labor Party’s day to day activities. 
Preliminary Conclusions 
 The Labor Party held three conventions between 1996 and 2002, after which the party 
mostly collapsed except for a brief and unsuccessful electoral effort in 2006.26 The LP and its 
predecessor, Labor Party Advocates, benefited from a militant labor movement and a series 
of betrayals by the Democratic Party from the 1980s to the second convention in 1998, which 
fueled the growth of the effort. With favorable conditions, the LP had an easy enough time 
recruiting union leaders disgruntled by Clinton’s support of NAFTA and the rise of 
neoliberal ideology in both major parties in the United States from the 1970s onward. 
Unfortunately for the LP, the tides of history would change by 2000, as the pressure to vote 
for the Democratic Party in the presidential elections rapidly increased and labor leaders, 
especially the top ranks of the American Federation of Labor-Council of Industrial 
Organizations, placed the economic and political weight of the labor movement behind 
 
25 Steven Greenhouse, “U.S. Labor Party Gets to Work at Its Second Convention,” The New York Times 
(November 16th, 1998) https://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/16/us/labor-party-gets-to-work-at-its-second-
convention.html?searchResultPosition=1; Steven Greenhouse “Facing Death, Founder Fights for Labor Party’s 
Life,” (Augst 25th, 2002) https://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/25/us/facing-death-founder-fights-for-labor-party-
s-life.html?searchResultPosition=2. Just two examples of several found when combing the NY Times archives 
online. 
26 “Labor Party to Seek Ballot Access in South Carolina,” Labor Party News (December 2005): 1, 3. 
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electing Clinton’s vice president Al Gore, along with their “2000 in 2000” campaign to elect 
2000 union members to political office on the Democratic Party ballot line.27 Despite the 
betrayal of organized labor by Bill Clinton over NAFTA, these campaigns show the AFL-
CIO moving closer to the Democratic Party after Clinton, rather than Mazzocchi’s Labor 
Party. These events raise questions about how seriously endorsing unions took the Labor 
Party and reveal the Labor Party largely failed in achieving Mazzocchi’s goal of “shifting the 
terms of debate.”28 
 In addition to changing conditions and waning support from the unions, primary 
documents from radical union members, who have thus far been written off, straw manned, 
and ridiculed by accounts of the Labor Party penned by friends and close associates of Tony 
Mazzocchi, suggest that the LP’s abstract approach to party-building and lack of 
participation in electoral campaigns until after the party had disbanded also contributed to its 
downfall. As part of this thesis, accounts from smaller, more radical elements of the Labor 
Party have been placed into conversation with accounts from Les Leopold and other leading 
members to test the strength of the predominant surviving narrative which to some degree 
blames socialists for the party’s decline. While there is some truth to Leopold’s portrait of 
groups of “sectarians” playing detrimental roles in certain instances within the Labor Party, 
more often than not small socialist organizations built strong chapters and worked alongside 
the LP’s leadership to grow the organization.29 In fact, the LP leadership’s unwillingness to 
form a united front and work with the revolutionary elements of the party at critical moments 
 
27 Minchin, Under Fire, 256-7. 
28 Leopold, The Man, 442. 
29 Leopold, The Man, 458. 
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may have undermined the party-building effort and allowed elements less committed to 
independent politics to seize power and undo much of the LP’s work. 
 Regardless of whether the more radical sources are convincing, making a genuine 
effort to include them in the history of the Labor Party and Labor Party Advocates provides a 
more holistic view of the effort than what can be found in the surviving accounts. While this 
may not be the definitive history of the Labor Party, pulling together disparate sources 
beyond the carefully curated accounts of LP leaders will pave the way for future projects to 
write that history and provide a glimpse of the labor movement to the left of John Sweeney’s 
“New Voice Slate” that is not yet represented in scholarship. To this end, the story of the 
Labor Party begins sometime in the 1970s, as cracks formed in the historically steady 
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Chapter One: The Road to Labor Party Advocacy 1970-1990 
 In general, sources agree on the objective factors, or material conditions and social 
structures, which gave rise to the Labor Party in 1996. On the one hand, the ideology of 
neoliberalism began to take root in the United States as early as the 1970s, culminating in the 
end of the “post-war bargaining regime” with Ronald Reagan’s administration firing striking 
members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) in August 1981. 
The seemingly unending attacks on U.S. workers coming from both sides of the aisle that 
followed alienated workers and union leaders from the political establishment represented by 
the Democratic and Republican Parties. On the other, the collapse of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the Warsaw Pact between 1989 and 1992 brought the Cold War to an 
end, weakening “the ties between the institutional labor movement and U.S. imperial foreign 
policy resulting in a new tolerance, and the occasional embrace, of viewpoints that would 
have been beyond the pale during the Cold War years.”30 Both trends constituted major 
material setbacks for the political left internationally, but for the left and working class in the 
United States, they proved to have a fleeting silver lining, opening new doors for class 
struggle. When it comes to subjective factors, the top leadership of the Labor Party generally 
identify two main groups which drove the creation of the Labor Party: the circle of union 
officials centered around Tony Mazzocchi and the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers 
International Union (OCAW), which advocated for the creation of a Labor Party, and the 
“New Voices” Leadership of the American Federation of Labor and Council Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) which, although never involved in the Labor Party, represented a 
 
30 Derek Seidman and Mark Dudzic, “Looking Back at the Labor Party: Mark Dudzic Interviewed by Derek 
Seidman,” New Labor Forum 23, no. 1 (2014): pp. 60-64, https://journals.sagepub.com/pb-
assets/cmscontent/Nlf/NLF-LookingBackAtLabourParty-1468941838437.pdf, 3. 
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new and more reform-minded leadership capable of tolerating Mazzocchi’s project.31 What 
members of Tony Mazzocchi’s inner circle—such as Mark Dudzic, Katherine Isaac, and Les 
Leopold—tend to leave out in their retrospective discussions is the role of smaller, more 
radical organizations, such as Campaign for a Labor Party and Black Workers for Justice, 
which also contributed to the formation of Labor Party Advocates. Keeping in mind the 
broader historical background of the 1970s and 1980s, this chapter discusses how 
Mazzocchi’s reformers and more revolutionary groups converged to first form Labor Party 
Advocates. 
Tony Mazzocchi and “The Years of Devastation” 
 In August of 1992, with an end to the reign of the Republican Party in sight, the AFL-
CIO News coined the term “Years of Devastation” to describe the relentless attacks on 
organized labor carried out under the presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush.32 The AFL-CIO entered the 1980s with a new, if not particularly fresh or 
young, president in Lane Kirkland and in turn faced the prospect of a new administration as 
the Carter administration became increasingly unpopular. Labor Historian Timothy J. 
Minchin described this period as the “start of a new era, one in which the AFL-CIO operated 
in a hostile economic and political climate,” however, for all of the Democratic Party’s 
verbal support for unions, the previous era was not necessarily a friendly time for unions. For 
all of Democratic President Jimmy Carter’s praise of Kirkland as he took over for George 
Meany, the more progressive elements of the labor movement felt alienated by the Executive 
 
31 Ibid, 2; Mark Dudzic and Katherine Isaac, “Labor Party Time? Not Yet,” Labor Party, December 2012, 
http://www.thelaborparty.org/d_lp_time.htm, 5. 
32 Timothy J. Minchin, Labor Under Fire: a History of the AFL-CIO since 1979 (Chapel Hill, NC: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2017), 184. 
 Bilsky 16 
Branch and Congress long before Reagan came along.33 As early as 1972, Tony Mazzocchi 
raised the issue of independent working-class politics after “a majority of Democrats 
supported President Nixon’s wage controls,” and the Carter administration, with a veto-proof 
Democratic Congress, failed to pass even “mild labor reform.”34 While Mazzocchi may have 
been correct speaking from the viewpoint of a primarily private sector union, it appears the 
Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) through the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 
may have brought temporary gains for organized labor, with the body initially garnering an 
“anti-management record.”35 Looking at statistics on union membership in the United States 
from 1973 onward, 1980 represented a turning point. While unions technically saw slight 
growth from 1973-1979, from 24% of the employed population belonging to unions to a 
membership rate of 24.1%, union membership declined in the U.S. from that point on, 
reaching 13.5% of the employed population by 2001. Even with the slight spike in union 
Membership in 1979, the Carter administrations saw an overall decrease in union density, 
from 23.8% in 1977 to 23% in 1980.36 Thus, while the decline in organized labor objectively 
worsened after 1980 with a decade of Republican administrations, the decline started much 
earlier, including under the Carter administration. Likewise, as Mazzochi pointed out, OSHA 
and the EPA, two major victories for the working class and environmentalists, were won 
under the Nixon administration, an administration which, in contrast to Democratic Party 
 
33 Ibid, 48. 
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administrations in the period, gave the position of Secretary of Labor to a union member. 
Mazzocchi did not attribute these gains to the Republicans, but rather pressure coming from 
outside the establishment parties from what he termed “motion in the streets.”37 
 In some ways, the Carter administration proved to be antithetical to the interests of 
unionized workers. In addition to declining union membership, not all of which can be 
blamed on the Executive branch of the government, the Carter years saw the appointment of 
Langhorne M. Bond to the position of Federal Aviation Administrator in 1977. In this 
position, Bond made it his goal to “devise an effective anti-strike mechanism” in response to 
perceived support for workers from the FRLA and the Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Organization’s history of frequent strikes and work slowdowns.38 Whether intended by 
Carter or not, Bond’s appointment was an attack on organized labor as he sought to develop 
anti-strike contingency plans and ways of circumventing the FRLA through the courts, 
culminating in the release of Bond’s plan through the Federal Register in 1980, an action 
intended to emphasize the Administrator’s determination.39 Bond’s anti-union preparations 
readied the battlefield for the opening cannonade of the Reagan administration’s attacks on 
organized labor. Likewise, AFL-CIO President George Meany held bitter feelings toward 
Carter for the failure of the Labor Reform Act of 1978 and the administration further 
deteriorated its relationship with organized labor by deregulating the Trucking and Airline 
industries.40 
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 Amidst Kirkland’s succession of Meany, the OCAW saw a change in leadership as 
well. In 1979, two years after OCAW members elected Mazzocchi as Vice President of their 
union, the union’s President Alvin F. Grospiron retired.41 Mazzochi would run to succeed 
him in 1979 and again in 1981, losing both times by a narrow margin.42 While it is 
unnecessary to go into great detail on Mazzocchi’s two bids for the presidency of the 
OCAW, two points are relevant to the Labor Party’s development, one of which may have 
even played a role in its downfall. First, Mazzocchi showed a high degree of foresight in his 
1979 campaign, warning “that the 1980s were going to ‘come at us like a freight train,’ and 
that the union needed to transform itself by building new alliances and griding up for a 
fight,” a point his opponent Robert Goss ridiculed him on.43 Additionally, Les Leopold notes 
that Mazzocchi butted heads frequently with OCAW member Bob Wages, notably not asking 
him for support in the 1979 race. A rather rough associate of Mazzochi’s instead asked for 
the endorsement in what Wages described as “New York Italian $#!^” something which may 
have contributed to Wages support for Goss in the presidential elections. Between personal 
tensions, and not sharing a similar vision of militant, anti-corporate unionism, the gulf 
between Wages and Mazzocchi would widen, causing problems down the road when the 
former became president and merged the OCAW with the United Paperworkers International 
Union to form the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International 
Union (PACE).44 While the merger, which dealt a serious financial blow to the Labor Party, 
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would not occur until 1999, the roots of Mazzocchi’s vision, but also his party’s collapse can 
be traced to his comments on the 1979 and 1981 elections. 
  Of the two contestants for president of the OCAW, events proved Mazzocchi right 
by the time of the second presidential election he participated in. Just as Carter had managed 
to succeed Gerald Ford on a wave of anti-Nixon sentiment, Ronald Reagan’s election 
campaign benefited from a tsunami of anti-Carter sentiment after the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution and the resulting Oil and Hostage crises. In addition to winning the Electoral 
College with 489 votes, Reagan decisively defeated Carter in the Popular Vote by a margin 
of 9.7%.45 Despite being a Republican Candidate, Reagan managed to garner a surprising 
amount of support from organized labor. On October 9th, 1980 the National Maritime Union 
became the first AFL-CIO affiliate to endorse Reagan for president, shortly after the 
unaffiliated International Brotherhood of Teamsters did so. Members of the NMU were 
quoted in the press, justifying the decision on an explicitly anti-Carter basis, with one 
member telling the United Press International “Go to any of our union halls along the 
coasts and you will see why we are for Ronald Reagan. It is a matter of jobs, Carter 
didn't come through with anything but promises, promises, nothing but promises.”46 In 
protest of Carter’s appointment of Langhorne F. Bond to head the FAA, PATCO also 
threw its endorsement behind Reagan, “receiving in return a letter endorsing an efficient 
control system and fairly compensated controllers, but making no mention of strike 
support,” from the candidate.47 Raegan also found popularity among the building trades, 
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apparently “alienated” by the civil rights movement and “attracted by the Republicans’ 
stronger stance on national security and moral issues.”48 With the labor movement split 
over the 1980 elections, Lane Kirkland publicly stated his intent to work with the new 
President, but with landslide popular support giving Raegan a sort of mandate of heaven, 
the AFL-CIO leaders found themselves shut out of the White House even before the 
disastrous PATCO strike took place.49 
 The real devastation of the Reagan-Bush years came with the presidential 
response to striking air traffic controllers in 1981. Their union, the PATCO, had been 
known since the late 1960s for its militancy, and under the Carter administration they 
made a push to privatize the Federal Aviation Administration, along the lines of the U.S. 
Postal Service, in hopes of achieving “wage determination on a private sector model” 
rather than through acts of Congress.50 With what seemed like the support of President 
Raegan after a period of rough relations with Carter, thirteen-thousand PATCO workers 
walked out on strike on August 3rd, 1980 without prior notice to the AFL-CIO 
leadership. Raegan acted without mercy against his former supporters, demanding a 
return to work within forty-eight hours and firing the 11,345 workers who remained on 
strike after ten days.51 This demonstrated an important lesson for unions at the time, 
even with dissatisfying—and at times hostile—Democratic administrations in power, 
organized labor would not find a home in the Republican Party as a means of protest.52 
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 The reaction of the AFL-CIO to PATCO and their effort to organize Solidarity 
Day in its wake has been well covered by labor historian Timothy J. Minchin in both 
Labor Under Fire and an earlier article on which the third chapter of his book was 
based. The idea for a mass protest against Reagan took root as early as May of 1981, and 
sprouted in early August of the same year, taking on a greater sense of urgency and 
received broad support of about one-hundred non-labor groups following the crushing of 
the PATCO strike.53 At least 260,000 to 500,00 demonstrators took part in Solidarity 
Day on September 19th, 1980, making it one of the biggest protests in U.S. history, but 
as Minchin notes, the “organizers were struggling to articulate a clear program,” due to 
the variety of groups sponsoring it outside of organized labor. Additionally, Reagan’s 
cuts to taxes and social services had been passed prior to the march, meaning the march 
did little to mitigate the administration’s economic austerity.54 Minchin briefly 
acknowledges that “some reformers were disappointed that more was not done to build 
on the momentum of this remarkable day,” but fails to develop this point, leaving a 
footnote citing an interview with Lane Kirkland’s eventual successor, John Sweeney of 
the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). Among the critical reformers, and 
one whom Minchin did not cite, was Tony Mazzocchi. Les Leopold writes that labor 
leaders used the event to funnel working class support into the Democratic Party for the 
1982 mid-terms, recalling a slogan “The next Solidarity Day is Election Day.” 
Furthermore, he quotes Mazzocchi remembering the event: 
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“It was the first time in years where we [the AFL-CIO] reached out to our rank-
and-file. And although we characterized them as being apathetic, they 
responded—850,000 working people marched to Washington. We stared Ronald 
Reagan in the eye, and our trade union leadership blinked. We went in with a 
bang and left with a whimper.”55 
Where Mazzocchi got his Solidarity Day numbers is a mystery, as they grossly overestimate 
the size of the crowd, but his quote highlights the development of his outlook on electoral 
politics.56 After decades spent lobbying in Washington, Mazzocchi became tired of pulling 
punches to appease members of the Democratic Party. Under the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan 
administrations it became increasingly clear that a new sort of politics would be needed if 
unions were going to start winning. During the 1980s, the need for political independence 
grew clear to Mazzocchi, just as calls for a Labor Party were growing from more radical 
sections of the labor movement. 
Introducing Labor Militant 
 The group which would become Socialist Alternative would go by two other names 
over the course of the 1980s before determining the new period going into the 21st Century 
would require a new look. The origins of Socialist Alternative lie in the Committee for a 
Workers’ International, an international Trotskyist tendency centered around the entryist 
grouping that published the Militant newspaper and organized within the ranks of the Labour 
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Party in the United Kingdom. Critics within the Labour Party argued the Militant Tendency’s 
“philosophy descends directly from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, and virtually nobody 
else,” and while such remarks were made with a good deal of snark, they had a certain 
amount of truth to them.57 In the post-War period, when its founders argued that Trotskyism 
internationally had moved away from the working class, “Militant set its sights in the first 
instance on the more conscious, politically aware sections of the working class,” or the “salt 
of the earth” as founding member Peter Taffe put it.58 At some point following the 
foundation of the Committee for a Workers’ International (CWI) in April 1974, with forty-
six members from twelve countries in attendance, a number of the tendency’s supporters 
found their way to the U.S., including John Throne, a former member of the CWI’s Irish 
section.59 History on the U.S. section of the CWI is generally scarce, but at some point in the 
early 1980s CWI affiliated immigrants to the U.S. and local contacts coalesced into a 
formation known as the Labor and Trade Union Group, with approximately three members in 
Oakland, CA by 1984 along with additional members in Seattle, Chicago, New York, and 
Boston. Although the name had apparently been used earlier, the group officially launched its 
newspaper Labor Militant and adopted the title as its name in 1986.60 Being in political 
solidarity with the Militant Tendency, which by the 1980s had elected a number of 
councilors and Members of Parliament on the Labour Party ballot line in the U.K., one of the 
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key demands made by members of Labor Militant was for the creation of a worker’s party in 
the United States.61 
By the spring of 1989, Labor Militant had published its twelfth issue, for the first 
time featuring an article concretely calling for readers to support an initiative for building a 
labor party in the U.S. The paper’s centerfold features the announcement of a “Campaign for 
a Labor Party” (CLP) launched by CWI supporters in New York City. The themes discussed 
in Mazzocchi’s work can be found in this first article, including criticisms of both the Carter 
administration and the Reagan-Bush administration, importantly touching on the aftermath of 
the PATCO strike in the process. The author of the article, writing under the pseudonym 
Alan Jones, even goes so far as to quote an unspecified article on the need for a Labor Party 
written by Les Leopold, although neither supported the CLP at the time.62 After discussing 
contemporary austerity and dipping into history with a brief biography of Eugene V. Debs, 
the article concludes saying that “Steps have already been taken in New York City by union 
activists and youth to mobilize the labor movement in the City to put up a labor candidate in 
the mayoral and city government elections later this year.” Finally, the article advertises a 
conference to be held on May 13th from 11AM to 5PM with demands to “Kick out Koch” 
and “For the AFL-CIO to build a Labor Party.”63 
  Despite the call for a conference featuring a quote from Tony Mazzocchi, the OCAW 
leader and his supporters are absent from the featured speakers list for the event. Among the 
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figures headlining the NYC CLP conference were Bernard Sanders, at this point an 
independent “Socialist Mayor of Burlington VT,” Labour MP and Militant supporter Terry 
Fields from Liverpool, and Stephen Pybus, the President of Calgary McCall Constituency in 
Canada and a member of the New Democratic Party.64 Based on a retrospective article on the 
Labor Party published by a former Labor Militant member, “Tony Mazzocchi was invited to 
speak, but he declined, as he was only willing to speak on platforms which had a union local 
or higher labor body endorse the meeting.”65 Despite the lack of support from OCAW 
leadership moving in a direction favorable to a Labor Party, the meeting went ahead with 
moderate success. Labor Militant’s next issue reported “close to a hundred trade unionists 
and student delegates” at the event. The report highlights two CWI slogans from Terry 
Fields’ contribution, calling for a Labor Party to run “workers’ candidates on a workers’ 
wage” and “educate, agitate, and org-anize.” Additional participants mentioned in the report 
included a member of the Air Line Pilots Association International from Eastern Airlines 
who had just entered the 71st day of a strike, a student from Boston, a worker from 
Philadelphia, and a woman named Vinita Seward who met Eugene Debs as a kid. The report, 
again written by Alan Jones, concluded with calls to “Build the CLP!” by getting union, 
tenant, and student organizations involved and for rank-and-file members to call on labor 
leaders to join the campaign.66 
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 Although in some periods of history, Trotskyists calling to form a workers’ party may 
have been taken as a pie in the sky effort, in the context of the late 1980s such an idea 
seemed possible. April 5th,1989 to February 20th, 1990 saw an exceptionally militant strike in 
Pennsylvania against the Pittston Coal Company, involving nearly two thousand Pittston 
employees and some forty-four thousand workers across Appalachia conducting wild cat 
strikes, acts of civil disobedience, and even outright sabotage against the coal company. 
Within the first six months of the strike, 3,700 strikers and supporters were arrested and the 
United Mine Workers Association (UMWA) and Pittston Coal company broke records by 
generating some 600 National Board of Labor Relations complaints against one another.67 
With the strike still ongoing in November of 1989, the union “prodded” Jackie Stump into 
launching an independent write in campaign for the Virginia General Assembly. Stump, who 
had been held in jail for three weeks due to civil disobedience over the course of the strike, 
won against incumbent Democrat Donald A. McGlothin Sr. with a landslide “two to one 
ratio” of votes.68 Although Labor Militant launched the Campaign for a Labor Party in New 
York when the Pittston strike was still in its early stages, the results of the strike proved their 
perspective that workers could run and win on independent ballot lines, echoing and 
exceeding the electoral gains made by “Labor Party” candidates in the 1870s and 1880s, who 
received 31% of the vote in New York City in that period.69 The success of the Pittston Coal 
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Strikers electorally, even with their strike still raging, set the tone for a second Campaign for 
a Labor Party convention to be held in Oakland, California in December, 1989. 
 The CLP conference in Oakland represented a point of convergence between the pro-
labor party elements of the OCAW and the more radical pro-labor party current represented 
by Labor Militant and adjacent figures. In contrast to the New York City convention, which 
failed to attract the endorsement of a union local and primarily saw participation by trade 
union activists, Labor Militant had sunk roots in the American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Local 444 and managed to win the union’s 
endorsement of the CLP Conference.70 Following this, the International Longshoreman and 
Warehouse Union Local 6 sent a letter endorsing the conference.71 Former Labor Militant 
member Richard Mellor held leadership positions in the local and actively participated in 
AFSCME from 1980 to 1996. Through Local 444, Labor Militant participated in numerous 
struggles in the Bay Area, participating in anti-police brutality protests surrounding the 
Rodney King verdict and organizing the local labor movement to support the “Free Dewayne 
Holmes” campaign in solidarity with the arrested former gang leader who organized a truce 
between Bloods and Crips in the verdict’s aftermath.72 Before Labor Militant’s anti-racist 
activity in the early 1990s, Mellor had been on the negotiating team for Local 444 thirty-one 
day strike in 1985 by “plumbers, wastewater treatment operators and other workers” at the 
East Bay Municipal Utilities District. According to AFSCME, the strike had been organized 
to oppose a policy change forcing “plumbers to report to job sites with their personal vehicles 
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instead of work trucks” which came as a “money saving” measure following a group of 
Black employees suing the water district for discrimination and ended in a reversal of the 
new policy.73 By winning the trust of unionized workers through class and anti-racist 
struggle, Labor Militant supporters granted a sense of legitimacy to the CLP which would 
finally attract Tony Mazzochi to their efforts. 
The Oakland Meeting and the Road to Labor Party Advocates 
 By the late 1980s, Mazzocchi had made some headway in his effort towards a Labor 
Party in his own Union. As early as 1979, Mazzocchi had begun polling workers about 
support for a labor party through the Labor Institute, lacking the material support from 
OCAW to conduct such a poll there. With the help of Mark Dudzic, the poll eventually 
reached about 1.5% of OCAW workers, drawn from lunchrooms rather than union halls to 
mitigate the bias of more active members, with 53% of participants reporting they would 
support a new labor party.74 As of 1988, Mazzocchi finally found a means of obtaining the 
OCAW’s financial backing, being elected to the position of Secretary Treasurer, with Bob 
Wages adopting a militant program and entertaining the idea.75 Initially, the Mazzocchi 
grouping focused on educational outreach; conducting polls, developing written materials 
that would later form the Corporate Power and the American Dream curriculum, and 
circulating a cartoon based on a recording of former New Democratic Party leader Tommy 
Douglass’ Mouseland speech.76 In addition, the loose grouping centered around the OCAW 
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contacted various union leaders and spoke at meetings to garner support for a labor party 
project. 
 On December 12th, 1989, Mazzocchi came to Oakland to speak at a conference 
organized by the CLP and AFSCME Local 444. Based on a recording, the meeting lasted just 
over two hours, with the Local’s president, Marvin Cain, introducing the meeting, followed 
by a brief contribution by Labor Militant member Richard Mellor, a thirty-minute speech by 
Tony Mazzocchi, about an hour of discussion from attendees, and Mazzocchi returning to the 
mic for closing remarks.77 According to one Labor Militant member’s account “Though he 
[Mazzocchi] thought there would be a weak turnout, he was surprised and enthused when more 
than 100 people attended the meeting, and there was complete support for the idea of a labor 
party.”78 Mellor recalled Mazzocchi telling the meeting’s organizers later that the success of the 
event spurred him to take the next step in his existing effort and form Labor Party Advocates, a 
story corroborated by other former Labor Militant members.79 
 The content of the meeting is worth briefly examining, as it demonstrates early on some of 
the tensions which would arise following the Labor Party’s foundation in 1996 and some of the 
themes in Mazzocchi’s thinking and public speaking. Firstly, Mazzocchi explicitly identifies his 
plan for building the Labor Party through “a series of public speaking engagements to identify 
people in organized labor who would be interested in setting up an interim charter situation and 
ultimately work toward a convention where a party would be formulated and where a program 
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would begin to be developed.”80 This point came up in response to an audience question about 
Mazzocchi being quoted in the Guardian discussing his strategy for building a Labor Party. A later 
exchange in the discussion portion of the meeting saw member of Painters Local 4 and socialist Joe 
Ryan question Mazzocci’s strategy, stating: 
“I think the only way for even something that’s the beginning of a movement on a 
local level to be addressed seriously and to be taken seriously by working people is to 
run for office and by running for office of course you have to formulate a program, 
and I was a bit disturbed, and that’s my question, is that why do you preclude from 
the beginning that we will not be an electoral organization at first?”81 
To which Mazzochi passionately fired back: 
“My experience tells me that organizing a body is a formidable task. It’s a serious 
task, and you just can’t form a party over night and run for elections. The whole 
history of third party movements in this country that are built around the electoral 
process is losing an election and the party collapses.”82 
Ryan, likely a member of Labor Militant, represents the view expressed in articles on the 
Campaign for a Labor Party, arguing for running candidates, a view which would carry on 
into their intervention in the Labor Party in the 1990s.83 Mazzocchi, stands his ground in the 
exchange, mirroring later arguments that his successors would make about the failure of the 
Green Party.84 Despite heated moments like this, it seems the meeting epitomized 
Mazzochi’s stance that a Labor Party would require open debate and the working out of a 
 
80 Afscme 444, Tony Mazzochi Labor Party Meeting 1989 Full Movie, 0:59:30-0:59:47. 
81 Ibid, 1:10:13-1:10:35. 
82 Ibid, 1:11:12-11:11:22. 
83 Alan Jones, “Campaign for a Labor Party Launched in New York City,” Labor Militant. 
84 Seidman and Dudzic, “Looking Back,” 15-16. 
 Bilsky 31 
program through democratic means, and Mazzocchi likely enjoyed dealing with constructive, 
dissenting criticisms like Ryan’s in this period.85 Mazzocchi’s opening remarks also reflected 
broader themes that appear elsewhere in his work and speaking. At one point he recalls 
“organizing over the garden fence” when he was growing up, a quip he used frequently to 
demonstrate the ubiquity of class consciousness and union support in the community from 
1934 through the 1950s.86 Mazzocchi also comments on corporate control of the media and 
the need for a Labor Party to have an independent voice and press on at least two occasions.87 
Going into the 1990s this point would be featured in the middle of The Labor Institute’s 
Corporate Power and the American Dream curriculum, in a section titled “Corporate Control 
of the Media and Politics.88 
 While it cannot be said for certain if the 1989 CLP meeting in Oakland was the 
impetus for the formation of Labor Party Advocates, the meeting’s success likely helped in 
moving Mazzocchi towards a founding conference. Around the same time as the Oakland 
meeting, the CLP had grown considerably, with the Winter 1989-1990 issue of Labor 
Militant reporting branches in Philadelphia, Seattle, Chicago, Columbus, and a newly formed 
branch in Boston.89 Many of these CLP branches would pool their forces with local union 
activists to form the basis for chapters of Labor Party Advocates. Other factors also played a 
role in the founding of LPA, including favorable polling on the Labor Party Question from 
members of the OCAW, and the rise of struggles for racial justice during the early 1980s. 
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Black Workers for Justice and the Farm Labor Organizing Committee 
 Although the fight for racial justice and a diverse trade union leadership would 
become defining features of the “New Voice” slate’s challenge to the Lane Kirkland 
administration in the AFL-CIO in the early 1990s, a revitalized anti-racist movement within 
the trade unions picked up much earlier. To his credit, Kirkland made efforts to correct 
discriminatory practices in the AFL-CIO which ossified under George Meany, working 
closely with leaders from the Civil Rights movement like Benjamin Hooks, Bayard Rustin, 
and Coretta Scott King to plan the Solidarity Day demonstration in 1981.90 That being said, 
real change in the movement came not from the top down from the bottom up, with a number 
of important struggles being waged by Workers of Color in the early 1980s. In North 
Carolina, the organization Black Workers for Justice (BWFJ) emerged in 1982 when a group 
of Black cleaning women employed by K-Mart in the Rocky Mount area “were being 
sexually harassed, discriminated against in promotions, and the hiring record was pitiful.” 
They would first form the organization K-Mart Workers for Justice, which later sought to 
broaden its horizons and organize Black workers across the Southern U.S.91 At the height of 
its unionization efforts from the 1925 to 1945, the Council of Industrial Organizations 
launched a major campaign to organize textile workers in the Southern states, known as 
“Operation Dixie.” By the effort’s close in 1953, no more Southern workers found 
themselves unionized than when the operation began, and the CIO’s earlier labor militancy 
had died down, culminating in a final shift toward business unionism in 1956 during its 
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merger with the more conservative American Federation of Labor.92 The failure of Operation 
Dixie cast a long shadow over union organizing in the South, with labor historian Barbara 
Griffith concluding “For American labor, Operation Dixie was, quite simply, a moment of 
high tragedy from which it has yet to fully recover,” in her study of the effort.93 In this 
context groups like Black Workers for Justice sought to fill a void in union organizing that 
had been left since the CIO’s failure, “building a national solidarity movement around 
organizing the South,” beginning in 1989.94 The organization combined “rank-and-file-
unionism” with community activism to build its campaigns, entering the political arena long 
before the Labor Party got started through organizing a “candidate screening process” to find 
candidates supportive of their efforts and campaign for them. This effort led to the election of 
candidates supporting BWFJ in the municipalities of Durham, Rocky Mount, Shiloh, and 
Morrisville.95 In the process of their work BWFJ developed a unique take on building 
minority unions, or unions unrecognized by the National Labor Relations Board which only 
hold sway with a portion of employees in a worker place, rebranding these organizing bodies 
as “non-majority unions” to avoid them being perceived as “racial minority unions.”96 The 
efforts of Black Workers For Justice in the early 1980s foreshadowed the kind of militant 
trade unionism which would see a revival in the 1990s and make the Labor Party and the 
victory of the “New Voice” slate in the AFL-CIO possible. 
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 In the same decade, the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) launched a 
campaign to unionize mostly Latino migrant farm laborers at farms contracted by Campbell’s 
Soup Company. Although founded by Baldemar Velasquez in 1967, the union until the 
1980s had remained fairly small, with the success of their effort at Campbell’s being a 
turning point for its growth. The campaign, which aimed to pressure Campbell’s into 
entering “three-way contract negotiations with growers in the Middle West” and workers 
represented by FLOC began in earnest in 1968.97 According to the New York Times, FLOC’s 
effort drew criticism from both the company and the union leadership of the United Food and 
Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW). In 1984, Velasquez had set a goal for the 
unionization effort, increasing pressure over the summer and saying, “his organization, which 
reported it had 3,500 members, including 1,500 dues payers, would add 2,000 members.”98 
After more than a decade of struggle, the union finally brought Campbell’s to the negotiating 
table, reaching an agreement which included “provisions for wage increases, medical 
insurance and paid holidays for 550 migrant workers who pick tomatoes and cucumbers.”99 
According to Les Leopold, by the 1990s “with 5,000 members, FLOC became a political 
force in Toledo, Ohio.”100 Like BWFJ, FLOC had combined the methods of militant 
unionism which challenged union bureaucracy, social justice activism, and political action to 
organize marginalized workers. Both organizations would endorse Labor Party Advocates, 
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and their leaders would become delegates at the founding convention of the Labor Party in 
1996. 
The Founding of LPA 
 The late 1980s represented a turning point for Mazzocchi’s Labor Party efforts. 
Union militancy and activism was again on the rise, despite the fallout of the PATCO strike 
in 1981, and socialist groups like Labor Militant had begun to concretely organize 
communities and union locals around the prospect of a worker’s party through the Campaign 
for a Labor Party. In addition, Mazzocchi’s polling efforts had yielded results favorable to 
forming a labor party, in the process revealing a split between “full-time OCAW officers and 
staff” and the union’s rank-and-file membership, with union staffers showing significantly 
more support for the Democrats and opposition to a Labor party.101 While union bureaucrats 
may have still been content to support the Democrats, the workers they represented showed a 
growing tendency toward independent political action. 
The early 1990s saw the stars further align for the creation of a Labor Party, with Bob 
Wages committing OCAW time, connections, and resources to a labor party effort and 
granting Mazzocchi the opportunity to step down as Secretary Treasurer to organize it. By 
1991, Labor Party Advocates was officially run by Mazzocchi and an interim leadership, 
with endorsements from the OCAW, the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of 
America, and the Pennsylvania Federation of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way 
Employees. 1992 would see 300 participants gather for an educational conference hosted in 
Ohio.102 The Labor Party Advocates finally saw the first official meeting of its Interim 
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Steering Committee in 1993, with “80 union leaders” representing “half a million workers” 
convening in Chicago.103 Within three years, amidst shocking changes in the AFL-CIO and 
the state of U.S. international trade, this grouping would host its founding convention. Over 
the first half of the decade, LPA would provide a basis for Mazzocchi’s labor party effort to 
educate and recruit trade union activists, enabling it to grow rapidly as the newly elected 
Clinton Administration changed the playing field for organized labor and caused even the top 
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Chapter Two: Dropping the “Advocates,” 1991-1996 
 With the formation of Labor Party Advocates (LPA) in 1991, the effort to build a 
labor party was well on its way. Primary documentation on the LPA is scarce online, unlike 
the Labor Party Press, which remains accessible through the Internet Archive’s Wayback 
Machine. The most thorough and publicly available documentation of the Labor Party 
Advocates exists in physical form in the Theresa El-Amin Papers at Duke University in 
North Carolina.104 Retrospective discussions of the Labor Party tend to gloss of the Labor 
Party Advocates, yet also speak of the formation with a degree of nostalgia, with Dudzic and 
Isaac writing “In retrospect, it may well have been wiser to secure support more significant 
support from the labor movement, retaining a looser, Labor Party Advocates structure rather 
than the raised expectations of a formal party,” with Adolph Reed Jr. half entertaining this 
sentiment in a later article, but also stating “It isn’t clear what would have happened if we 
hadn’t called the convention when we did.”105 Despite a general lack of readily available 
source material, the history of the LPA must figure into any thorough analysis of the Labor 
Party. Thankfully, articles concerning the LPA from Against the Current, the journal of the 
socialist organization Solidarity, cover some of the gaps in official in the five-year period 
from the foundation of LPA to the foundation of the Labor Party. Furthermore, the 
independent television news outlet Labor Beat filmed parts of the final days of Labor Party 
Advocates, represented by the 1996 Convention, and interviewed several participants, 
providing some details of the founding convention in lieu of the resolutions presented.  
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As discussed previously, the Labor Party’s foundation must be contextualized in a 
broader history of the U.S. labor movement, and the trajectory of the early 1990s could have 
turned out very differently depending on the interaction of the AFL-CIO with electoral 
politics and the Clinton Administration. Whereas the AFL-CIO under Kirkland was 
staunchly pro-Democrat, cracks in the federation’s working relationship with the Clinton 
administration began to form after the passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in 1993, culminating in the “New Voice” slate publicly challenging and defeating 
the Kirkland AFL-CIO in 1995. Alongside a renewed sense of union activism, militant strike 
action, and the further weakening of anti-socialist sentiment in organized labor—the latter of 
which began as early as the Kirkland years—conditions aligned for the Labor Party 
Advocates to go a step further and drop the “A” in their initials. While the 1996 convention 
represented a high point for debate within the Labor Party and showcased great optimism for 
the coming period, it also brought tensions over how to build a party to the surface. 
Unfortunately, despite the party’s commitment to open debate, its democratic process 
favored international unions over smaller locals and community groups. While this may have 
been more democratic in the sense of membership represented by the internationals, in 
practice such unions would become the Labor Party’s weakest links. Likewise, important 
tensions would come up in the process of founding the Labor Party, as the unified 
commitment to economic justice and labor solidarity did not always translate to agreement 
on social issues, particularly at points when the interests of socially conservative leaders 
representing immigrant workers clashed with feminist elements of the Labor Party. While 
spirits may have been high at the time of the party’s founding, and some questions of 
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program were resolved—at least on the surface—fault lines were already developing which 
would spell doom for the Labor Party once conditions changed.  
The Reformation Betrayed: Clinton and the AFL-CIO from 1992-1994 
 Although the relationship between organized labor and the Democratic Party was 
already strained as early as the Carter Administration, after more than a decade of Ronald 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush’s anti-labor policies, AFL-CIO leadership were more than 
willing to support the Democrats in the 1992 elections. The intervention of the AFL-CIO on 
behalf of the Clinton campaign demonstrated the political power of unions, confirming a 
point often made by LPA founder Mike Dudzic that: “unions had to be at the core. As the 
only institutions with the resources and the capacity to implement a broad political strategy, 
no viable party can exist without the support and participation of a significant percentage of 
the national labor movement.”106 Seeking a “new start” after the Bush and Reagan years, the 
AFL-CIO called for its membership to vote on a resolution to endorse Bill Clinton in the 
presidential election, and 99.81% of over thirteen million votes were in favor.107 With 
104,426,611 votes cast in the 1992 election, if every union member who voted Clinton in the 
AFL-CIO endorsement vote cast their ballot in the general election, they would account for 
at least 12.5% of the popular vote.108 In discussing the elections, the AFL-CIO news even 
credited the union vote with deciding “the election in eleven battleground states, including 
Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio.”109 Counting just electoral votes, and not the financial 
resources and manpower of the AFL-CIO, organized labor represented—and even after 
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further decline likely still represents—a significant political force in the United States. 
Unfortunately, while the Clinton victory may have demonstrated the power of unions in 
electoral politics, his administration would disappoint after entering the White House. 
The Clinton administration failed to live up to its promises for union leaders which 
weakened its support from the labor movement. In addition to promises of implementing fair 
trade policies in the face of the outgoing Bush administration’s version of NAFTA, the AFL-
CIO endorsed Clinton and Gore on the grounds that they would deliver “health care and 
workplace fairness legislation.”110 Former Labor Party leaders frequently cite the North 
American Free Trade Agreement as a major factor contributing to what has been described as 
“the Labor Party moment.” Signed into law by Clinton on December 8th, 1993 with the 
support of Vice President Al Gore, to many union members NAFTA represented “the first of 
many trade agreements that implemented a globalization program that enriched a global elite 
at the expense of workers everywhere,” reigniting “a growing fury” among organized 
workers against the Democratic Party.111 Although NAFTA promised more jobs, better labor 
standards, and fair trade, AFL-CIO leaders were critical of the Agreement’s lack of 
enforcement mechanisms and recognition of the right to strike, and worried it would lead to 
further deindustrialization and the outsourcing of jobs which weakened U.S. unions.112 
Kirkland’s AFL-CIO managed to launch a “grassroots mobilization” of its membership 
against NAFTA, even managing to sway Congress against the bill for a time, but boots on the 
ground weren’t enough to defeat pro-NAFTA corporate interests outspending the federation 
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by a proportion of three-to-one.113 The North American Free Trade Agreement represented 
the first in a long line of “bilateral agreements with low wage countries” which unions would 
lobby against, but fail to prevent, in the long run resulting in the further erosion of organized 
labor’s ability to strike and the reinforcement of a trend toward concessionary bargaining.114 
However, despite NAFTA weakening unions in the long run, in the short term it spawned a 
period of heightened labor militancy, alongside other factors bubbling under the surface since 
the 1980s and early 1990s. 
 Following the passage of NAFTA, the labor movement still held out hope for 
healthcare reform. Months before the passage of the trade agreement, President Clinton 
announced his healthcare plan on September twenty-second, 1993. Although the Clinton 
Administration’s proposal did not abolish private insurance or healthcare, it attempted to 
curry favor with the labor movement by “Meeting the AFL-CIO’s long-held goal of universal 
coverage,” through the federal government paying for uninsured citizens. To show their 
support of the bill, the AFL-CIO would launch a “grassroots public relations campaign” to 
raise approval ratings for its passage.115 Just over a year later, despite “excited hopes,” the 
New York Times reported “After the legislation had staggered under its own weight and the 
withering attacks of Republicans and insurance interests for months, Senator George J. 
Mitchell, the majority leader, bowed to the inevitable and announced that Congress would 
not pursue the issue any further this year.”116 Despite the Executive branch’s support for 
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healthcare reform, the Democratic Party proved to be too big of a tent to win any form of 
healthcare reform, even before Republican interference came into play. As Mark E. 
Rushefsky and Kant Patel noted “Some conservative Democrats were against the whole idea 
and other less conservative Democrats supported a modest proposal, with few if any 
mandatory features… On the left were liberals who supported a single-payer plan. No one in 
either house was able to put together a bill that could produce a majority.”117 The Democratic 
Party’s lack of ability to unify and pass reform further discredited it in the wake of NAFTA, 
begging the question of if the big tent could not pass mild reform, was it time to build a 
smaller, but ideologically more coherent alternative which could fight for the change 
organized labor wanted? The failures of the Clinton administration would play into a 
Republican victory in the 1994 midterm elections, described at the time as the “Reagan 
Revolution Redux,” while also opening the door for workers to consider an alternative to 
both the friendly austerity of the Democrats and the rabidly anti-labor policies of their 
counter parts.118 
Building Labor Party Advocates, 1991-1994 
 As discussed in the last chapter, the Labor Party Advocates became active in 1991 
after OCAW president Bob Wages allowed Tony Mazzocchi to step down as secretary 
treasurer and organize for the Labor Party full time, with the Interim Steering Committee not 
convening until 1993, when 80 union leaders met in Chicago. Compared to what would 
become the Labor Party, the LPA was a much smaller, looser formation, with a more 
centralized leadership by merit of its size, but a lack of coherent program or structures. It 
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tended to play an educational role, rather than an electoral or activist role in the labor 
movement, with its primary function seeming to be the publication of a newsletter edited by 
“veteran activist” Bob Kasen and other educational materials while organizers signed 
workers up to join the movement to form a labor party.119 Although penning a 
comprehensive history of the LPA is impossible without access to the formation’s documents 
and newsletters, Dudzic and Isaac cover the broad strokes of its development in the essay 
“Labor Party Time? Not Yet” and a contemporary speech from Mazzocchi, along with 
interviews from other participants, reveal the goals and methods of the LPA in some detail. 
 Shortly after the founding of Labor Party Advocates in 1991, Mazzocchi’s party-
building effort received some press in Against the Current, the bi-monthly journal of 
Solidarity, a multi-tendency revolutionary socialist organization founded in 1986. The July-
August issue from 1992 included speeches from Tony Mazzocchi and Peace and Freedom 
Party presidential candidate Ron Daniels, preceded by coverage of protests against police 
brutality and racism on the West Coast.120 In a “hot room” in the summer of 1992, both men 
addressed a meeting of the Community Labor Forum in Philadelphia on the subject of 
independent politics.121 Mazzocchi’s contribution at the meeting detailed his approach to 
building a labor party and the kind of organizing LPA was engaged in immediately after its 
founding. After a humorous anecdote about the survey of OCAW members he conducted in 
1989, Mazzocchi listed a series of targets to meet for adopting a formal party structure. 
Whereas figures like Les Leopold and Mark Dudzic often questioned if the Labor Party’s 
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founding convention in 1996 was premature, it appears that the LPA delayed the convention 
if anything, with Mazzocchi in 1992 citing 1993 or 1994 as a target date to recruit 100,000 
members and form a party. Mazzocchi also highlights the loose standards for membership 
and lack of LPA structures, calling himself “not the ‘leader’ of Labor Party Advocates, I’m 
one of the organizers, as anyone can be,” and stating that “We don’t exist yet; we’re an 
organizing drive.” In essence, anyone interested in building a labor party could join LPA if 
they agreed to pay dues of $20 a year.122 The “organizing drive” metaphor, referring to the 
process by which employees in a workplace make a concerted effort to talk to their 
coworkers and form a union, survives in more recent retrospective works, highlighting the 
role LPA played as an educational force with the goal of building “trust, unity, and tolerance 
around the core issues of class and power first.”123 
 Elsewhere in his speech, Tony Mazzocchi brought up the diversity of membership in 
Labor Party Advocates, in regard to members political activity, noting “We have LPA people 
who are involved in the NOW efforts, the efforts of Ron Daniels and others. There are also 
people involved in the existing political configurations, which isn’t the choice of many of 
us.”124 While the former candidate and organization listed by Mazzocchi were independent 
political efforts, his latter reference to “the existing political configurations” implies that a 
portion, possibly a minority, of LPA members were engaged in Bill Clinton’s presidential 
campaign at the time. Such members would likely have been represented by union leadership 
which had endorsed the LPA, but were unwilling to back independent candidates until a 
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hypothetical point when such candidates would be viable, continuing to support the 
Democratic Party in the meantime. When and whether to support independent candidates 
would become a central contention at the 1996 and 1998 Labor Party conventions. In the 
category of LPA members involved in independent political formations would fall 
individuals like Jeff Booth and his comrades in Labor Militant and the Campaign for a Labor 
Party. Although a CLP chapter had been formed in the Boston area as early as 1989, it would 
soon merge with the LPA.125 Booth recalls Mazzocchi putting out a call to join the LPA and 
in 1991 “taking them up on that offer” by writing to or calling the national office. According 
to Booth “You just joined, and you could start a Labor Party Advocates chapter, and we did 
that, and there was a good response. So, we pulled a group of people beyond Labor Militant 
together into an early Labor Party Advocates chapter.” The Boston Chapter of LPA 
specifically had recruited nearly one hundred members on paper and was capable of regularly 
turning out forty to monthly meetings.126 Les Leopold, in a rather polemical rant against left-
wing “sectarians” in his biography of Mazzocchi seems to have taken notice of Labor 
Militant in particular, referring to it as one of the “more sophisticated sects with ties to 
current leftist tendencies in England and Ireland,” which joined the Labor Party. In trying to 
chastise Labor Militant and other socialist groups interested in the Labor Party, Leopold 
characterizes them as lacking numbers, specifically noting the Bay Area and New York, 
where two CLP conferences were initiated by Labor Militant members, one of which 
Mazzocchi even spoke at.127 In writing this, Leopold failed to consider that those he labeled 
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“sectarians,” a term originally used described to describe violence and discrimination on the 
between groups of differing religious identity but more recently applied to leftist “sects” 
isolated from the working class and unwilling to work with other groups, is that in the 
process of founding chapters such groups often attracted union locals and organized workers 
to the LPA, and would go on to help form relatively successful chapters, such as those in the 
Boston area. 
In addition to attracting the attention of socialists from Labor Militant and Solidarity, 
several other revolutionary socialist groups latched on to Labor Party Advocates. Leopold 
notes the presence of various groups descended from Joseph Stalin’s synthesis of “Marxism-
Leninism,” including Maoists (probably including the somewhat underground organization 
Freedom Road), ex-Communist Party USA members, and supporters of Albanian communist 
leader Enver Hoxha.128 Likewise, the Bolshevik-Leninist current descended from Leon 
Trotsky saw widespread representation beyond Labor Militant and Solidarity, through 
organizations like Socialist Organizer, the Rhode Island Branch of the International Socialist 
Organization, and the Bulletin In Defense of Marxism, published by a faction of the Socialist 
Workers Party. The latter publication focused its March-April issue from 1996 on the debate 
in Labor Party Advocates leading to the 1996 convention, even including an application to 
join the LPA on its back cover.129 
 Labor Party Advocates would not meet its target of recruiting 100,000 members by 
1994—or even after that point—but had taken on a more organized character by then.130 As 
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of 1993 the LPA had established formal leadership structures, with the formation of an 
interim steering committee of eighty union officials supposedly representing five hundred 
thousand or so workers—although with LP membership being around fourteen thousand in 
2002 and peaking at between fifteen to twenty thousand, only a small minority of rank-and-
file workers were ever really involved in the formation.131 Available sources do not detail the 
activities of this governing body, but it seems to have been based on endorsing unions, rather 
than representing tangible LPA chapters with active membership, in contrast to Mazzocchi’s 
vision of a Labor Party being “representative… by geography.”132 Likewise, without a 
clearer picture of specific members on the steering committee, it is difficult to tell whether or 
not this leadership body was representative in regard to gender or race, but using 
participating unions as an indicator, the steering committee would come to represent at least 
some marginalized identity groups, with working and unhoused women represented by the 
California Nurses Association (CNA) and Kensington Welfare Rights Union (KWRU), and 
immigrant workers, particularly from Latin America, represented by the Farm Labor 
Organizing Committee (FLOC).133 While former LPA leaders often cite the flexibility of the 
organization’s informal structures as a reason why they wish they never moved to a formal 
party structure, based on the smaller nature of the steering committee, without any broader 
membership structures to hold it accountable, the nostalgia for LPA may also have had 
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something to do with the ability of Mazzocchi, Dudzic, Leopold, et. al. to maintain tighter 
control over the formation nationally. In spite of this concentration of power and a lack of 
formal structures to hold leaders accountable, the LPA’s leadership would be unable to 
holdback a sudden resurgence of the Labor Left by the mid 1990s, culminating in the triumph 
of a reformist opposition in a contested AFL-CIO presidential election. 
“New Voices,” New Opportunities? 
Despite American unions facing serious defeats in 1981 and 1993 with the firing of 
striking PATCO members and the passage of NAFTA respectively, unions saw something of 
a revitalization, if not in numbers than in militancy in the 1990s. As discussed previously, the 
former event represented the collapse of the post-War Bargaining regime, whereas the latter 
represented the culmination of two decades of neoliberal ideology taking root in both 
establishment parties in the U.S. In delineating the factors which paved the way for the 
“Labor Party Moment,” Dudzic and Isaac cite “A resurgence, after decades of 
marginalization, of the longstanding labor/left tradition which had long focused on class-
struggle unionism and independent political action.”134 This subjective change in 
consciousness flowed directly from the objective economic factors—unions making 
economic concessions in contract negotiations, job losses from deindustrialization, and 
declining union membership rates—propagated by NAFTA and the PATCO defeat. 
The Cold War also played a major ideological role in the U.S. labor movement, with 
George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO since the American Federation of Labor and the 
Council of Industrial Organizations merged in 1955, being a staunch anti-communist and 
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pushing back on the more radical labor tendencies found in the CIO. As historian Philip Taft 
wrote in 1959 “The AFL never faltered in its opposition to communism,” with the purging of 
communists from union leadership being an important part of the merger.135 By and large, 
Lane Kirkland continued his predecessor’s opposition to communism, becoming a strong 
advocate of the anti-communist Solidarność union in Poland, but took a softer position than 
Meany, actively working with anti-war groups to organize Solidarity Day and even tolerating 
the presence of communists and socialists at the event.136 While the 1970s and 1980s saw an 
increase in AFL-CIO union leaders distancing themselves from militant strike action and 
building stronger ties with management, going so far as to endorse “well-managed 
enterprise” and “developing partnerships with employers” in 1983 and 1985, this period 
would also see the reintroduction of more militant former CIO unions into the Federation.137 
In July 1981, immediately prior to the PATCO strike, the AFL-CIO actually had reason to 
celebrate, with Kirkland negotiating a merger between the Federation and the United Auto 
Workers (UAW) which brought with it 1.2 million members and 2.5 million dollars per year 
in dues.138 A decade later, Ron Carey would run for president of the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters on a platform of reform, promising to end endorsements for 
Republican presidential candidates and say “goodbye to the Mafia, goodbye to concessionary 
contracts, goodbye to those who have lined their pockets at their members' expense.”139 
Shortly after, Carey would negotiate the reentry of the Teamsters into the AFL-CIO, a move 
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which would “set the stage” for the John Sweeney’s ascent to the Federation presidency in 
1995 and encourage an “aggressive mobilization and bargaining strategy,” according to 
former Labor Party leader Mark Dudzic.140 
 The defeat of the AFL-CIO’s anti-NAFTA campaigns in 1993 spelled doom for Lane 
Kirkland’s administration. According to labor historian Timothy J. Minchin, “The loss was 
shocking and many in the labor movement felt something had to change. A defeat that even 
the AFL-CIO News termed “a bitter pill” had set the stage for Kirkland’s leadership to be 
challenged.”141 In 1995, John Sweeney, president of the Service International Union, 
organized the “New Voice” slate to contest the presidency of the AFL-CIO in response to the 
increasingly unpopular Lane Kirkland announcing his intent to run for reelection in May of 
that year.142 By June, Kirkland reconsidered and retired in August of 1995, with Thomas R. 
Donahue serving out the remainder of his term.143 Soon after, the “New Voice” slate was 
elected and took office on October 25th, 1995, and started their administration on a militant 
note by telling “the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors in July that if it pushed through a plan 
to cut 18,000 workers from its payroll, his union would conduct ‘a massive campaign of 
resistance and retribution.’”144 The victory of Sweeney and the “New Voice” slate 
represented the culmination of an ideological shift in the AFL-CIO, with the federation 
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finally recognizing its decline and the need for change.145 According to the accounts of Mark 
Dudzic and Tony Mazzocchi’s partner Katherine Isaac: 
“In response to growing demands for change, the ‘New Voice’ slate of John Sweeney 
and Rich Trumka swept into office in 1995 in the only contested election in the 
history of the AFL-CIO. They promised a revitalized labor movement with the goal 
of organizing one million new members per year. A "labor spring" emerged in which 
the Cold War-inspired anti-intellectualism of the labor movement gave way to new 
leadership, welcoming academics and activists from other social movements to bring 
their experience and energy to help revitalize the movement.”146 
Other sources from the time period cite Sweeney’s presidency as an inspiration to move 
towards founding a Labor Party, with an article in the New Labor Forum by Sean Sweeney, a 
member of Labor Militant at the time, noting how a pledge to “stop automatic checkbook 
endorsements of Democratic candidates,” was among the “New Voice” leadership’s reforms, 
potentially opening a path for an independent party to emerge.147 Despite widespread praise 
for John Sweeney, including from Mazzocchi and his associates in the 1995, more radical 
elements of the labor movement were not quite as optimistic about the new AFL-CIO 
administration. Sean Sweeney goes on to call the move by the AFL-CIO inadequate, noting 
how “any plan to revitalize the labor movement while continuing Labor’s abusive 
relationship with the Democratic Party is a plan set up for failure.”148 According to another 
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former Labor Militant member, Jeff Booth, founder of the Harvard Union of Clerical and 
Technical Workers: 
“John Sweeney was a conservative. He was a breath of fresh air after Lane Kirkland, 
but when I was involved in meetings in the Boston area of labor activists supporting 
Sweeney coming in and the changes he would make, changes like organizing 
immigrants were very positive, but Sweeney and the other AFL-CIO leaders kept 
their heads in supporting the Democrats, a capitalist party.”149 
Booth’s comments might not make sense relative to the standard U.S. conception of the 
political spectrum and must instead be understood from a revolutionary socialist perspective, 
with Sweeney being conservative in the sense of being unwilling to challenge capitalism and 
willing to cooperate with the political establishment. Thus, while the “New Voice” leadership 
represented new opportunities for organizing and a sense of hope for the Labor Party 
Advocates that the terms of debate were changing in the U.S., the AFL-CIO would not be 
backing a labor party project overnight. Instead, if the labor left was going to seize the 
“Labor Party moment,” they would need to act on their own and build a challenge to the pro-
Democrat AFL-CIO leadership from the ground up. 
The Labor Party’s Founding Convention, 1996 
 The question remains, why did the Labor Party Advocates drop the “Advocates” and 
become a party, especially a party that would not participate in elections? It would seem the 
former point was due to pressure from membership and the latter was due to pressure 
specifically from union leadership. The influence from union leaders on an electoral stance 
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would not officially play out until the 1996 convention and would bring an end to the Labor 
Party Advocates lack of centralism when it came to its members’ participation in other 
electoral projects. The 1993 Interim Steering Committee called for a founding Convention 
within two years, but it would take a bit longer for the call to translate into action, suggesting 
some hesitance by the LPA’s leadership.150 When it came to calling the convention, Mark 
Dudzic and Katherine Isaac cited pressure from union activists to capitalize on momentum 
generated by the LPA’s growth from union endorsements in 1994 and 1995.151 Adolph Reed, 
jr. puts a more positive spin on this pressure, characterizing it as an “enthusiastic response” 
coming from an “activist base.”152 The more revolutionary elements of the LPA were among 
the supporters of moving to a more structured party model, generally being displeased with 
Mazzocchi’s “abstract approach” to building LPA and what they saw as a “top down” model 
of organizing, with the Mazzocchi clique firmly in control of the formal organizational 
structures.153 This position was prominent among Labor Militant supporters, with Jeff Booth 
similarly calling the “sign up one hundred thousand members scheme” abstract and going on 
to say that, “now people who were involved in the Labor Party, they have this thing in their 
head that it wasn’t really the time yet [to form a party in 1996], but Mazzocchi was pulled 
away from that [position] and that’s why there was a founding convention in 1996, because 
the sign up a hundred thousand people thing didn’t work.”154 While participants may disagree 
today whether the 1996 convention was the correct move, at the time pressure from activists 
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won the day. In January 1995, a meeting of the LPA National Council in St. Louis voted to 
hold a founding convention in the Spring of the following year.155 
 Beginning on June sixth, union activists packed into an “overflowing convention hall 
in Cleveland, Ohio for a “boisterous four-day event.”156 The exact number of delegates in 
attendance and the number of workers they represented varies from account to account. In 
the essay “Labor Party Time? Not Yet.” Dudzic and Isaac recount the presence of one-
thousand-and-four-hundred delegates representing nearly two million workers from nine 
international unions and 117 locals, while Derek Seidman ups the number of delegates to 
nearly 1,500 when introducing his interview with Mark Dudzic.157 The most precise figure 
available for delegate attendance comes from a 1999 issue of the Labor Party Press (LPP), 
correcting an error in the New York Times coverage of the Labor Party’s second convention 
in 1998. The LPP reported that the founding convention received little press attention, 
quoting Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting in characterizing the lack of press coverage at 
the first convention as a “politically inspired ‘blackout’” and reporting 1,367 delegates in 
1996.158 In an earlier article covering the immediate aftermath of the convention and again 
criticizing the mainstream media for not covering the Labor Party, the LPP reported a total of 
1365 delegates, with 428 speakers from the floor. Furthermore, the report states the party 
“represented over 1,250,000 workers” and the convention cost about two-hundred thousand 
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dollars to put on.159 While the mainstream media did not pick up on this first convention, an 
independent news program, Labor Beat, filmed and broadcast parts of the convention, 
including interviews, the debate on the convention floor over electoral policy, and a protest 
that delegates participated in.  
Spirits were generally high going into the founding convention, with participants 
remembering it fondly. Labor Militant member and delegate Jeff Booth remembers the two 
conventions he participated in as having two different kinds of energy, with the first being 
characterized by an excitement because of the prospect of founding a new party.160 Gary 
Olson, an at-large delegate for the National Writer’s Union from Lehigh Valley, 
Pennsylvania recalled,  
“I must say that, for me, nothing compared to my emotional reaction to the Founding 
Convention in Cleveland in 1996. As the vote passed, marking the transition from 
LPA to The Labor Party, I looked across the hall at several hundred diverse faces and 
felt that I’d been waiting for this moment my entire life. Upon returning home, a few 
of us set to work organizing a local chapter.”161 
Green Party presidential candidate and at-large delegate Ralph Nader even expressed high 
hopes for the Labor Party, remarking “This convention will be looked upon as the rebirth of 
the labor movement after so many years of being subordinated to corporate power.”162 The 
convention was further characterized by a unified sense of solidarity, with workers like 
Margaret Trimmer-Hartley and Mike Griffin, involved in the Detroit Newspaper Strike and 
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the 1993 Staley Lockout in Decatur, IL respectively, giving rousing speeches met with 
roaring applause.163  
The optimism of the crowd did not lower the quality of debate, which at times got 
tense, and when it came to written output the convention was quite productive. As part of a 
founding a formal party, the convention debated and passed a constitution and a political 
program titled “A Call for Economic Justice.” The sixteen-point platform primarily consisted 
of anti-corporate, pro-labor, economic demands, leading off with a call to “Amend the 
Constitution to Guarantee Everyone a Job at a Living Wage,” with even demands to “End 
Bigotry” and protect the environment being tied to ending workplace discrimination and 
protecting jobs specifically.164 The program also reflected Mazzocchi’s belief that it was time 
for workers to bargain with the state for their rights, rather than with employers, as exhibited 
by the fifth demand calling for the government to “Guarantee Universal Access to Quality 
Healthcare.”165 Former Labor Party leaders pride themselves upon the Party’s creation of a 
program which would unify workers around class-based economic demands, rather than 
appealing to self-proclaimed “activists” or “progressives.”166 As Les Leopold wrote of 
Mazzocchi, “ While he personally supported left social issues, he wanted a Labor Party to be 
a home not only for self-defined progressives but also for gun-toting, Bible-thumping 
workers who supported a pro-worker, anti-corporate program.”167 Although debates between 
revolutionary socialists, progressive activists, union leaders, and Mazzocchi’s tight-knit 
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circle of supporters occurred early on in the Labor Party Advocates, they came to a head at 
the 1996 convention. While some issues would be resolved, such as the debate over whether 
or not to include the right to an abortion in the Labor Party’s political platform, others, such 
as the party’s orientation to elections, would become defining debates for the duration of the 
party’s existence. 
1. The LPA and the Fight for Racial Justice 
 In 1997 Sean Sweeney—at the time a member of the LP’s National Committee, a 
member of Labor Militant, and the Director of the Queens College Worker Education 
Extension Center—reported that the Labor Party at its founding was “presently too white and 
too male,” raising the importance of diversifying the Labor Party effort to reflect the racial 
and gender composition of the working class.168 Although a demographic poll was never 
taken on the LPA and LP’s membership, Mazzocchi and other leaders frequently stated their 
intent to build a representative Labor Party in those regards. The closest any source comes to 
an official figure is Mark Dudzic guessing “that about 30% were people of color and 
probably about a third of the membership were women. That was probably reflected up 
through the leadership of the Labor Party.”169 Referring to a report from the very first 
meeting of the Labor Party Interim National Committee from August Fifteenth 1996, elected 
at the convention earlier that year, leadership roughly reflected Dudzic’s estimates, with at 
least four of the sixteen members in attendance being People of Color and about six being 
women, with individuals beyond the elected INC being invited who would “broaden 
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representation” on the committee.170 While exact figures for demographics in the Labor Party 
may never be known, a close examination of the founding convention reveals a genuine, 
concerted effort to begin building a truly representative party. 
 Interviews and recollections of the convention reveal a number of LPA members 
attended with the intent of using the soon-to-be party as a vehicle for fighting for racial 
justice. Some organizers, such as President of the Farm Labor Organizing Committee 
Baldemar Velasquez, cited feeling left out of the mainstream political process as reason for 
supporting the Labor Party. As he told Labor Beat, speaking for the primarily Latino migrant 
farm workers in his union, “We need a party that sees things from this perspective, and we 
don’t think this stuff is being talked about anywhere else. We feel that if we’re part of this 
Labor Party… that we’ll get our issues out on the floor… and we hope that this party will be 
open to hearing what American life is like from another perspective, from a different 
experience.”171 The attacks on immigrant workers, and why organizers like Velasquez 
wanted to seek an alternative to the Democratic and Republican Parties, can be seen through 
the lens of legislation being passed at the federal and state level at the time. In 1994, voters in 
California passed Proposition 187 or “Save Our State,” a ballot initiative disproportionately 
targeting Latino immigrant workers which would deny public services to “illegal aliens.”172 
Although some might argue the bill would only affect those workers without documentation, 
Velasquez noted at the Labor Party Convention that the workers represented by FLOC often 
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faced discrimination based on their ethnicity regardless of their immigration status, even if 
they were American citizens.173 Although Proposition 187 was sponsored by the Republican 
Party, and most Democratic Party leaders came out against it, the Field Institute reported 
forty percent of Democratic voters in California voting in favor of the ballot question, 
indicating substantial anti-immigrant sentiment even within the ranks of the party fighting the 
law.174 It would take nearly five years for the entire law to be struck down by the courts, on 
the legal grounds that legislation passed by the Federal Government later in 1996 superseded 
it and states did not have the right to “regulate immigration law, a function that the U.S. 
Constitution clearly assigns to the federal government.”175 The superseding federal 
legislation, while not as harsh as Proposition 187, still posed a threat to immigrant workers, 
strengthening immigration laws and “adding penalties for undocumented immigrants who 
commit crimes while in the United States or who stay in the U.S. for statutorily defined 
periods of time.”176 Months before the Labor Party convention, an article in the New York 
Times characterized the immigration reform bills being debated in Congress as the “most 
restrictive immigration laws in 30 years and the first cuts in the number of foreigners 
entering the country legally since the 1920's,” further noting that “there are Republicans and 
Democrats on both sides of the issue.”177 The uncertain future of immigration in the early to 
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mid 1990s, with neither party presenting a clear opposition to criminalizing undocumented 
workers, set the stage for the FLOC to endorse the Labor Party’s founding convention. 
 Other racial justice groups and advocates within the labor movement similarly saw 
the formation of a Labor Party as a means of raising their struggles against special oppression 
in front of a wider forum, in hopes of the broader working-class supporting them. Ashaki 
Binta, a member of Black Workers for Justice and a Field Representative in the SEIU’s 
Southern Region, expressed tentative support for the convention, telling Labor Beat that “as 
African-Americans, one of our main concerns and hopes is that we can overcome through 
this process some of the historical weaknesses that have existed in the effort to unify the 
working class in this country. I’m hoping that we can overcome them through the building of 
this labor party movement.”178 The labor movement in the United States had a complicated 
relationship with the struggle for racial justice, with Timothy Minchin noting “While the 
Federation had long tolerated racial discrimination within its ranks, it played an important 
role in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”179 The Kirkland administration began making 
efforts to diversify the AFL-CIO and work closer with the Civil Rights movement, 
particularly around organizing Solidarity Day with the help of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and going into the 1990s, the effort to 
diversify became a theme of the “New Voice” slate’s campaign, with John Sweeney 
immediately revamping “his union's board so that 20 of its 57 members are female, black or 
Hispanic.”180 Racist tendencies were present among delegates within the convention hall in 
Cleveland, with Brenda Stokely, President of AFSCME District Council 1701 in New York, 
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recalling “When I walked around that convention hall in Cleveland, I heard some folks say 
things about blacks and women that would not have been out of place in Klan country. I 
didn't want to be there, but I knew I had to be there.”181 While the Labor Party’s foundation 
did not magically solve racism among white workers, it allowed the issues to be discussed 
“under one roof” among leading members of the labor movement, with Adolph Reed, Jr. 
noting the potential of the Congress “to fashion a concrete alternative both to narrow, 
exclusivist forms of identity politics and to the false universalism that denies the reality of 
other forms of injustice.”182 The hopes of Labor Party leadership and members would 
translate into action at the founding convention, through members organizing bodies to 
advance the causes of social justice and the passage of a constitution reflecting this goal. 
 By 1997, three caucuses were built around fighting special oppressions were 
established in the Labor Party, representing “African Americans, women and Latinos.” Sean 
Sweeney noted that “at least two” of the caucuses could trace their roots to “networks that 
developed on the convention floor in Cleveland.”183 Although it is not completely clear 
which two caucuses Sweeney meant in particular, one of them was the Black Caucus, which 
held a preliminary meeting in Washington, D.C. on February 8th, 1997 with its east coast 
membership, a gathering presided over by Adolph Reed and Bob Clark, the elected co-chair 
of the Labor Party. In a report on the meeting for the Labor Party Press, Reed stated their 
intent was to “continue a discussion in the spirit of the black caucus that met at the Party's 
founding convention,” and lay the ground for a “broader meeting of black LP members later 
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in the year.”184 Furthermore, the Labor Party enshrined its commitment to fighting racism in 
its program and, to a lesser degree, its constitution. In the fourth point of “A Call for 
Economic Justice,” the Labor Party twice cites race first and foremost as a basis upon which 
“bosses have profited from dividing working people,” and a form of discrimination the party 
would not tolerate. This program further called for expanding the number of identity groups 
covered under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights act, opposing police brutality and “the 
criminalization of dissent and poverty,” and implementing affirmative action laws.185 
Notably absent are calls for any form of racially or ethnically targeted reparations, with the 
intent of the program appearing to be fixing specific forms of oppression through fighting 
systemic discrimination and relying on the program’s other economic demands to alleviate 
generational poverty. To address the concerns about immigrant rights raised by FLOC, the 
demand to End Bigotry also included a line stating, “When immigrants are scapegoated and 
denied full labor rights and civil rights, we are all scapegoated and denied our rights,” with 
further calls to implement immigration policy which “does not discriminate on any basis,” 
and language about foreign policy which supports fair trade.186 
 In contrast to the Labor party’s program, its constitution is less specific when it 
comes to fighting identity-based oppression, stating “We believe in a country where the 
opinions of others are tolerated, bigotry and discrimination are rejected, and everyone enjoys 
equal opportunity and the equal protection of the laws without prejudice.”187 The lack of 
specificity here might be a point for criticism today, but available documents do not show the 
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wording being a point of contention. From a socially progressive standpoint, the remainder of 
the Labor Party’s demand to End Bigotry is quite far reaching, going so far as to attack 
discrimination based on disability and sexual orientation, reflecting the theme of “An Injury 
to One is an Injury to All.” The program’s calls for various forms of social justice even 
extend into the fifth demand to “Guarantee Universal Access to Quality Health Care,” with a 
line calling for “Unimpeded access to a full range of family planning and reproductive 
services for men and women, including the right to continue or terminate a pregnancy.”188 
However, the inclusion of this last point was never set in stone, and required some 
negotiations to end up in the program, representing one of the more neatly resolved debates 
to occur in the Labor Party. 
2. FLOC and the Abortion Debate Within LPA 
 Before the 1996 Convention even began, Tony Mazzocchi had put out a call for 
endorsing unions to draft, vote on, and submit resolutions with things they wanted to see in a 
Labor Party Program. After forming a somewhat ad-hoc Platform Committee, Labor Party 
Advocates got to work drafting a program, breaking into teams to “triage some two hundred 
or so resolutions.”189 Among the unions to submit resolutions was the California Nurses 
Association (CAN), which had come to support Labor Party Advocates in 1995 after 
emerging “from period of internal turmoil to embrace a militant and organizing-oriented 
union model.”190 The union proposed including a demand guaranteeing the right to safe 
abortions, with CNA President Kit Costello citing the experience of union members dealing 
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with “the results of back-alley abortions” in their hospitals.191 When the Platform Committee 
accepted Costello’s suggestion, it resulted in “an unexpected rift,” in the LPA.192 The debate 
over abortion at the founding convention is well covered by Les Leopold and Mark Dudzic in 
their retrospective discussions of the Labor Party, as such an important issue should be. As a 
central contention in the founding process, the resolution of the problem through discussion 
marked a success story for Mazzocchi and company’s approach to winning over groups of 
workers with socially conservative beliefs. 
 The debate over abortion started when Baldemar Velasquez and the numerous 
“devout Catholics” in FLOC threatened to walk out over the new “plank” in the platform 
which advocated the right to safe abortions. While the original wording seems to be lost in 
print documents somewhere, the key point of contention became the use of the word 
abortion. As the CNA and the FLOC began to clash, several LPA allegedly approached 
Mazzocchi trying to get him to intervene, seeing as losing either union would be a serious 
blow. In a moment of wisdom, one almost reminiscent of Jesus addressing his followers in 
the Bible, Les Leopold recalls that Mazzocchi smiled and told his disciples “Let them work it 
out. Isn’t that what we’re here to do?”193 Despite the hagiographical qualities of Leopold’s 
work coming to the forefront in this part of the text, it appears the two unions engaged in a 
fruitful debate. By the end of the convention, the unions agreed to not use the word abortion, 
and instead opted for language which guaranteed the right to birth control and to “terminate 
or keep a pregnancy.”194 This result came from finding some common ground, in that FLOC 
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did not want to restrict abortions in cases of “rape, incest, the endangering of a mother’s 
life,” in the end guaranteeing the right to choose but avoiding what Velasquez characterized 
in the original language as “sloganeering.”195 According to Mark Dudzic, “The real 
achievement of the abortion debate was not that it was finessed by a judicious choice of 
words. Rather it was that its conclusion was crafted, agreed to and owned by workers who 
had strongly held opinions on this issue and that they were willing to put them aside for the 
sake of a broader unity.”196 
 Thus, according to the accounts of Mazzocchi’s close allies, the abortion debate 
wrapped up neatly. While this may be partly true, the result was not necessarily satisfactory 
and seems to have not been universally applied. Accounts published after the convention cast 
doubt on the clean ending of Leopold’s story, with Sean Sweeney noting in 1997 that “The 
Party leaders' anxiety about potentially divisive matters like abortion has caused quite a bit of 
ferment since the program was adopted in Cleveland,” and suspecting that some activists 
would continue to argue for a more explicit program when it came to issues of social 
justice.197 Furthermore, a 1996 pamphlet version of the Labor Party’s A Call For Economic 
Justice published by the New York Metro Chapter notably excludes the compromise 
language of guaranteeing the right to terminate pregnancies, leaving the demand at the much 
vaguer “Informed choice and unimpeded access to a full range of family planning and 
reproductive services for men and women.”198 This would indicate some groups within the 
Labor Party, particularly at a local level, took liberties in how they presented the program. 
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 Although entirely possible that the unions settled the debate amicably on the 
convention floor, a question emerges as to why commentators like Les Leopold place the 
abortion debate on such a pedestal in their work. On the one hand, the compromise 
represented a victory for Mazzocchi’s proposed method of using democratic debate to settle 
issues. On the other, Leopold’s placement of the abortion debate immediately before an 
extended attack against “sectarians” at the founding convention is suspect.199 Leopold tells a 
somewhat idealized account of unions with different views coming together to contrast his 
account of his opponents at the convention, mostly including members of smaller socialist 
organizations—most of whom were also active in their union locals and communities, as was 
shown in the previous chapter. In contrast to the quiet “shuttle diplomacy” that occurred 
between CNA and FLOC, Leopold’s idea of “the sectarians” are all represented by a single 
leader from the Golden Gate Chapter who would “scream until he was red in the face.” 
Whereas the Nurses and the Farm Laborers were correct to raise their differences, “the 
sectarians” are portrayed villainously for the crime of challenging procedures “even when it 
was obvious they would lose.”200 Although this does not cast doubt on the accuracy 
Leopold’s account of the abortion debate, it reveals his bias in portraying players in the 
Labor Party and raises questions about how accurately Leopold describes the extraordinarily 
contentious debate on how the Labor Party should approach elections. Thankfully, the main 
debate covered by Labor Beat at the convention was the debate on running candidates, 
allowing viewers to see how parts of it played out. 
3. The Electoral Question and Party Structure 
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 Finally, before moving on to the history of the Labor Party as a formal entity, it is 
worth spending some time discussing the debate on how to approach electoral work which 
emerged as it played out in the 1996 convention. The founding convention saw two major 
camps emerge when it came to electoral strategy, with the more radical elements of the party 
and a minority of union locals coalescing around a resolution drafted by the International 
Longshoreman and Warehouse Union in favor of running and endorsing candidates—with 
some qualifiers—and the majority of endorsing unions and the leadership of Labor Party 
Advocates arguing to delay running and endorsing candidates until the party gained more 
traction. Another tendency would eventually gain traction in some chapters of the Labor 
Party, wishing to use fusion ballots with the Democratic Party, but this tendency would not 
be a major factor in the debate for a few years to come. The voting procedures and 
organization of the Founding Convention played a role in turning the tide of the vote 
decisively in favor of the resolution against running candidates, in the process setting the 
Labor Party on a path towards its untimely demise in the 2000s. 
 During the debate on electoral strategy, Luisa Gratz, representing ILWU Local 26, 
stood up to read her union’s resolution. The resolution proposed delaying entering national 
elections until another convention could be organized in two years to assess if the Labor 
Party was in a position to do so but included two major provisions and several conditions for 
Labor Party chapters, county, and state organizations to participate in elections. The 
conditions were: 
1. The organizations may endorse labor candidates who declared themselves 
independents running at the local and state levels. 
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2. The organizations may also run Labor Party candidates on the state or local level 
provided they did not incur any expense to the national Labor Party. 
3. Independent candidates endorsed by local Labor Party organizations and Labor Party 
candidates must abide by and conform to the Labor Party’s program. 
4. The Labor Party may not endorse candidates of other political parties.201 
The first provision was likely included with the Jackie Stump campaign launched by the 
UMW during the Pittston Coal Strike and similar campaigns in mind, with the goal of using 
Labor Party chapters as a means of pushing out anti-union politicians and aiding electoral 
actions initiated by striking workers.202 The latter three points reflected a strategy favored by 
some elements of the Labor Party which believed that running local candidates could be a 
step toward growing the organization and laying the ground for the party to run candidates 
nationally. This contradicted Tony Mazzocchi’s belief that holding “isolated elective offices” 
was pointless, notably saying “Look, if some progressive wants to run for local office 
because he wants a job, I can understand that. But don’t tell me it’s going to fundamentally 
change anything important.”203 Mark Dudzic similarly opposed running local candidates, 
citing his experience with electoral campaigns being “disempowering.”204 Likewise, the 
condition that campaigns would not incur costs on the national Labor Party was likely 
included to circumvent “legal restrictions on the use of union funds for direct political 
purposes” which Labor Party leadership feared “would have cut off access to union treasury 
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funds needed to fund the party,” if they ran candidates.205 Finally, the fourth part of the 
resolution ensured local chapters would be committed to working class political 
independence and not attempt to use fusion ballots, a position in line with the thinking of 
Labor Party leadership.206 
 Overall, the ILWU resolution made an honest attempt at addressing the concerns of 
the majority of union leaders and Tony Mazzocchi’s associates, while allowing the Labor 
Party to function as an electoral party right off the bat. In addition to the ways in which its 
text addressed concerns about running candidates, the ILWU resolution received support 
from a number of leading trade union activists, the sort of workers who contradicted any 
attempts to slander the resolution as being the product of sectarians without organizational 
support. Mike Griffin, who founded the Labor Party Advocates Chapter based in Decatur, 
Illinois and played a role in challenging union bureaucracy in the militant, but unsuccessful 
Staley Lockouts in 1989, spoke in favor of the resolution in an interview with Labor Beat. He 
stated “I think if we’re going to have a fundamental organizing tool for the Labor Party 
Advocates, we’re going to have to begin organizing out communities now, running our 
people for local and state elections. We don’t need a mass budget from LPA to get that done, 
we can raise the money as citizens of our local community.”207 Despite support from a 
worker who received speaking time at the podium due to his role in the Staley Lockout, the 
majority of union leaders in the convention room remained opposed to the resolution to run 
candidates. 
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 A number of other union leaders expressed their opposition on the debate floor. Carl 
Finamore of the International Association of Machinists (IAM) Local 1781 passionately 
spoke against the ILWU motion, calling for the Labor Party to focus on “protests, pickets, 
and demonstrations,” and arguing “we have come this far because we have thankfully 
avoided a head on confrontation with the national leaders of the AFL-CIO in our own unions 
by not challenging them on their own turf, the electoral strategy… I propose not to fight them 
there until we’ve won the battle on the streets.”208 This reflected a sentiment among many 
union leaders that the Labor Party was allowed to exist because of AFL-CIO President John 
Sweeney’s apparent ambivalence to it. In later retrospectives, leaders of the Labor Party 
would quote Sweeney’s comments on the Labor Party where he stated, “I would be the last 
person, however, to discourage the dedicated brothers and sisters who are organizing the 
Labor Party movement from taking their best shot and I hope the progress they are making 
sends a clear signal to a Democratic Party that has moved away from working families just as 
surely as it has moved away from the old, the young, the disabled, and the poor.” They would 
maintain that one factor which set the Labor Party in the 1990s apart from similar attempts 
was the fact that it gained enough support that “union leaders did not publicly denounce 
it.”209 Implied in this line of argument was the idea that testing the AFL-CIO leadership 
would spell doom for the party, likewise, suggesting a reluctance among opponents of the 
ILWU motion to actively challenge John Sweeney. Delegates such as Finamore and Mary 
Larsen of UE Local 111 instead supported a competing motion to delay running or endorsing 
any candidates until a later date when the party had grown stronger. 
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 After considerable debate, the motions about electoral strategy were put to a vote. In 
remembering the convention hall, Jeff Booth of Labor Militant recalled the considerable size 
of the convention, with “long tables at the front for unions with the most power and the 
smaller unions, activists, and community groups pushed to the back.”210 Votes at the 
convention were not given out at a one delegate, one vote ratio, but rather delegates from 
individual unions received colored cards indicating their relative voting power. According to 
Les Leopold, many of the smaller left-wing groups at the convention opposed this, to which 
leadership said that larger organizations, such as international unions, deserved more voting 
power as they could bring more workers and resources to the table.211 Of course, the 
weighting of delegates was based upon the potential members a union could contribute, not 
active, dues paying members from that union involved in Labor Party Advocates. Footage of 
the convention confirms Booths account of how votes and tables were set up, and when the 
vote in favor of delaying running and endorsing candidates occurred, the front of the room 
became dominated by hundreds of yellow and green cards being raised, with many blue and a 
few orange cards going up toward the middle of the floor. In contrast, when those opposed 
voted, far fewer placards went up, mostly toward the back of the room. The exact meaning of 
each color is currently unknown, but some delegates held multiple placards and each color 
likely corresponded to a share of vote.212 
 After the vote, many delegates applauded and praised the process. Gerald Zero from 
IBT Local 705 expressed his belief that the Labor Party should wait to run candidates after 
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stating that the convention included a lot of “good debate.”213 Jerry Gordon of the Workers 
Unity Network expressed approval at the resounding decision to not support Democratic or 
Republican Party candidates but was dismayed that the ILWU motion failed.214 Whether or 
not delegates got what they wanted out of the debate on electoral strategy, most seemed 
optimistic for moving from simply being advocates to being part of a real Labor Party. The 
conference would then see delegates suspend the rules of debate to organize a march on the 
office of Mayor White of Cleveland to protest his anti-union policies, further raising the 
morale of participants.215 Despite high spirits, stresses in the Labor Party’s foundation were 
beginning to form. In favoring the perspectives of delegates from larger unions, the Labor 
Party threw its lot in with the ability and willingness of those unions to pay dues and 
mobilize members to support it. When union militancy was on the rise this may have been 
easy enough to maintain, but as conditions changed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
Labor Party would see its supporting unions fall through on their commitments. 
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Chapter Three: The Growth and Decline of the Labor Party, 1997 to 2002 
 Members of the newly formed Labor Party got to work straight away after the 
founding convention. Existing chapters of Labor Party Advocates reorganized themselves 
and prepared to form state organizations with “Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, Connecticut, Wisconsin, California, New Hampshire, New Jersey and New York… 
all moving in that direction.216 Meanwhile, at-large members set to work establishing new 
chapters where none had been before while union members set to finding ways to discuss the 
LP in their workplaces. In the Lehigh Valley in Pennsylvania, longtime activist and former 
member of Students for a Democratic Society, Gary Olson worked to form the “Brennan 
Chapter of the Labor Party,” which “at its peak” included one hundred and fifty dues paying 
members with about one fifth of the membership “attending monthly meetings held at 
Moravian College in Bethlehem.”217 In January of 1997, the young chapter—at that point 
consisting of fifty members—voted on its name to honor the memory of local “labor leader 
and historian” John Brennan who had died in December of 1996.218 Brennan had shown a 
commitment to independent left politics and registered to vote as a socialist for much of his 
life. In his account of the Brennan Chapter, Olson discusses their activities in some detail, 
including how the LP interacted with the local labor movement, writing: 
“Thanks to my friendship over the years with local members of the Steelworkers and 
Teamsters, we were invited to make presentations to their local meetings. At one 
point, I was welcomed to join the monthly meetings of the Lehigh Valley Labor 
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Council… These combined a social function with political discussions and were 
fruitful for a time. Eventually, due to pressure from the local Democratic Party 
hierarchy—who were closely tied with the Labor Council and were uncomfortable 
with my presence—I was gently “disinvited” from further attendance at these 
gatherings. This intransigent hostility from the Democratic Party presaged one of the 
most serious challenges faced by both the local and national LP.”219 
Hostility from the Democratic Party was not unique to the Lehigh Valley, and especially as 
the 2000 elections became serious, the Labor Party faced increasing pressure from 
Democrats and their allies in organized labor to pack up shop. In addition to the pressure for 
unions to support the “lesser of two evils” in the elections, union leaders would fail to deliver 
on their promised support while the LP struggled to grow without running candidates. 
Coupled with intense debates within local chapters and increasingly undemocratic methods 
within the national party, the Labor Party would find itself in terminal decline at the turn of 
the century, with its fate certain after its third convention and Tony Mazzocchi’s death in 
2002. 
Labor Party Campaigns, A Substitute for Candidates? 
 In lieu of running candidates, the LP launched a number of other campaigns to raise 
awareness of specific parts of the Party’s program, occasionally petitioning for such 
campaigns to become ballot questions in strategically picked districts. The Labor Party 
organized four principal campaigns during its existence: Just Healthcare, Free Higher 
Education, Campaign for Workers Rights, and the Campaign for the 28th Amendment. Each 
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campaign corresponded to a single point in the “Call for Economic Justice,” specifically the 
fifth, eighth, third and first demands, with the “28th Amendment” sought to amend the U.S. 
Constitution to protect the “right to a job at a living wage or a guaranteed income when no 
jobs were available.”220 Of the four campaigns, Just Healthcare resulted in the most tangible 
success—likely in part due to the previous attempt at healthcare reform nationally in 1993—
and was the best recorded in Labor Party materials. For these reasons it will serve as a case 
study to assess the effectiveness of the Labor Party’s campaign and recruitment strategy. 
 The Just Healthcare Campaign emerged as the Labor Party’s first major campaign, 
for a 28th amendment began to fade. Although the first campaign seemingly got off to a 
strong start, with the Labor Party Press reporting “LP activists in some 25 locations have 
taken 28th Amendment petitions to their neighbors. In every location, our canvassers have 
found that 70-95% of the people they talk to sign the petition,” mentions of the campaign 
drop off in the LPP archives after March 1998.221 A focus on healthcare appears seven 
months before this, with the September 1997 issue of the Labor Party Press including three 
articles on the U.S. healthcare system. Les Leopold notes the failure of the 28th Amendment 
campaigns in his biography of Mazzocchi, stating “Several party chapters really did try… 
But while many people signed the petitions, there was a generalized pie-in-the-sky 
dreaminess to it. Although some local activists persisted for many months, the campaign 
never gained traction.”222 Mark Dudzic likewise described the 28th Amendment campaign as 
“a bridge too far,” noting that “even most of the activists did not believe that an actual 
 
220 “A Call for Economic Justice: The Labor Party's Program;” Leopold, The Man, 463. 
221 Ed Bruno, “28th Amendment Next Steps,” The Labor Party Press, March 1998, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908103050/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv32/28.htm. 
222 Leopold, The Man, 464. 
 Bilsky 76 
constitutional amendment was possible in any conceivable time frame.”223 Just Healthcare 
seems to have been an attempt to pivot and regain lost momentum, picking a more concrete 
issue to canvass around in hopes of yielding more concrete results for the Labor Party. The 
first official appearance of the campaign using the slogan “Just Healthcare” coincided with 
the November 1998 issue of the Labor Party Press, marking the LP’s first constitutional 
convention. By this point however, Ed Bruno and the Boston Chapter of the Labor Party had 
already succeeded in getting a non-binding referendum on Just Healthcare on the ballot in 
one district in Massachusetts.224 With Bruno, the full-time New England organizer, playing a 
leading role in the previous campaign, the Boston Chapter likely became the guinea pig for 
Just Healthcare, allowing organizers test getting a non-binding referendum on the ballot and 
publishing a few articles on healthcare to sound out the campaign before launching it, hoping 
to avoid the effort petering out like the 28th Amendment. 
 Jeff Booth recalled the Just Healthcare Campaign well, with the efforts of the Labor 
Party attracting illegal police repression as they collected signatures outside a supermarket in 
Teal Square in Somerville. According to Booth, “We [the Boston Chapter] took the Just 
Healthcare campaign very seriously…” and had turned out eight or so people to raise 
awareness for the ballot question in the community. At some point, “the Somerville cops 
pulled up, got out of their car and they didn’t know what was going on, these were rank-and-
file cops, and they started questioning us, but we had a copy of the law permitting us to table 
there and just handed it to them, so they read it and left.” Unfortunately for the tablers that 
day, the manager of the store had a high-ranking friend on the force, who according to Booth, 
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later “rolls up on a motorcycle with another cop car behind him, and we show him the law 
but he says ‘I don’t give a **** what the law says, if you’re not out of here in five minutes 
I’m going to arrest all of you.’” Booth, and Greg Gigg from the IBT, leading this group 
mostly made up of young workers and college students, for most of whom this represented 
their first political activity, complied to avoid getting anyone in trouble. “I was so angry that 
this sort of repression happened that I went straight back to the Boston office to meet with Ed 
Bruno, and he said, ‘If we do a legal thing, by the time we organize it and pay for it, the 
referendum will be over.’ So, like a lot of people in this country we just ignored it and this 
cop from the Somerville Police got away with illegally cracking down on petitioners trying to 
organize for universal healthcare.” Booth went on to justify telling the story by saying “It’s 
an anecdote, but it’s not random. It shows we were active.”225 In addition to being a fun 
story, it also highlights the working relationship between Labor Militant members like Booth 
and other Labor Party members like Gigg and Bruno. Contrary to Leopold’s portrayal, the 
“sectarians” with British influences could get along quite well with their counterparts in 
Mazzocchi’s clique and with union activists in general, talking through the best tactics for the 
moment to succeed in building the Labor Party. 
 And the Just Healthcare Campaign did succeed to some degree, not just in the Boston 
area, but in Labor Party Chapters around the country. By 1998, voters had passed non-
binding referendums for Just Healthcare by a seventy-one percent margin in West Roxbury 
and Quincy, with the LP making an effort in 1999 to get Just Healthcare on the ballot in 
Somerville, recruiting thirty-five new members in the process.226 Jenny Brown from the 
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Labor Party chapter in Gainesville, Florida citied similar successes with the Just Healthcare 
Campaign, stating “We went door-to-door with Just Health Care, even getting our county to 
place a nonbinding referendum on the ballot. Like other referendums on health care and 
education conducted by Labor Party chapters, it won handily.”227 In the Lehigh Valley, Gary 
Olson recalled organizing a successful protest “on the need for national health with speakers 
from Physicians for Social Responsibility,” attracting organizations beyond the LP to the 
effort.228 Although the Just Healthcare campaign managed to make gains for the LP, both in 
terms of increasing dues paying membership and raising the party’s profile in the 
community, it had its limits. 
 Activists at the time recall running into the same issues when it came to community 
outreach, regardless of the campaign going on, the fact that the LP’s electoral stance 
confused people. Even Les Leopold recognizes this contention, although he claimed it only 
applied to self-identified progressives, writing “It was a very tough sell. A political party that 
stayed out of electoral politics?”229 In fact, beyond Leopold’s progressive paper tigers, 
workers in the community were often perplexed by the Labor Party’s lack of candidates. As 
Jeff Booth recalled “And of course when you’re on the street or talking to a union rank-and-
filer or shop steward, they’re like ‘Oh Labor Party, how do I vote for you? Where do you run 
candidates?’ They want something concrete, and you can present them with a campaign, 
which we did, that’s concrete and something they can get involved with, but not everyone is 
an activist. Even activists aren’t thinking long term a lot of the time. People want an 
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alternative that already exists, but you can’t have that either, you have to engage people and 
organize both electorally and non-electorally, to put it simply, and the Labor Party never got 
that straight.”230 Even while Just Healthcare showed a higher degree of success than the 
campaign for the 28th Amendment, it had its limitations, and this would cause the Labor 
Party to return to the question of electoral strategy.   
The 1998 Convention 
 The Labor Party put out a call for its first Constitutional Convention in March of 
1998, scheduling it for two-and-a-half days from the Thirteenth to the Fifteenth of November 
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.231 The convention would represent the high-water mark for the 
Labor Party in terms of activity, press coverage, and membership with numerous mainstream 
news services running stories on it. The convention saw growth in its number of delegates, 
with forty-seven additional attendees bringing the total count to 1,414 delegates.232 If the LP 
ever really approached twenty thousand members, it likely would have been in this period. 
By March of 1998, the Labor Party was also growing in terms of union endorsements, adding 
a ninth International Union to its list of endorsing organizations in addition to numerous 
additional locals.233 Members didn’t know it at the time, but this would be the last new 
international union endorsement for the Labor Party.234 As Jeff Booth would recall, “the 
second convention was probably about as enthusiastic as the first, but this time because the 
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LP was growing fast, rather than because it was new.”235 The official convention report 
which appeared in The Labor Party Press in January of 1999 noted “It was a wiser and more 
sober crowd, and perhaps a more determined one,” highlighting how the Labor Party had 
grown and learned from the experiences of the past two years.236 The key feature of the 
Constitutional Convention would be electoral strategy, with the LP Electoral Commission 
founded at the 1996 Convention finally releasing a plan for electoral campaigns to be ratified 
at the convention. This plan included a number of similarities to the ILWU motion from 1996 
in regard to financing and holding candidates accountable, with a notable difference being 
“The Labor Party will support only candidates for office who are Labor Party members 
running solely as Labor Party candidates. The Labor Party will not endorse any other 
candidates,” disqualifying LP chapters from endorsing independent labor candidates running 
on a similar basis to the Pittston Coal Strike candidate Jackie Stump but also ensuring locals 
would not go off and endorse fusion ballots or other third-party efforts. This report would 
spark lively debate going into the 1998 Convention, after the Interim National Committee 
adopted it on January twenty-fifth of that year.237  
 Although the 1998 convention did not receive recorded press coverage like the 1996 
convention, the preservation of Labor Party Press issues from the period through the Internet 
Archive’s Wayback Machine provide a comprehensive, if static, overview of the debate. 
While Labor Party Leadership and the pro-electoral elements of the party seemed to 
encourage the development of a concrete plan for elections, many in the Labor Party majority 
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remained opposed to running candidates in the immediate future. The Labor Party’s co-chair, 
Bob Clark, made this line of argument in an article presenting multiple delegates views, 
writing:  
“I think this proposal is a breath of fresh air… Our union has said all along that 
someday the Labor Party has to run candidates. 
If you're going to be a real political party, and you want to gather people around you 
and make it real in their eyes - that's what a political party does. 
But that doesn't mean that we're going to jump up and down as a union and say we 
should run candidates right away… We understand that you have to build a base in 
order to do that. In our union, we're focusing on getting our locals affiliated and 
building this thing.” 
Clark’s statement, although more positive toward elections than that of Carl Finamore to in 
1996, held fast to the majority position that the Labor Party was not ready to run candidates. 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Clark’s fellow Co-Chair, Kit Costello of the California 
Nurses Association. Interestingly, the only African American members quoted in this 
particular article both opposed running candidates in the immediate future, but this 
correlation with a sample size of two should not be indicative of trends within the broader 
party, Luisa Gratz, a Black woman, had been the most vocal proponent of the ILWU Local 
26 resolution in 1996.238 It might however a convenient way for those opposed to running 
candidates to portray the debate in the paper to subliminally shore up their case by making 
their position look the most diverse in terms of supporters. 
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 While many labor leaders were cautious to run candidates without a base of support, 
those in favor of running candidates argued that running candidates locally could be a means 
through which to build the labor party. They also argued that the Electoral Committee’s 
restrictions might prove to be damaging to the Labor Party’s efforts to grow. This time 
around, the contributors included former City Councilor Mike Ferner of Toledo Ohio, who 
wrote: 
“I had zero electoral experience myself, and very little experience even working on 
other people's campaigns. Going into it, people might not have thought it was 
credible, but by the time we got done, it was credible. I didn't win that time, but two 
years later I did win. So I think the Labor Party would not be doing itself any favors 
by establishing a high threshold for what is a credible campaign, because then you're 
never going to get the experience you need to get there.” 
This view was also expressed by Sean Sweeney of the New York Metro Chapter, a member 
of Labor Militant, which had recently went through a name change to be known as Socialist 
Alternative, who stressed the need to “run to win,” while also arguing for campaigns to plan 
two years in advance and outlining a plan for running candidates in New York City by 
2001.239 
 By the time delegates made it to the convention floor, the Labor Party had reached 
general agreement with the proposal of the Elections Committee, which seemed to satisfy 
both Labor Party members who wanted to wait to run candidates and those who wished to 
move ahead with electoral work as soon as possible. Despite the broad consensus, two 
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amendments were proposed and generated considerable debate on the first day of the 
convention. A section of delegates more eager to run Labor Party candidates submitted an 
amendment to “allow two of the three levels of Labor Party organization (local, state, and 
national) to approve electoral activity — which would remove the power of the national 
Labor Party to veto an electoral campaign.”240 It is unclear from the convention report which 
chapters, unions, or community organizations were behind this particular proposal. The 
“sectarians” described by Les Leopold in the Golden Gate and New York Metro Chapters 
appear to be likely suspects proposing the amendment, however, Leopold’s account has a 
tendency to blur the lines between different tendencies with different proposals, and his 
vague polemicizing makes it impossible to identify which groups were promoting more 
“autonomous” local and state organizations.241 Examining the paper of Socialist 
Alternative—which, like the organization, had undergone a name change from Labor 
Militant to Justice in 1997—their focus was on implementing a different amendment to the 
Election Committee’s proposal, with Sean Sweeney of the New York Metro Chapter 
advocating for the Labor Party to eliminate a criteria for elections requiring state 
organizations to have an arbitrary figure of one-thousand members before running 
candidates, and instead opt for a having a recognized state chapter. In fact, other than this 
proposed amendment, Sweeney’s article states “Justice supports the Electoral Committee’s 
report,” revealing that Leopold’s arch-sectarians in New York City were actually quite 
willing to collaborate with the national leadership in working out an electoral strategy.242 
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Based on the final version of the “Report on the Labor Party’s Future Electoral Strategy,” 
this amendment was accepted, and—given its omission from the Labor Party Press’ 
convention coverage—likely didn’t cause much debate.243 It is possible members of a 
different group, Socialist Organizer, in the Bay Area were behind the controversial 
amendment, although no documentary evidence has been found to confirm this. Whoever 
proposed and supported allowing chapters to run candidates with the approval of two levels 
of Labor Party organizations, “In the end, delegates voted overwhelmingly to defeat the 
amendment.”244 
 The second amendment to stir trouble on the convention floor proposed changing the 
Labor Party’s electoral strategy to allow chapters to run and endorse “fusion candidates” in 
states like New York. The amendment, proposed by “Bill Henning of Communications 
Workers of America Local [CWA] 1180” was intended to allow the New York State Labor 
Party and its affiliated chapters to secure the LP’s ballot line through endorsing candidates of 
the Green Party and Working Families Party.245 Labor Party leadership criticized fusion party 
strategies and with good reason, noting that “fusion parties become creatures of the major 
parties that they are hoping to transform. New York witnessed the disgraceful spectacle of 
the Working Families Party being forced to endorse a gubernatorial candidate who - even 
before the election! - promised to attack public worker unions and undermine public worker 
benefits.”246 Interestingly, the generally anti-electoral leadership centered around Tony 
Mazzocchi and Les Leopold found themselves in an alliance with members of the Labor 
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Party eager to run candidates, including the “sectarians.” Leading up to the convention, 
Socialist Alternative criticized the amendment being proposed, with Teamster El Jeer 
Hawkins of Harlem vowing that “We’ll continue to fight against the fusion illusion.”247 
Likewise, Vermont state representative and Progressive Party member Terry Bouricius took 
to the convention floor to denounce the amendment, cautioning that “cross-endorsements 
with Democrats or Republicans would be the death knell of the Labor Party.”248 Although 
supporters of the CWA amendment paid lip service to independent politics by voicing 
support for the Green Party, their simultaneous endorsement of the Working Families Party, 
which often endorsed Democrats, clued other Labor Party delegates in to the fact that the 
CWA in New York may have been less than committed to maintaining the standard of 
working class political independence that the Labor Party had been founded to promote. 
Although the fusion amendment was voted down, the debate over elections in the LP was far 
from over, and the diametrically opposed viewpoints emerging in the New York organization 
would pave the way for possibly the most contentious clash in the Labor Party’s history. 
However, rather than jump to this conflict, it is worth discussing the other results of the 1998 
convention. 
 As has been hinted at, the Labor Party’s efforts had attracted more than just the “the 
same old suspects” from the “old left unions” during the course of its activity. Institutionally 
the Labor Party was quite diverse, with endorsements from FLOC, the California Nurses 
Association, and the Kensington Welfare Rights Union, and by the second convention the 
diversity of its membership resulted was reflected in the formalization of its identity-based 
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caucuses.249 While until this point many caucus meetings had been described as “informal,” 
the convention reports from 1998 separate the meetings of the “black caucus, women’s 
caucus, and gay and lesbian caucus,” from the “thousands of informal conversations” 
occurring at the convention. Instead, these caucuses, the latter of which was a new 
development since 1996, “convened” in Cleveland.250 Although Les Leopold’s account of the 
Labor Party portrayed the debate over abortion as open and shut in 1996, the women’s 
caucus reopened the debate in 1998, proposing the change the language on reproductive 
services in the “Call for Economic Justice” from supporting “unimpeded access to a full 
range of family planning and reproductive services for men and women, including the right 
to continue or terminate a pregnancy,” to support “prenatal services and free, safe, legal 
abortion.” This was voted down by the convention, along with an attempt to get the Labor 
Party to adopt a more restrictive stance on abortion. By the end of the convention, Baldemar 
Velasquez, speaking on behalf of FLOC affirmed his union’s commitment to the Labor 
Party, regardless of the particular language on reproductive rights used in the program.251 It 
seems that the Labor Party leadership managed to maintain the peace between the Women’s 
Caucus and socially conservative layers of the Labor Party through the compromise 
language, which permitted abortions in all but name, but the compromise was still not ideal. 
When it came to anti-racist struggles, a resolution was proposed to oppose police brutality 
and get the Labor Party to organize solidarity actions in support of Mumia Abu Jamal, a 
journalist and former member of the Black Panther Party on death row, however it does not 
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seem to have been debated due to time constraints.252 At the very least, the circulation of 
resolutions among delegates provided more than fourteen-hundred labor leaders and readers 
of the Labor Party Press with information on the plight of Mumia Abu Jamal and what they 
could do support him, whether or not the national organization debated or took a stance on 
the case. At the second convention the Labor Party continued to avoid “the expediency of 
identity politics” to quote Katherine Isaac and Mark Dudzic, but this came at the cost of 
deadlocked debate on issues of social justice in front of the entire national organization.253 
Had the Labor Party continued longer than it did whilst holding regular conventions, it is 
unclear whether the abortion debate would have remained cordial.  
 Whether or not the Labor Party National Convention, the highest decision-making 
body in the organization, would convene regularly also became a point of contention in 1998. 
In organizing the Constitutional Convention, Mazzocchi had realized that holding such an 
affair was costly in terms of both time and money. For this reason, the Executive Committee 
of the Labor Party—the day-to-day governing body of the organization between 
conventions—proposed a constitutional amendment to allow the Interim National Council to 
determine when the next convention would be held with a minimum of one convention being 
held every five years, rather than the National Convention setting the date. This was met with 
considerable opposition, with delegates raising fears of the amendment curbing internal 
democracy. In the end, Mark Dudzic broke ranks with Tony Mazzocchi and the Executive 
Committee to propose a compromise where the National Convention would be convened in 
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2002, about three-and-a-half years after the 1998 convention instead of two years.254 Despite 
this compromise prevailing along with another constitutional reform granting a full vote to 
representatives of State Labor Parties on Interim National Council, rather than only one-fifth 
of a vote, some Labor Party members were still worried about issues of internal democracy 
by the end of the convention. David Walters, a member of the Golden Gate Chapter and the 
volunteer behind the Labor Party’s web page, praised the changes made to electoral policy at 
the convention, but stated: 
“I think the convention was in some ways less democratic than the last one. At the 
founding convention, delegates could lobby the resolutions and constitutional 
committees. This time, no one knew until the day of the convention who was on those 
committees. There was less time for debate and, of course, there was the 
overwhelming vote of the internationals that could, as a bloc, make the convention go 
any way they wanted.”255 
Despite the great hopes and productivity of debate at the second convention, and the growth 
of the Labor Party which preceded it, cracks in the coalition were beginning to show. Over 
the course of the two years that followed, the internal democratic structures of the Labor 
Party would be put to the test locally on the question of fusion ballots, and the national party 
would fail to intervene constructively. 
The Battle for the New York Metro Chapter 1999-2000 
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 The New York State Labor Party became a hot bed for political debate following the 
second convention, as the state housed two factions representing opposite tendencies within 
the LP. Despite the emergence of factionalism between unions like CWA local 1180 in favor 
of endorsing “progressive” Democrats using fusion ballots and activists—including members 
of Socialist Alternative—in favor of running independent candidates, the New York Metro 
chapter had grown considerably since the founding of the Campaign for a Labor Party in 
1989. Numbers—as seems to be usual with the Labor Party—vary from account to account, 
with Mark Dudzic recalling the chapter had approximately one thousand and two hundred 
members at its height.256 Articles from Justice in 2000 place membership figures at “over one 
thousand,” in the Spring of that year and about nine hundred in the summer, following 
somewhat tense chapter leadership elections.257 Based on these accounts, a safe guess would 
be that the New York Metro Chapter had about one thousand members, with more than that 
around the 1998 convention and fewer as debate in the chapter ran its course. Although all 
sides of the debate could have acted differently to ensure the health of the New York Metro 
chapter, the local union leadership clearly violated democratic norms in the chapter’s 
leadership elections, making them the antagonists of the affair. Furthermore, the failure of 
Mazzocchi and the Labor Party’s leadership to act decisively and form a united front with 
members of Socialist Alternative in the chapter, who they were politically closer to, 
undermined the credibility of their own commitment to independent politics and maintaining 
internal party democracy. 
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 Despite not having “significant” union support in New York State, the Labor Party 
managed to grow rapidly through the efforts of its activist core. As Socialist Alternative 
member Alan Jones wrote, the New York Metro chapter played a “trailblazing role in terms 
of initiatives, campaigns, public events and politics in the party.”258 Members of the chapter 
regularly tabled for Labor Party Campaigns, and held a number of successful public events, 
even attracting celebrity attention. The Labor Party Press regularly reported the New York 
Metro Chapter drawing crowds, republishing an article from the chapter’s newsletter, 
MetroActive, describing a benefit with film maker Michael Moore drawing “over 350 people 
and raised thousands of dollars for the chapter” on February Ninth, 1997.259 On May 
Seventeenth, 1999, the New York Metro “put on a rollicking two-and-a-half-hour 
hootenanny for some 470 people” to raise funds and awareness for the Just Healthcare 
campaign. In addition to Michael Moore and a plethora of lesser-known artists, the famous 
communist and folk singer Pete Seeger took the stage for the event.260 Possibly the largest 
event organized by the New York Metro chapter was a seven-hundred-person rally to 
commemorate Karen Silkwood, a labor activist martyred while working with Tony 
Mazzocchi and the OCAW to expose health and safety concerns at the Cimarron Fuel 
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Fabrication Site in Oklahoma.261 Thus, although unions in New York City were often 
“hostile” to the Labor Party’s efforts, it managed to maintain an active organization, even in 
the immediate aftermath of the 1998 convention. 
 The debate in the New York Metro Chapter grew directly out of the debate at the 
center of the Labor Party’s Constitutional Convention, with the rival political perspectives 
putting forward two different leadership slates in the November 1999 elections for the 
chapter’s Executive Committee. The Communication Workers of America and other union 
locals in New York City formed the “New Directions” slate to challenge the incumbent 
Executive Committee majority known as the “United Action slate,” which included a number 
of the chapter’s leading activists and members of Socialist Alternative like Sean Sweeney 
and Gloria Mattera. The former faction represented a minority position in the Labor Party, 
advocating for fusion candidacies and endorsements. They also opposed the United Action 
slate’s criticism of union leaders in New York City, citing worries that protesting union 
leadership and Democratic Party politicians would alienate the labor movement in general to 
the LP’s detriment. United Action fired back that their goal was not to win over union 
leadership, noting that union leaders in New York were “firmly embedded” in the 
Democratic Party establishment and had even endorsed Republican Mayor Rudy Giuliani in 
the most recent election. The United Action slate instead wanted to focus on organizing ran-
and-file union members and communities to challenge both union leaders and the two parties 
of big business in the city.262 The far left of the Labor Party, represented by United Action in 
this context, probably had the most in common with the LP’s national leadership in practical 
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terms, in that both groups were strong opponents of fusion politics at the 1998 convention, 
and agreed with the word of the Labor Party’s Electoral Policy, even if they differed in levels 
of enthusiasm for running candidates. On the other hand, while Tony Mazzocchi himself was 
more or less sympathetic to socialists, likely due to his “experiences with Reds and radicals 
in the ‘40s,” his “advisers” were biased against them, “fearing” they would tear the Labor 
Party apart.263 The “sectarians” in the New York Metro chapter had thus far been productive 
members of the Labor Party, but from the beginning Labor Party leaders held the belief “that 
unions had to be at the core,” of the effort to build a party, which led them to treat building 
community organizing and activism as secondary priorities to bringing union leadership on 
board with the LP.264 Without strong institutional support from unions, the odds were stacked 
against the United Action slate from the start if the Labor Party leadership had to intervene. 
 The election period got off to a reasonable start, with supporters of both slates going 
to membership with leaflets and campaign materials promoting their visions of the New York 
Metro Chapter’s future, whether it lay in running candidates or fusion voting. After weeks of 
campaigning and debates, “Suspicions of fraud were aroused when the night before ballots 
were to be sent out, (November 12) membership coupons for scores of new members were 
handed to the Chapter’s Election committee. A large portion of these—77—were the recruits 
of one individual candidate of New Directions, who had no record of recruiting anyone 
before becoming a candidate.” The United Action slate took immediate action, sending out 
members to visit the new recruits and deliver election leaflets, only to find that the members 
“included children as young as one year old, 7 years old, ten years old, instances of an 
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address where 8 of the new recruits ostensibly lived there but there was only one person 
actually living there, and people who had no clue about being members of the Labor Party 
other than they knew or were related to the New Directions candidate.”265 The accounts of 
the New Directions slate are not -available, unfortunately leaving their perspective on how 
the elections went out of the picture, but the case for a fraudulent election was quite strong.  
According to Les Leopold, chaos quickly descended upon the chapter as “charges and 
countercharges” dominated every meeting. Leopold repeats the story about one group 
“signing up toddlers to pad its numbers,” but his account otherwise lacks specifics, ignoring 
the political issues in the debate (earlier iterations of which are well documented in the Labor 
Party Press’ convention coverage) and taking a plague upon both of your houses approach to 
the matter. As is usual in Leopold’s book, Mazzocchi is the reasonable man in the middle, 
trying to make peace.266 Leopold entered his anecdote with a preconceived bias that both 
groups must be wrong, because both were “fringe ideological sects,” and anyone deemed a 
sect by Leopold was bad.267 Where his argument ultimately breaks down is the point that one 
of the two groups was not a “fringe ideological sect,” the New Directions slate clearly had 
the backing of union leadership in the chapter with close ties to the Working Families Party, 
and by association with that party’s strategy, were supportive of Democrats.268 He states the 
debate drove away “unionists and other non-sectarian workers,” yet the key antagonist in the 
affair was a section of labor union leadership, coming from CWA Local 1180.269 In fact, the 
driving out of members Leopold cites is contradicted by the fact that at the time of its 
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suspension, the New York Metro Chapter still claimed nine-hundred members, meaning a net 
loss of about one-hundred since the electoral fraud became a debate in the chapter.270 If “non-
sectarian” workers were a majority, and they likely were, why did the debate only drive away 
about 10% of membership? Despite clear grounds for an investigation of fraud, the chair of 
the chapter Election Committee, himself a union leader, only accepted eight challenges of the 
seventy seven ballots mailed under suspicious circumstances—mailed the same day and from 
the same location in addition to including children, a corpse, and individuals unaware of their 
membership—resulting in an election where “New Directions candidates elected all 17 of 
their slate by an average differential of about 60 votes.”271 Despite significant evidence, 
Mazzocchi refused to intervene in the affair decisively. 
One possible interpretation of events, and this is subject to change if more evidence 
were to emerge, is that Mazzocchi, Leopold, and company were more afraid of setting a 
precedent for disciplining union leaders they wanted in their party than they were for setting 
a precedent for punishing breaches of democratic norms. The Executive Committee had 
already shown a tendency for favoring union leadership over community organizations in 
how they ran conventions.272 Despite the New Directions slate having opposite politics to the 
rest of the Labor Party with their endorsement of fusion voting and their likely breach of 
democratic norms, coming out strongly against the few unions to support the Labor Party in 
New York City while supporting the socialist faction would possibly alienate other union 
leaders, and according to Mazzocchi’s approach to organizing, the endorsements of union 
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leaders would bring members to the Labor Party. Denouncing both sides of the debate would 
also allow the Interim National Council to consolidate its power in the Labor Party, as Les 
Leopold notes the solution to the crisis was to suspend the whole chapter and switch to a 
system of “chartered organizing committees.273 Leopold had already showed authoritarian 
tendencies in his view of how the Labor Party should be run by proposing “shutting out” the 
sectarians he despised, adding some credibility to the notion the Labor Party leadership 
would want to centralize power at the cost of internal democracy if they felt a threat to their 
control.274 
The New York Metro Chapter’s suspension in May of 2000 would precipitate serious 
changes in the approach of Socialist Alternative. According to Jeff Booth, until the chapter’s 
suspension Sean Sweeney and the New York membership had led a faction in Socialist 
Alternative’s National Committee in favor of liquidating into the Labor Party. Booth and 
Philip Locker, a student member from Oberlin College, had argued against this faction on the 
grounds that most of Socialist Alternative’s new recruits at the turn of the century were 
coming from the international anti-Globalization movement, college campuses, and 
intervening in the Ralph Nader campaign. The suspension of the New York Metro chapter 
shifted the terms of debate--to borrow a term from Mazzocchi—in the organization. Without 
a Labor Party to intervene in, Sweeney, who had built his entire perspective in Labor Militant 
and Socialist Alternative around the LP, would soon part ways and focus on his academic 
career.275 Gloria Materra, who held a position on the NYM LP chapter’s Executive 
Committee would leave Socialist Alternative but remain an ardent supporter of independent 
 
273 Leopold, The Man, 465. 
274 Ibid, 451. 
275 See Appendix I. 
 Bilsky 96 
left politics, taking on a leadership role in the Green Party in New York and helping convince 
the Green Party to adopt the Labor Party’s economic platform.276 Those that stayed in 
Socialist Alternative would reorient to Booth and Locker’s perspectives, and the “Battle of 
Seattle” against globalization would mark a turning point for the organization, paving the 
way for its intervention in Occupy Wall Street and the eventual election of city councilor 
Kshama Sawant.277 
The Labor Party’s Slow Demise 2000-2002 
Despite the suspension of the largest chapter in the Labor Party, Les Leopold was 
somewhat unconcerned about the effect it had on the party’s viability. The loss of the New 
York Metro chapter was temporarily offset by “union recruiting” which had “accelerated a 
bit.”278 Even with a surge in membership, the Labor Party’s days were numbered. The 
pressures of the 2000 election would undo much of the anti-Democratic Party sentiment 
which had fomented in the Labor Party after Clinton passed NAFTA. The resulting decline in 
union militancy would evaporate the Labor Party’s base of support, while a stealthily 
encroaching recession for working people and sudden nationalistic shift in U.S. politics in 
2001 would unilaterally wipe out left politics and movements in the United States. The Labor 
Party limped into its third and final convention in 2002, its fate sealed by the changing 
political climate and the loss of support from the labor movement and community activists. 
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 Although endorsements from union locals and labor leaders brought the Labor Party 
new sources of income, they did not necessarily translate to increases in active membership. 
In Boston Jeff Booth remembered “severe gatekeeping” when it came to trying to meet with 
the membership of union locals, even when it came to “ostensibly pro-Labor Party union 
officials.” While Booth noted that some unions, like the UE made efforts to build the Labor 
Party, for most their endorsements were just on paper. Even officials in Mazzocchi’s own 
union could be difficult, “I remember there was an OCAW local in Waltham, and we met 
with one person from that local where we said, ‘we want to meet with your members.’ We 
would put forward different formulas for both official and unofficial meetings, but 99% of 
the time, including at that OCAW local, the officials would either say “no, we can’t do that” 
or they would just string us along until it never happened.”279 Although Mazzocchi made a 
concerted effort to keep the Labor Party effort real in OCAW, even the support of his own 
union would dry up over time.  
As noted in the first chapter, Bob Wages, president of the OCAW, always had an 
uneasy relationship with Tony Mazzocchi, but he supported the Labor Party after the success 
of Mazzocchi’s polls of union members in 1989. Unfortunately, the pressures placed on the 
labor movement by the tides of history would eventually catch up with OCAW. Despite a 
revival of union militancy and the rise of the “New Voice” AFL-CIO leadership in 1995, 
union density continued its steady decline, dropping from 14.9% when John Sweeney took 
power to 13.5% by 2001.280 In general, “globalization and deindustrialization had ravaged 
the membership of sponsoring unions,” reducing the Labor Party’s remaining base for 
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recruitment and finances.281 The “Tech Bubble” of the 1990s helped to offset the economic 
impacts of deindustrialization, keeping the markets afloat as “National employment in 
technology sector industries shot up by 36 percent over the period,” and “Average weekly 
wages for technology sector workers doubled, rising by 102 percent over the 10-year 
period.”282 Unfortunately for American workers, this did not translate to economic 
prosperity, as in addition to the loss of industrial employers in the U.S., what jobs remained 
“had been downgraded significantly through the increasing prevalence of part-time 
employment, wage cuts, and work speedup.”283As the labor movement withered in the late 
1990s, Bob Wages began to question the viability of the OCAW, stating “We were losing 
members and not organizing in sufficient numbers to give me hope that we could reverse our 
fortunes through organizing.” In January of 1999, Wages finalized a merger between his 
union and the more conservative United Paperworkers International Union to form the Paper, 
Allied, Chemical, and Energy International Union (PACE).284 By 2001, the conservative 
currents within PACE had won out and leadership of the union ended subsidies for the Labor 
Party, which had been key to paying the LP’s full time staff.285 In the past the Labor Party 
had built a base of dues paying union locals and membership capable of raising thousands of 
dollars at events, but events out of Mazzocchi’s hands were rapidly eroding this financial 
base. To add to the Labor Party’s growing money problems, U.S. politics were undergoing 
changes as well. 
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Although John Sweeney had initially taken an ambivalent stance on the Labor Party, 
and even went so far as to question the relationship between the Democratic Party and the 
AFL-CIO in some writings, the 2000 election would mark an end for union leaders tolerating 
independent political projects. Facing the prospect of another Bush presidency in the 2000 
election, the AFL-CIO rallied its support around AL Gore’s campaign. In addition, John 
Sweeney proved an unwillingness to break from the Democratic Party, instead opting to 
change the party from within through the “2000 in 2000” campaign which aimed to elect two 
thousand union members into office on Democratic Party Ballot lines in the election. This 
strategy saw considerable success for the Democrats and the AFL-CIO in terms of winning 
races, as the effort exceed its goal by six hundred seats.286 The pressure to support the 
Democratic Party in the 2000 election was great even within the Labor Party. Although Tony 
Mazzocchi personally liked Ralph Nader, who spoke at the Labor Party conventions in 1996 
and 1998 and at times donated office space and funds to the effort, by the end of 2000, any 
association with Nader was political suicide in the Labor movement. Mazzocchi spoke at the 
Green Party convention that nominated Nader, which was a bridge too far for the labor 
leaders and discredited the effort in the eyes of many unions which pulled their 
endorsements.287 As Dudzic and Isaac put it, “The debacle of the stolen 2000 Presidential 
election - and the subsequent scapegoating of Green Party candidate Ralph Nader as a spoiler 
- created an environment hostile to any attempt to build an independent political 
movement.”288 This hostility would only increase in the year that followed. 
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 Although the 2000 election brought organized labor back firmly within the confines 
of the Democratic Party, the terrorist attacks which took place on September 11th, 2001 
would put what little remained of progressivism in general, let alone the independent and 
socialist left, in the country on hold until the Iraq War. In response to the high jacking of 
planes into the Pentagon and the Twin Towers, a sudden wave of nationalism swept the U.S. 
Jeff Booth recalled how every street in Boston was plastered with American Flags, to the 
point that any house not waving flags and holding candlelight vigils on its porch became a 
curiosity to stare at. When the attack occurred, Booth had been tabling with Phillip Locker 
outside of Breuger’s Bagels in Boston, upon seeing the event occur on a television screen 
inside and pausing to fully grasp what was happening, they realized “we won’t be able to do 
anything after this.” According to Booth “Nothing was going on for the Left after that until 
the anti-Iraq War movement, if the 2000 election had knocked the Labor Party down, 9/11 
buried it.”289 While Bush entered office with a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of many 
Americans, his response to the September Eleventh Attacks resulted in a sudden conservative 
shift in U.S. politics, with Bush’s popularity soaring in the aftermath.290 
 Mazzocchi’s Labor Party managed to push on to the promised 2002 convention, but 
not in great shape. The Labor Party stopped publishing The Labor Party Press online by 
November of 2000, leaving few traces from the Labor Party until 2004 with the launch of the 
Labor Party News. The 2002 convention was held in late July, sometime around the twenty-
seventh, in Washington, D.C. and included a demonstration.291 An article from Socialist 
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Alternative commented that “Going into the LP's 2nd national convention in 1998, the party's 
newspaper was full of interviews and debates between LP activists about how to build the 
party effectively. This time, there are so few activists left that The LP Press did not run a 
single article about convention debates - just the invitation to the conference.”292 Even former 
Labor Party leadership acknowledges the LP’s last convention reflected the “diminished 
prospects” of the new period, taking a “step back” from the electoral strategy approved in 
1998 to refocus on “issue-oriented organizing campagins.”293 Unlike the 1998 Convention, 
the 2002 did not receive press coverage, but a story on Mazzocchi appeared in the New York 
Times in August, painting a similarly drear picture of the Labor Party in that year. As the 
Labor Party struggled to survive, so did Mazzocchi, battling Pancreatic Cancer with only “a 
few weeks or a few months to live.” According to Greenhouse’s report, the Labor Party had 
stagnated at 14,000 members, relying on the support of 350 remaining union locals to keep it 
afloat.294 Tony Mazzocchi would die a few months later on October fifth, 2002. Committed 
to building the Labor Party to the bitter end, even in his final months he remained optimistic 
that it would outlive him, when asked about the LP’s slow growth he told the press “Looking 
at the experience of the Social Democratic parties in Europe, they didn't grow overnight.”295  
  Mazzocchi’s death did not bring about the end of the Labor Party. In the literal sense, 
the party outlived its founder, with elements of the LP making a few last efforts to organize 
through 2010. In another, the LP’s fate had been sealed much earlier, with tactical 
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blunders—not running candidates and failing to prioritize organizing non-union workers—
and changing conditions compounding to ensure its decline. The task remains to assess the 
party’s lasting influence on labor politics, and its relevance to socialist, left, and broadly 
working-class politics today. 
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Conclusion: Wither the Labor Party? 
The Labor Party would outlive Mazzocchi by about five years, finally suspending its 
operations in 2007.296 In this period, it would attempt to rebrand its internet presence and 
even make its only foray into electoral politics, but such moves did not translate to any 
lasting growth. Having explored the main body of the Labor Party’s history, the task of 
assessing its legacy, and what workers, socialists, and labor leaders can learn from the Labor 
Party experience remains. The central question of this assessment must be, what—if 
anything—could have been done differently to have made the Labor Party effort a success? 
For the purposes of this discussion, “success” should be defined in terms of the New 
Democratic Party in Canada, an oft cited inspiration for Mazzochi’s Labor Party. Mark 
Dudzic explains this point best, recounting: 
“The NDP was interesting. First of all, because a lot of unions had direct experience 
with it, so it was accessible and was comfortable to the union culture. And you had 
the model of the passage of single-payer healthcare that was led by the NDP even 
though they didn’t actually hold power in any province except Saskatchewan. They 
were a minority power nationally, but they were able to, as Tony always used to say, 
seize the terms of debate and move a working-class agenda with a national political 
basis. That was really important. And then you had these exciting new movements in 
the context of neoliberalism.”297 
This anecdote establishes a much lower bar for success than the outright replacement of one 
of the two dominant parties in American politics, while also setting a higher standard than 
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simply winning various isolated offices. Thus, for the Labor Party to have been successful, it 
would have either needed to achieve substantive elected power in a particular administrative 
region, such as a state, or through its creation won a significant social democratic reform. In 
the latter case, the passage of any of the Labor Party’s campaigns, including Just Healthcare, 
the 28th Amendment Campaign, and Free Higher Education, could be considered such 
reforms. Although the Labor Party failed to meet these criteria, only resembling the NDP’s 
success in its institutional support from unions (albeit on a smaller scale), it is worth 
pondering how the Labor Party could have survived long enough to play a similar political 
role to the NDP, but in U.S. politics. 
First, the ability of conditions outside of the Labor Party’s control which affected its 
growth must not be underestimated. As discussed earlier, a set of clear-cut political and 
economic factors precipitated the rise and fall of the Labor Party. The emergence of 
neoliberalism in the 1970s and the collapse of the post-war bargaining regime after the 
PATCO strike in the early 1980s created a gap between the organized working class in the 
United States and both the Democratic and Republican Parties. Although unions had high 
hopes for Bill Clinton in the 1990s, the passage of NAFTA under his watch, and in turn Lane 
Kirkland’s inability to defeat the trade agreement, opened the door for a revival of social 
unionism in the United States to challenge both the Democratic Party and AFL-CIO 
establishments. The Labor Party, along with the very much distinct New Voice leadership led 
by John Sweeney, represent two political reactions to those circumstances, with the Labor 
Party representing a reaction from the left of the new AFL-CIO leadership. The failure of the 
labor movement to reverse the trend of declining union membership in the face of 
deindustrialization caused by NAFTA eventually eroded the institutions which funded the 
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Labor Party and made its existence possible, at least under Mazzocchi and company’s 
framework of centering the party around unions. Finally, the fallout of the 2000 elections and 
the September 11th terrorist attacks acted as an ideological damper on independent politics 
and labor militancy. In the face of such circumstances, the Labor Party had little chance of 
maintaining its momentum in the early 2000s, but different courses of action may have 
allowed the LP to weather the storm and reemerge with new vigor by 2008, acting as a pole 
of attraction for the Occupy Wall Street movement which emerged then. 
In a comparative study of the rise of the Australian Labor Party and the near 
establishment of a Labor Party in the United States by the American Federation of Labor in 
the 1890s, Robin Archer discussed several factors which may have made the difference 
between a Labor Party forming in the former country, but not the latter. Among the factors 
most relevant to this project were questions of Race and Immigration, which will be 
broadened to include issues of Social Justice as well, the organization of unions in each 
country, and the role of socialists in the labor party efforts.298 In the context of Archer’s 
work, the focus of the chapters on Race and Immigration was the effect of racial and ethnic 
hostility on the development of a labor party. Archer deemed hostility based on race and 
immigration “Negative” factors, meaning that neither one had a significant impact on the 
development of a labor party in the 1890s, given that Australia and the U.S. experienced 
similar levels of both in industrial working-class communities (particularly hatred toward 
Chinese and Eastern and Southern European immigrants), and a labor party still developed in 
Australia. Of the two factors, hostility toward immigrants became a decisive factor in the 
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1900s, but not in the 1890s.299 Mazzocchi’s Labor Party, unlike much earlier attempts at 
forming a Labor Party, developed explicitly anti-racist perspectives, and, in contrast to the 
AFL’s position of non-discrimination in affiliate union bylaws but allowing unions to 
discriminate on the basis of race in practice, went so far as to develop Black leadership—
including LP co-chair Robert Clark, Theresa El Amin, and Adolph Reed, Jr.—and internal 
caucuses to discuss and promote issues faced by People of Color within the organization.300 
In fact, after Mazzocchi’s death, one of the last holdouts of the Labor Party was in South 
Carolina, where the party obtained sixteen-thousand signatures from working-class, often 
majority Black, communities to obtain state ballot access.301 In Boston, Jeff Booth recalled 
the Labor Party becoming a forum for coordinating ant-racist organizing in the Labor 
Movement, with Theresa El Amin recruiting Alan Booth—no relation—and Jeff to organize 
with Black Workers For Justice.302 
This is not to say that the Labor Party always excelled in the category of organizing 
for social justice. Although it had a base of immigrant Latino workers through FLOC and a 
number of leading Black labor activists in its ranks, some of the Labor Party’s stances today 
might be seen as not going far enough, such as on the question of abortion. Although 
Mazzocchi’s closest associates attempted to portray the debate over abortion as a cleanly tied 
up debate through an organic compromise in language, the debate at the second LP 
convention and a copy of the program distributed as a pamphlet in New York City contradict 
this. Had the Labor Party persisted for longer, with more conventions, the failure to settle the 
 
299 Ibid, 234. 
300 Archer, No Labor Party, 52-53. 
301 Seidman and Dudzic, “Looking Back,” 14. 
302 See Appendix I, Jeff Booth is not African American, but BWFJ took a multi-racial approach to organizing 
and would include white workers in an effort to build class solidarity across racial divisions. 
 Bilsky 107 
debate over abortion and possibly other social questions could have snowballed over time. 
Likewise, anti-racism should have featured more prominently in The Labor Party Press. 
Among the “Positive” factors, or factors which played a decisive role in the 
establishment of labor parties, Archer lists the impact of what was known in the 1890s as 
“new unionism,” a tendency which organized “unskilled and semi-skilled workers into large 
‘open’” industrial or general unions. The new unions, as opposed to the more conservative, 
closed craft unions, “had the motivation and the resources to engage in independent political 
activity.”303 The rise of new unionism in the 1890s could be seen as a political parallel to the 
revived labor militancy and social unionism which took hold in the AFL-CIO from the late 
1980s through the 1990s, which emphasized challenging the establishment, diversifying 
unions and their leadership, and organizing immigrant, public sector, and service industry 
workers along with traditional factory and trade workers. According to Archer, the weakness 
of the new unionism in the United States played a decisive role in preventing the growth of a 
labor party in the 1890s, in particular, the reluctance of Samuel Gompers to embrace the 
tendency of such unions toward independent political action thwarted the effort.304 Likewise, 
John Sweeney’s favorable orientation to the Democratic Party and at best ambivalent stance 
on the Labor Party in the 1990s did not help the Labor Party’s growth, but if Sweeney and 
other labor leaders had intervened decisively in support of the LP it could have totally 
changed the course of the effort. Furthermore, as has been discussed, even among the unions 
and locals that endorsed the Labor Party, organizers often found it impossible to talk to rank-
and-file membership about the party. The “severe gatekeeping” of the union locals would 
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hurt the LP’s recruitment efforts in the long term and further undermine the party’s aim to 
promote social unionism.305 Had union leaders supporting the Labor Party made a greater 
effort to mobilize rank-and-file members of their locals, the party could have built a stronger 
base and overcome its stagnation at about 14,000 members. 
In the context of the 1890s, Archer also cites the impact of socialist sectarianism as a 
factor in the Labor Party’s failure, noting that union leaders feared that if they established a 
Labor Party it would “lead to a destructive outbreak of factional conflicts between activists.” 
Importantly, Archer blames both reformists and revolutionaries for these conflicts.306 While 
this played a role in the Labor Party, particularly in the conflict between the pro-fusion and 
pro-independent candidate factions of the New York Metro chapter, revolutionary socialists 
overwhelmingly played a positive role in building the LP and genuinely intended to build a 
Labor Party and not just carve away whatever recruits they could. Had Mazzocchi and the 
Executive Committee intervened decisively against the anti-democratic measures taken by 
the “New Directions” slate in 1999, a slate which stood for fusion balloting in opposition to 
overwhelming majority of the LP, rather than taking a plague upon both your houses 
approach, they likely could have built an amicable relationship with the so-called 
“sectarians” of the New York Metro Chapter.  
Unfortunately, in the midst of prioritizing unions that often failed to deliver even a 
fraction of the active membership they claimed to represent, the Labor Party leadership 
sidelined community organizers and rank-and-file union activists. In a period of declining 
union membership, any attempt to build a workers’ party of any sort would first and foremost 
 
305 See Apendix I. 
306 Archer, No Labor Party, 240. 
 Bilsky 109 
need to flow from an active drive to organize workers not affiliated with unions. The 
example of the New York Metro Chapter showed that a sizeable organization could be built 
out of unorganized workers and rank-and-file activists, with or without the approval of local 
labor leaders. While some labor leaders promised to challenge the AFL-CIO leadership in the 
streets at the 1996 convention, in practice this did not play out in a significant manner 
coming from the Labor Party. Les Leopold rejected an organizing model based on Jesse 
Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition as the wrong way to start, due to it being too oriented to 
existing progressives and activists.307 However, an activist coalition model could have been 
the solution to the Labor Party’s growth problems. As Gary Olson, a veteran organizer of the 
New Left and Students for a Democratic Society in the 1960s and 70s, argued:  
“For me, creating a mass movement must take precedence over a new party or at least 
they must occur simultaneously. I’m encouraged by the interest now in evidence 
about the first Rainbow Coalition in Chicago in the late 1960s. The Black Panthers, 
Young Lords (Puerto Rican) and the Young Patriots (poor white migrants from 
Appalachia) were able to put aside their differences in favor of their interests as a 
class. Alas, owing to COINTELPRO this was not to be but there’s no objective 
reason it can’t be attempted again on a larger scale. It was this type of vision that 
animated my original attraction to the Labor Party.”308 
Olson draws an important parallel between the Labor Party’s mission and Fred Hampton’s 
Rainbow Coalition, in that both groups aimed to organize on a class basis as a means of 
fighting oppression, both economic and social. Modeling a coalition approach after the 
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original Rainbow Coalition, organized by the working class from the bottom up, rather than 
Jackson’s top-down Democratic Party campaign could have been a means of engaging 
community members in the Labor Party and provided a basis for launching challenges to 
bureaucratic leadership in the AFL-CIO and organizing new workplaces to further grow the 
Labor Party’s institutional support from unions. 
 Finally, the question of electoral politics played an important role in determining the 
success of the 1996 Labor Party. Although Mark Dudzic often drew parallels between the 
Labor Party and the New Democratic Party in Canada, he notably ignored that the NDP had 
from the start been an electoral effort in his analysis. This fact comes up in a roundabout 
fashion when Dudzic and Isaac note the prominence of an animated adaptation of NDP 
founder Tommy Douglas’ Mouseland speech in the 1980s, where Douglas describes the 
“story of a mouse that faces the false dilemma of voting for either a black cat or a white cat, 
parties that clearly do not represent the interests of the mouse.”309 Getting into a comparative 
history of the LP and the NDP is a task for another day, but it will suffice to say that the 
Labor Party opposed electoral politics, while taking inspiration from a movement started by a 
politician, not a union organizer like Mazzocchi. The Labor Party made an electoral effort in 
the last year or so of its existence by petitioning for ballot access in South Carolina, but gave 
up saying “Even this inspiring effort, however, fell victim to the growing marginalization of 
the labor movement and the rising tide of Obamamania.”310 By 2006 when the ballot access 
effort began, even many of chapters of the Labor Party which didn’t suffer from alleged 
sectarian conflicts, such as the Brenan chapter in Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania, had packed 
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up shop.311 While conditions may have been against the Labor Party running a campaign in 
2007 when they ceased operations, the Labor Party could have made earlier efforts to enter 
electoral politics, while it still had the support of unions and an active, national membership. 
As Jeff Booth argued: 
“People don’t wait forever. Short-termisim, in terms of political thinking is a fact of 
life. When you’re organizing you have a window of opportunity, you have a mood, 
and if you don’t go through that window or hit the mood right people move on to 
something else. In this country that means the “progressive” Democrats that come on 
the scene promising the world. If you’re going to form a workers’ party in this 
country, it’s not like you’ll have forever to do it. The issue-based campaigns and sign 
up a million people things didn’t work. To attract people to the project of building a 
Labor Party you have to actually do it. You can debate whether that means simply 
running local candidates, running in wider races, or a combination.”312 
While it can’t be said for certain if running candidates would have saved the Labor Party, at 
least in terms of letting it survive to play a role in the next uptick of struggle, by the time the 
LP stopped dragging their feet and moved into the electoral arena, their window of 
opportunity had long been shut. With overwhelming support for a strategy of running 
candidates emerging from the 1998 convention, the Labor Party should have at least put the 
methods it outlined to the test, and such methods could have been the key to saving the LP. 
 When it came to shifting the terms of debate in the U.S. as Mazzocchi wanted, the 
Labor Party failed, with nothing to show for it. However, the Labor Party experience itself is 
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worth studying, in hopes of informing future discussions of whether the working class needs 
a party of its own and how such a party could be built. This thesis provides a comprehensive 
history of the effort, for the first time bringing previously obscure and disconnected primary 
documents together with the official accounts of the Labor Party published by leading figures 
like Les Leopold, Mark Dudzic, and Katherine Isaac. There is however more work to be 
done. The 1990s are still a relative frontier for labor history, and while Minchin provides a 
thorough history of the AFL-CIO, historians have yet to test his account or write a similarly 
extensive history of the rank-and-file labor movement in the period, an account comparable 
to something like Art Pries’ Labor’s Giant Step. Furthermore, as this conclusion attests to, 
modernizing Archers comparative history of the U.S. and Australian labor party efforts could 
be taken into the twentieth century, with the writing of a comparative history of the LP and 
the NDP, or maybe even a comparative history of the Green Party U.S., the Labor Party, and 
the Reform Party. Possibilities abound for pulling working class history closer to the present 
day. 
 Bilsky 113 
Bibliography 
Archer, Robin. Why Is There No Labor Party in the United States? PRINCETON; 
OXFORD:  
Princeton University Press, 2007. Accessed April 3, 2020. doi:10.2307/j.ctt7rg2c. 
Afscme 444, Tony Mazzochi Labor Party Meeting 1989 Full Movie. YouTube, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDt0zNCfgzQ.  
The Associated Press. “CAMPBELL SOUP REACHES ACCORD WITH UNION.” The 
New York Times, February 23, 1986, sec. 1.  
Barret, Tom, and George Saunders, eds. Information, Discussion, Discussion Bulletin in 
Defense of Marxism, 1996, 131 edition.  
Bilsky, Jacob, and Gary Olson. A Few Responses to Questions About the LP. Personal, 
February 17, 2021.  
Bilsky, Jacob, and Jeff Booth. A Revolutionary Socialist's Recollections of the Labor Party. 
Personal, January 24, 2021.  
“Biographies-Gloria Mattera.” Green Party U.S. Accessed April 23, 2021. 
https://www.gp.org/gloria_mattera.  
Borges, Frank, and Dave Campbell. “Report on the Labor Party's Future Electoral Strategy.” 
The Labor Party Press, March 1998. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908103954/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv32/election.htm.  
 Bilsky 114 
Brookhiser, Richard. “Reagan Revolution Redux.” The New York Times, November 11, 
1994, sec. A.  
Brown, Jenny. “The Corporations Have Two Parties, Now What?” Labor Notes, March 28, 
2013. https://www.labornotes.org/blogs/2013/02/corporations-have-two-parties-now-
what.  
Bruno, Ed. “28th Amendment Next Steps.” The Labor Party Press, March 1998. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908103050/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv32/28.htm.  
“A Call for Economic Justice: The Labor Party's Program.” Labor Party, 1996. 
http://www.thelaborparty.org/d_program.htm.  
“CA's Anti-Immigrant Proposition 187 Is Voided, Ending State's Five-Year Battle with 
ACLU, Rights Groups.” American Civil Liberties Union, July 29, 1999. 
https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/cas-anti-immigrant-proposition-187-voided-
ending-states-five-year-battle-aclu-rights.  
Caulfield, Norman. NAFTA and Labor in North America. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 2010.  
Clymer, Adam. “THE HEALTH CARE DEBATE: THE OVERVIEW; NATIONAL 
HEALTH PROGRAM, PRESIDENT'S GREATEST GOAL, DECLARED DEAD IN 
CONGRESS.” The New York Times, September 27, 1994.  
 Bilsky 115 
“Constitutional Debate.” The Labor Party Press, January 1999. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150917134421/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv41/lpp41_main9.ht
ml.  
Corporate Power and the American Dream: toward an Economic Agenda for Working 
People. Draft 5ed. New York, NY: The Labor Institute, 1997.  
Crick, Micheal. The March of Militant. London, UK: Farber and Farber Limited, 1986.  
Daniels, Ron. “Time for a New Party.” Against the Current, 1992, 39 edition. 
https://againstthecurrent.org/atc039/p5149/.  
“Delegate Resolutions.” The Labor Party Press, January 1999. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150917170813/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv41/lpp41_main8.ht
ml.  
Dudzic, Mark, and Katherine Isaac. “Labor Party Time? Not Yet.” Labor Party, December 
2012. http://www.thelaborparty.org/d_lp_time.htm.  
“Electoral Debut.” THe Labor Party Press, January 1997. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150917160738/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv41/lpp41_main2.ht
ml.  
“Endorsing Unions.” The Labor Party Press, March 1998. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150506204422/http://lpa.igc.org/unions.html.  
 Bilsky 116 
Gascon, Charles, and Evan Karson. “Growth in Tech Sector Returns to Glory Days of the 
1990s.” The Regional Economist, 2017, 24–26.  
Gigg, Greg. “Just Health Care Headed for the Ballot in a Third Community.” The Labor 
Party Press, September 1999. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908104505/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv45/lpp45_convgigg.
html.  
Greenhouse, Steven. “Anthony Mazzocchi, 76, Dies; Union Officer and Party Father.” The 
New York Times, October 9, 2002, sec. A.  
Greenhouse, Steven. “Facing Death, Founder Fights for Labor Party's Life.” The New York 
Times, August 25, 2002, sec. 1.  
Greenhouse, Steven. “Man in the News: John Joseph Sweeney;New Fire for Labor.” The 
NEw York Times, October 26, 1995, sec. A.  
Griffith, Barbara S. The Crisis of American Labor: Operation Dixie and the Defeat of the 
CIO. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988.  
Herron, Sean. “Campaign for a Labor Party Formed in Boston.” Labor Militant. 1989, 14 
edition.  
Hirsch, Barry T, and David A McPherson. “UNION MEMBERSHIP AND COVERAGE 
DATABASE FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: NOTE .” Industrial 
 Bilsky 117 
and Labor Relations Review 56, no. 2 (January 2003): 349–54. 
http://www.unionstats.com/Hirsch-Macpherson_ILRR_CPS-Union-Database.pdf.  
“Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act.” Legal Information 
Institute. Legal Information Institute. Accessed April 22, 2021. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/illegal_immigration_reform_and_immigration_respo
nsibility_act.  
Isaac, Katherine, and Laura McClure, eds. “Moving to State Organizations.” The Labor 
Party Press, May 1997. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908104556/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv23/lp08.htm.  
Isaac, Katherine. “The Labor Party's Interim National Council Holds First Meeting.” The 
Labor Party Press, November 1996. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908103608/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv12/lpt9.html.  
Jones, Alan. “Campaign for a Labor Party Launched in New York City.” Labor Militant. 
1989, 12 edition.  
Jones, Alan. “New York Metro Chapter Suspended by State Executive Committee: How 
NOT to Build the Labor Party.” Justice, 2000, 20 edition.  
Jones, Alan. “Successful New York Conference.” Labor Militant. 1989, 13 edition.  
 Bilsky 118 
Katz, Jesse. “Gang Truce Leader: From Peacemaker to Prisoner : Justice: He’s Serving Time 
for a Robbery He Says He Didn’t Commit. Some Call Him a ‘Potential Savior’ for 
City.” The Los Angeles Times, December 6, 1992.  
Khalil, Ramy. “Labor Party’s 3rd National Convention The Fight for a Workers’ Party 
Continues.” Justice, 2002, 30 edition.  
Kilborn, Peter T. “Teamsters' New Chief Vows to Put Members First.” The New York Times, 
December 13, 1991, sec. A.  
Labor Beat: Labor Party Convention '96. YouTube. Committee for Labor Access, 2013. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mX9RMx4z2iE.  
“Labor Party Chapter Named after Brennan.” The Morning Call. January 31, 1997, sec. B.  
“Labor Party Constitution.” Labor Party, 1996. 
http://www.thelaborparty.org/d_constitution.htm.  
Langdon, Gregory. “New York--Benefit Performance II.” The Labor Party Press, July 1999. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908104649/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv44/lpp44_orgnote.ht
ml.  
Leip, David. 1992 Presidential General Election Results, 2019. 
https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=1992&f=0&off=0&elect=0.  
Leopold, Les. The Man Who Hated Work and Loved Labor. White River Junction, VT: 
Chelsea Green Pub. Co., 2007.  
 Bilsky 119 
Mayo, Nathanette. “Black Workers for Justice.” Against the Current, 1990, 27 edition. 
https://againstthecurrent.org/atc027/black-workers-for-justice/.  
Mazzocchi, Tony. “Beyond ’92: For a Labor Party.” Against the Current, 1992, 39 edition. 
https://againstthecurrent.org/atc039/p5150/.  
McClure, Laura. “Labor Has a Party.” Labor Has a Party | Dollars & Sense, 1996. 
http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/1996/0996mcclure.html.  
McClure, Laura, and Katherine Isaac, eds. “Black Caucus Meeting.” The Labor Party Press, 
May 1997. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908104556/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv23/lp08.htm.  
McClure, Laura, and Katherine Isaac, eds. “Just Healthcare: How Do We Get There?” The 
Labor Party Press, November 1998. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908104020/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv36/healthcare5.htm.  
McClure, Laura, and Katherine Isaac, eds. “Labor Party Gets Ink.” Labor Party Press, 
January 1999. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908103908/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv41/lpp41_ink.html.  
Mellor, Richard. “Socialist Alternative Members: Questions and Answers.” Facts for 
Working People, November 17, 2014. 
https://weknowwhatsup.blogspot.com/p/socialist-alternative-members-questions.html.  
 Bilsky 120 
Millet, Lydia. “Michael Moore Does a Benefit for NYC Chapter.” The Labor Party Press, 
May 1997. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908104556/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv23/lp08.htm.  
Minchin, Timothy J. Labor Under Fire: a History of the AFL-CIO since 1979. Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2017.  
Muhammad, Saladin. “Black Workers For Justice, Twenty Years of Struggle.” Against the 
Current, 2002, 101 edition. https://againstthecurrent.org/atc101/p717/.  
“National Average Wage Index.” Social Security, 2019. 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/AWI.html.  
New York Metro Chapter. A Call for Economic Justice. New York, NY: The Labor Party, 
1996.  
Northrup, Herbert R. “The Rise and Demise of PATCO.” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 37, no. 2 (1984): 167–84. https://doi.org/10.2307/2522839.  
O'Brien, T. “Labor History and the Tendency Toward Independent Political Action.” Labor 
Militant. 1989, 13 edition.  
Office of the Clerk, Edmund L Henshaw, and Thomas E Ladd, Statistics of the Presidential 
and Congressional Election of November 4th, 1980 § (1981).  
 Bilsky 121 
“Official Call to 1st Constitutional Convention of the Labor Party.” The Labor Party Press, 
March 1998. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908104745/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv32/conrules.htm.  
Priest, Dana. “VA. COAL MINER STRIKES GOLD IN POLITICS.” The Washington Post, 
November 20, 1989.  
Reed, Adolph. “Adolph Reed, Jr. Responds.” New Labor Forum 23, no. 1 (2013): 65–67. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1095796013513240.  
Reed, Adolph. “Sorry, Our Convention Was Better... ...so Why Didn't You Cover It?” The 
Labor Party Press, November 1996. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908104949/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv12/lp2.html.  
Rep. A Summary Analysis of Voting in the 1994 General Election. San Francisco, CA: The 
Field Institute, 1995. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20101020160337/http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribe
rs/COI-94-95-Jan-Election.pdf.  
Rep. Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and Reporting. California 
Proposition 187. Hastings, California: UC Hastings College of Law, 1994. 
https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2103&context=ca_ballot_
props.  
 Bilsky 122 
Richard, Martin. “Why a Strike Is Still One of the Union’s Strongest Weapons.” AFSCME 
Council 57, September 1, 2017. https://www.afscme57.org/news/why-strike-still-one-
union-s-strongest-weapons.  
Rosenfeld, Sam. Labour/Le Travail 81 (2018).  
Rushefsky, Mark E., and Kant Patel. Politics, Power and Policy Making: The Case of Health 
Care Reform in the 1990s. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998.  
Ryder, James W. Letter to Marvin Cain. “ILWU Local 6 Endorses Labor Party Conference.” 
Oakland, CA: 8400 Enterprise Way Suite 115, October 31, 1989.  
Schmitt, Eric. “In Immigration Bill Debate, Divisions and Odd Alliances.” The New York 
Times, February 26, 1996, sec. A.  
Seidman, Derek, and Mark Dudzic. “Looking Back at the Labor Party: Mark Dudzic 
Interviewed by Derek Seidman.” New Labor Forum 23, no. 1 (2014): 60–64. 
https://journals.sagepub.com/pb-assets/cmscontent/Nlf/NLF-
LookingBackAtLabourParty-1468941838437.pdf.  
Based on a PDF version of the full interview published directly online, rather than the full 
version which appeared in the journal. A link to the abridged interview can be found here: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24718462 
Serrin, William. “MIGRANT WORKERS ORGANIZE A BOYCOTT OF CAMPBELL.” 
The New York Times, July 2, 1984, sec. A.  
 Bilsky 123 
“Set to Organize!” The Labor Party Press, January 1999. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908104500/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv41/lpp41_main1.ht
ml.  
“Should a Labor Party Be on the Ballot?” The Labor Party Press, May 1998. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908105742/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv33/election.htm.  
Sweeney, Sean. “New York State Labor Party Says ‘Let’s Run Candidates.’” Justice, 1997, 4 
edition.  
Sweeney, Sean. “The Labor Party's: Alternative Politics.” New Labor Forum, no. 1 (1997): 
43–49.  
Taffe, Peter. A Socialist World Is Possible. London, UK: CWI Publications, 2004.  
Taffe, Peter. The Rise of Militant. London, UK: Militant Publications, 1995.  
Taft, Philip. The A.F. of L. from the Death of Gompers to the Merger. New York, NY: 
Harper, 1959.  
Trottier, Tom. “The Fight for Socialism and the Lessons of the Labor Party.” Socialist 
Revolution, January 29, 2020. https://socialistrevolution.org/the-fight-for-socialism-
and-the-lessons-of-the-labor-party/.  
Von Bergen, Drew. “Reagan Gets Second Union Endorsement.” United Press International. 
October 10, 1980. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1980/10/10/Reagan-gets-second-
union-endorsement/3755339998400/.   
 Bilsky 124 
Walters, David. “Conversation With David Walters.” The Labor Party Press, January 1999. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150917163503/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv41/lpp41_conv14d
w.html.  
———. “COAL STRIKE STUBBORNLY PASSES 6-MONTH MARK IN VA.” The 
Washington Post, October 1, 1989.  
———. “NY Metro Chapter Elections Marred by Fraud.” Justice, 2000, 19 edition.  














 Bilsky 125 
Appendix I: A Revolutionary Socialist’s Recollections of the Labor Party 
The following is a transcript representing the first half of an interview conducted with Jeff 
Booth on January 24th, 2021. This first half of the interview is quoted extensively in the main 
body of the thesis. It is followed by notes from two follow up interviews. The first portion 
represents a direct transcript, although the spellings of certain proper nouns and use of 
punctuation may be mistaken. 
Would you like to introduce yourself? 
My name is Jeff Booth, I live in Eastern Massachusetts. I spent a long time in Boston, 
Sommerville and Cambridge. I’ve been active in the labor movement since I was seventeen 
years old, first in the Bakers, Confectioners, and Tobacco Workers Union—which has a 
different name now—in factories around Upstate New York and in Schenectady where I’m 
from and Albany. I was in the United Electrical Workers in the mid-eighties, and on the 
executive board of the Boston local of the UE, or at that time UE Local 262. And then I did 
some union organizing, voluntarily trying to organize a workplace I was in. During that time, 
when I came to Boston, I became a socialist around 1984. I went to college in Boston before 
that, and I continued to be active in the labor movement, I was a founding member of the 
Harvard Union of Clerical and Technical Workers in the late eighties and a union 
representative, which was basically a shop steward, of that union for many years, including 
the time for which I was active in the Labor Party in MA.  
In the early there were a lot of left and socialist independent electoral efforts. My first run in 
with left politics was kind of haphazard. I think I was in High School when John Anderson, 
who was kind of like a Ross Perot sort of figure but more progressive, ran and attracted a lot 
of people on the left to his campaign, including myself although my political ideas were all 
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over the place at the time. At the same time, I ran into the Citizen’s Party in Schenectady, an 
ex-member of the Socialist Worker’s Party was doing a campaign, he didn’t have a lot of 
support, but I was one of his “foot soldiers,” one of his only foot soldiers going door to door 
in Schenectady with leaflets and stuff. In many unions there was also talk of a Labor Party. 
My union when I was young, the Bakers, Confectioners, and Tobacco Workers Union, went 
on strike, and while I don’t remember much about a labor party, among my coworkers there 
was always enormous cynicism and hatred of the two parties. 
I became a socialist, as I mentioned earlier, as a member of Labor Militant, which is now 
known as Socialist Alternative. Now I’m in an organization called the Independent Socialist 
Group, which is in political solidarity with the Committee for a Workers International, and 
Labor Militant and Socialist Alternative were in the past in political solidarity with the 
Committee for a Workers International. 
 
How did you become involved with the Labor Party? 
So that was, in a way, more to do with my being involved with a socialist organization, rather 
than being active in the Labor Movement because I found out about it first through socialists. 
Labor Militant was already talking about the need for a labor party when it officially founded 
in this country in 1986. The headline of the first issue of the paper, Labor Militant, was 
something to the effect of we need a Labor Party, fight for a labor party, or something like 
that. The organizers of Labor Militant, not all of them, but some were from England. I was 
not, there was a core of founding members that I was a part of, but the Committee for a 
Workers International sent over an organizer and there happened to be two founding 
members of Labor Militant from Britain originally but they were living in the U.S. That 
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would be Richard Mellor and Robb Rooke, along with the organizer, John Throne, who 
passed away recently. And then a handful of other immigrant and U.S.-born socialists who 
founded Labor Militant, and so we were always looking around for labor party, or anything 
like that, information or organizing, and it was going on. One of the things we discovered in 
helping to form the Labor Party was that in talking to union activists, for me that mostly 
meant in MA, but also in national conventions, there was a common thread of “Oh yeah, I 
was a part of this group, this small group, or in this union local here or there, and we were 
always talking about the need for a labor party.” So the idea of what we would call 
independent political action, or forming a labor party or a workers party seemed to be 
percolating in the labor movement, below the radar a little bit, but still there before Labor 
Party Advocates was started in the early nineties. There was always this interest, and mayb 
I’m jumping ahead a little bit, but one of the things that led Tony Mazzocchi, as the prime 
mover of the labor party effort, was that members of Labor Militant in the Bay Area, in 
Oakland and San Francisco, they encountered members of Labor Militant there as part of an 
effort called Bay Area for a Labor Party [Campaign for a Labor Party] or something in the 
early eighties, as an actual group of union activists, including John Reimann, Richard Mellor, 
people like that. When they became members of Labor Militant, they continued to organize 
for that and in the late eighties the organized a conference, I think it was based in Mellor’s 
local, he worked for East bay Municipal Utility District as a backhoe driver. He had a 
position on the executive board of his local, and he helped organize a conference on a labor 
party in his local, and they invited Mazzocchi, I’m not sure how they got in touch with him, 
and a hundred and fifty people showed up, at least, and Mazzocchi was very impressed by 
those numbers and the quality of the union members involved and so on. And there was 
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another conference organized later in New York, and Mazzocchi was there, and these two 
conferences, we think—not that Mazzocchi would acknowledge that anywhere in writing or 
speeches he did—we think that was a bit of a spark, that plus him working in his own union 
to poll workers about a labor party, and the polling results were very good—that’s mentioned 
in Dudzic and Isaac’s article, they actually kind of downplay it, it was a big deal—so that 
plus the conferences made Mazzocchi think this could be something real. 
 
I’ve read a bit about Labor Party Advocates, but there wasn’t much on it. Would you 
be willing to talk more about it? 
Oh yeah, because I think it was a big deal for the Labor Party. So Labor Party Advocates was 
based on these conferences, based on Mazzocchi’s organizing, based on people he knew, and 
based on the general idea in the labor movment here and there about the need for a labor 
party, and examples internationally. It all came together in the form of Labor Party 
Advocates, and Mazzocchi put out material from his union, he started to work closely with 
other like Les Leopold, and that material said “Hey, we did these polls, there’s interests, we 
want to start Labor Party Advocates,” and it ended with something saying, “If you’re 
interested get in touch with us.” I remember very early on, possibly 1990 or 1991, taking 
them up on that offer and myself and a member of Labor Militant that was very enthusiastic 
about it just got in touch with their office, back before the wide use of computers, I think we 
called or wrote letters. You just joined and you could start a Labor Party Advocates chapter, 
and we did that, and there was a good response. So, we pulled a group of people beyond 
Labor Militant together into an early Labor Party Advocates chapter. Where the LPA ended 
and the Labor Party began, officially it was at the 1996 convention, but I remember it got 
 Bilsky 129 
more organized prior to the convention. The LPA chapter in Boston we started grew pretty 
well, you know, before the convention I’m sure we were approaching one hundred members 
on paper, we’d get forty or whatever to meetings. It was pretty impressive at that time, as far 
as the left went in Boston, to have all these people join, because it wasn’t all people from 
existing left groups, it was people from unions and the public interested in the labor party, 
and that grew bigger after the convention. 
 
When you look at the Dudzic and Isaac article, the LPA, without necessarily saying the 
name, was what they mean when they say “well maybe we should not have founded a party.” 
So Labor Party Advocates, had this kind of schema. We’re going to sign up a million 
members before we form a party, and we’re going to do these campaigns, formulated before 
the convention. So LPA had this scheme and it was sort of abstract, we signed up as many 
people as we could, but what’s lacking in a lot for the analysis of the Labor Party, including 
just not understood in the Dudzic and Isaac article from 2012, is that you can talk all you 
want, you can do campaigns on paper and all this other stuff—and we made them more than 
on paper in the Boston Area—you can do that stuff, but there’s a limit. There’s a 
relationship, a dialectic, between actually organizing a party and starting to run candidates, 
and thereby attracting people to the party, and doing organizing outside of just electoral 
work. You can’t separate the two, and so now people who were involved in the Labor Party, 
they have this thing in their head that it wasn’t really the time yet [to form a party in 1996], 
but Mazzocchi was pulled away from that [position] and that’s why there was a founding 
convention in 1996, because the sign up a hundred thousand people thing didn’t work. 
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There’re so many reasons for that, and I could talk all day, but I’ll just say a few headlines: 
 
People don’t wait forever. Short-termisim, in terms of political thinking is a fact of life. 
When you’re organizing you have a window of opportunity, you have a mood, and if you 
don’t go through that window or hit the mood right people move on to something else. In this 
country that means the “progressive” Democrats that come on the scene promising the world. 
If you’re going to form a workers’ party in this country, it’s not like you’ll have forever to do 
it. The issue-based campaigns and sign up a million people things didn’t work. To attract 
people to the project of building a Labor Party you have to actually do it. You can debate 
whether that means simply running local candidates, running in wider races, or a 
combination. It was a tension from the start. The debate on running candidates was a 
legitimate debate, which was not properly engaged with at key times in the LP and LPA. 
They were always pushing back, they being the union leaders that were involved, pushing 
back against push up or shut up time, pushing back against running a candidate.  
 
And of course when you’re on the street or talking to a union rank-and-filer or shop steward, 
they’re like “Oh Labor Party, how do I vote for you? Where do you run candidates?” They 
want something concrete, and you can present them with a campaign, which we did, that’s 
concrete and something they can get involved with, but not everyone is an activist. Even 
activists aren’t thinking long term a lot of the time. People want an alternative that already 
exists, but you can’t have that either, you have to engage people and organize both 
electorally and non-electorally, to put it simply, and the Labor Party never got that straight. 
They were really trying hard not to piss of the AFL-CIO leaders, some of which were 
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nominally supporting the labor party. Dudzic and Isaac mention that John Sweeney said 
something nice about the Labor Party in their article, but he also said a lot of not so nice 
things about the Labor Party. John Sweeney was a conservative. He was a breath of fresh air 
after Lane Kirkland, but when I was involved in meetings in the Boston area of labor 
activists supporting Sweeney coming in and the changes he would make, changes like 
organizing immigrants were very positive, but Sweeney and the other AFL-CIO leaders kept 
their heads in supporting the Democrats, a capitalist party. 
 
One last point on this, but it’s the key theme I feel, why the Labor Party didn’t succeed, 
there’s other reasons as well, but trying to appease the Labor bureaucracy at the top of the 
AFL-CIO was not going to work. You have to convince the labor leadership, in some cases 
you have to fight them and in others you might work with them, but you can’t rely on them. 
Every single labor leader at the top who said they supported the labor party effort baled on it 
in the run up to the 2000 election, except for Mazzocchi himself and maybe the UE—I’d 
have to check on that. So Mazzocchi went around, and the Labor Party was already sort of in 
decline after the second convention, but Mazzocchi still held off on running candidates and 
held off the radicals—including union activist radicals—and they’re still holding off. 
Mazzocchi personally wanted to support Nader running as a Green, who helped the LP in 
various ways, and just by talking about wanting to do that as an individual labor leader, the 
rest of the AFL-CIO leaders, the ones that were nominally involved in the labor party and 
were tolerating it in some ways, they all turned on Mazzocchi and said no, this is too much. 
They withdrew their funding and supported Gore and the Democrats. The convention 
structures were leaning way to heavily in favor of the union bureaucracy and not enough 
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toward lower-level activists, union rank and file, unorganized workers, and community 
activists. 
 
How did dual membership between Labor Militant and the Labor Party work? 
I was a revolutionary socialist and member of Labor Militant during my entire time in the 
Labor Party, and I was open about it. It was a battle to do that, but as far as this dual 
membership question is concerned, it didn’t really apply. Throughout my time in Labor 
Militant, Socialist Alternative, and the Independent Socialist Group, dual membership 
referred to being a member of another small, centralized, left party or organization. Being a 
tendency in a mass labor or socialist party is very common and is different than being a 
member of multiple small socialist tendencies. Allowing members of Labor Militant to join 
the Labor Party wasn’t a tension at all within Labor Militant, we enthusiastically embraced 
the Labor Party because it was part of our orientation right from the start.  
There was interest in it, as I tried to explain earlier. If you look back at official histories, you 
won’t find much about the Labor Party, but there were independent, third-party efforts from 
the left throughout the early eighties—like the Citizen’s Party.  
 
What did activity in the Boston Chapter look like?  
There was an active chapter from the start in Boston. We paid dues to the Labor Party 
nationally and held fundraisers and took donations to support the local chapter financially. 
Sometime between the 1996 and 1998 conventions, this guy named Ed Bruno from the UE 
became a fulltime organizer—I knew him from when I was in the UE, he was on the 
executive board of the Boston local. The Labor Party shared office space with the SEIU at 
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Downtown Crossing, I think on Washington Street, and I would go there to work with him 
[Ed Bruno] sometimes. In fact, one of my main memories, and this may be out of sequence, 
is that we took the Just Healthcare campaign very seriously in Boston.  
We got enough signatures to get a non-binding referendum on the ballot in certain districts. 
We actually won those, but they were non-binding, so a lot of people didn’t take the results 
seriously, but for us it was a victory because it got the issue out. By the way, there have been 
a number of times in U.S. history when universal healthcare was a big issue and the 
Democrats and Republicans just buried it—like they’re doing now. 
 
Anyway, one of my memories of campaigning for the Labor Party, and as a member of Labor 
Militant, was that I had a decent number of people out leafleting and getting signatures for 
the Just Healthcare campaign in Teal Square in Somerville—which was more working class 
at that time. I don’t remember the chain, it was a well-known chain but it’s out of business 
now. Greg Gigg was there from the Teamsters, a lot of young people that I knew through 
Labor Militant or left politics, and some other union people. We had a good number of 
people, maybe eight of us. You’re legally allowed to get signatures outside of supermarkets, 
and other stores like Market Basket—which has a conservative reputation—never hassled us. 
But at this one store everything was going great until the Somerville cops pulled up, and they 
got out of their car and they didn’t know what was going on. These were rank-and-file cops 
and they were sort of questioning us—which wasn’t a good thing to do—but we had a copy 
of the law and we handed it to them and they left. But the manager who called them called up 
some captain he knew, and the captain rolls up on a motorcycle with another cop car behind 
him and we show him the law and discuss very calmly with him. He goes “I don’t give a 
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fuck, I don’t give a shit what the law says, if you’re not out of here in five minutes I’m going 
to arrest all of you. So here I am, with people who are doing their first political activity, I 
didn’t want anyone to get arrested, so we huddled and decided to leave. I remember I got 
angry that this arbitrary repression happened, and I went straight down to Boston to the office 
with Ed and I sat down with him and said “I think we should challenge this.” He said, and I 
kind of understand where he was coming from, “I we challenge it, by the time we organize 
and pay for it the referendum window will have passed.” We decided, like a lot of people do 
in this country, that it would be too costly to do anything. So we said “fuck it” and the 
Somerville police and this captain got away with breaking the law and intimidating a bunch 
of people trying to get universal healthcare. An anecdote, but not random. It shows we were 
active; we had a real campaign going, and we won these non-binding referendums. 
 
We did a lot of activity. Another anecdote, the Labor Party national wanted us to write op-
eds and get on the radio to spread the word about the campaign. We had meetings about this 
and made plans. We got out op-eds and things in the papers sporadically, but we went to 
radio stations and asked to talk about Just Healthcare and I’ll never forget WGBH’s 
response. This is public radio mind you. [in a posh, nasal monotone] “We don’t do advocacy 
reporting.” Of course, everything that comes out of their mouth is advocating for capitalism 
in one way or another. We might have got on some college radio stations, but this was 
angering. 
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But back to an earlier point, a campaign like that is good, but to get more people involved 
and have a real impact you need to also be a serious political party with serious electoral 
work. And that was always put on the back burner to the point where it never got cooked. 
 
 
What did membership look like in the Boston Chapter? Were members organized or 
non-union workers? What industries did they represent? 
It was a mix of union officials, union activists, and non-union workers. We got to a size 
where we started attracting people who were not involved in politics or in unions. We often 
met at SEIU local 285, which organized workers at Harvard Pilgrim at the time, and the 
person that let us meet there was a guy named Frank Borgias. There was a member of Labor 
Militant named Martha Root who was a stop steward for that local. She knew Frank and 
talked to him about letting us use the SEIU’s offices to meet, and they had a large room that 
could hold about sixty people and the building itself was very accessible, right near the 
Parkway T and the Downtown Crossing stop. We would literally have people walk in off the 
street for some of the public meetings that we had. We had at least monthly meetings of the 
membership, and then executive board meetings and so on. I remember a couple meetings in 
the winter where we just had homeless people walk into the back of the room to be warm and 
we welcomed them. I’m not saying that to be charitable, we just let people walk in and they 
could participate in meetings like anyone else. So, we had a viable community chapter of the 
Labor Party. Later we had a Somerville chapter that met in the Public Library and various 
churches and union halls. 
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And the Boston Chapter gaining members became a pole of attraction for union officials who 
had left politics, some of whom kept those politics hidden. We held open elections to 
determine who was on the chapter’s executive board, and Martha and myself—who were 
openly revolutionary socialists and shop stewards—were elected. Martha may have held 
some official position in her union, but despite helping to organize my union local at 
Harvard, the more conservative leadership of my local kept me out of an official position 
because of my politics. I want this on the record that Chris Rondeau of the Harvard Union of 
Clerical and Technical workers told me we couldn’t have South African anti-Apartheid union 
activist Nimrod Sejake come and speak to our local because “that would be too radical.” At 
the same time, many other unions allowed me to organize a speaking tour for Nimrod, 
including the CWA and UE. I won’t get into it, but at one of those meetings we ran into 
trouble with a little fascist group based out of Southie. I was doing three things at once, 
helping to organize the Labor Party, helping to organize Labor Militant, and running the 
union drive at Harvard. 
So anyway, I was a shop steward, Martha was a shop steward and maybe on the eboard, but 
other people like Theresa El-Amin, Jeff Crosby, and Frank Borgias on the executive board of 
the LP had full time union positions. They eventually decided, after we had all worked very 
well together to build the chapter, that when there was another election where Martha and I 
won a second term they didn’t like that. Theresa pulled me into her office—and this was 
weird because before this she asked me to become a leader of Black Workers for Justice, 
even though I’m not Black. They had a multiracial structure, mostly lead by Black workers 
and activists. There was a Black Activist named Alan Booth from the IUE local that was 
involved. He and I went to a convention in North Carolina for Black Workers for Justice with 
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Theresa.—and she explicitly said that because we were openly socialists “you and Martha 
remaining on the executive board would be too much for the leadership.” Frank, Jeff, and 
Theresa went after me and Martha, and this was after we had had the chapter going for a 
while, and we said no, we feel strongly about being open about being socialists. They told us 
to resign, and we said no, we were elected, and we won’t resign, but we’ll have another 
election. So, we had another election, and we won, and they hated that so much. 
 
After that, Crosby started losing interest, but we asked him to have a meeting about the Labor 
Party in his local and he agreed. He turned that into a meeting to immediately vote to join the 
Labor Party, and he didn’t organize for it. The right wing of his local, the motorcycle riding 
right wing workers at the GE Plant, went and packed the meeting. Crosby, in his own local as 
president lost the vote and he didn’t really care that much I don’t think. He moved on to 
supporting Democrats through the North Shore Labor Council after that. 
 
This is illustrative of a bigger problem in the Labor Party; besides it never running a serious 
electoral campaign at any level. There was always this tension between on paper—and I do 
believe Mazzocchi did organizing in his own union, and we certainly did in my local of 
AFSCME 3650 and SEIU 285—unions endorsing the party and the membership not actually 
mobilizing for it. In my local, the unelected leadership including Chris Rondeau and his pork 
choppers (business unionists making big salaries in leadership positions) never backed the 
Labor Party, but I convinced some rank-and-file activists to join. 
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But this is the point: Even ostensibly pro-Labor Party union officials, they mostly failed to 
organize their members to support the Labor Party. You can pass a resolution in your 
executive board meeting, you can support a campaign on paper, but most union officials—
and this is a problem with Dudzic and Isaac’s article, they’re not honest about organizing and 
courting labor leaders who were doing a lot wrong at the time, like they would say these 
labor leaders represent a million workers or ten thousand workers, they’d give these figures 
at conventions and in articles, the problem was that yeah, they say they represent that many 
workers, but how many were active in their union local? How many even heard about the 
Labor Party? Mazzocchi, I think, dipped into his union on this in a serious way, but many 
labor leaders didn’t. When we had the chapter going, LPA then later the official Labor Party 
chapter, in Boston and Somerville, we would have an official list from the national—which 
we had to fight to get to a certain extent but we got it--of unions leaders to approach and try 
to get a meeting at their local. The best we could ever do was a meeting with officers, maybe 
a shop steward or two, but not even that in many cases. In other words there was severe 
gatekeeping going on. I remember there was an OCAW local in Waltham, and we met with 
one person from that local where we said “we want to meet with your members.” We would 
put forward different formulas for both official and unofficial meetings, but 99% of the time, 
including at that OCAW local, they would either say “no, we can’t do that,” or they would 
just string us along until it never happened. I can think of Paul Tracy of AFGE, on paper 
AFGE supported the Labor Party. Did we ever get a meeting with anyone but Paul Tracy 
from AFGE? No. And he was a really nice guy and everything, but we never got a meeting. 
There was Dave Slaney, one of those underground Maoist-New Left types, an officer of a 
Steel Workers local. Could we ever get a meeting with his local? I still remember being on 
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the phone with this guy, who I’d seen on the Left many times before and after this, nope. 
Could never get his meeting with his local. These were people who claimed to have 
progressive politics and locals, but there was severe gate keeping. Just horrible. 
 
I remember seeing Theresa El Amin, who was very active, standing there in the back of the 
room. And she didn’t have a vote—even if I disagreed with her on stuff—like the union, 
frankly, bureaucrats populating those long tables at the front. 
 
These union leaders represent x thousand workers, and I agree with that sentiment to some 
extent, but you have to make it real… and they never made it real. There were some 
exceptions. The UE did some, I remember being allowed to speak at a UE convention, 
despite being of the executive board for a number of years, about the Labor Party.  
 
There was a bunker mentality with the unions, separating them from the community. It boils 
down to the old argument about business unionism or social unionism, but even those 
claiming to be social unionists would gatekeep us. They wouldn’t so much as let union 
activists, let alone community activists, near their locals to talk to their members. That’s why 
the Labor Party failed, because if you give all that power, in terms of voting, just to union 
bureaucrats, and you don’t find a way to get past the gate keepers and convince them 
politically to support things you, then it won’t translate to real party.   
 
All the big labor leaders that Mazzocchi bragged about getting involved, they had one foot in 
the Democratic Party the whole time and one tentative toe dipped into the Labor Party. So 
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they never really, with the exceptions of the UE, the OCAW, and a few others, had real rank-
and-file support and that’s why it failed. They gave money, they gave resources, they gave 
some of their activists out to things, but they wouldn’t organize their rank-and-file. 
 
Notes from Interview on March 29th, 2021 
Labor Party members were generally older, organized in the Sixties and Seventies. 
The Labor Party Press was a traditional newspaper with a blue masthead. Booth had been 
interviewed for it at some point. 
 
I asked a question about the mood at the various LP Conventions. 
Booth attended two conventions and a “Train the Trainers” event in New Jersey. The Train 
the Trainers curriculum was based on a Paulo Fieri’s “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” and was 
run by the OCAW. 
At the 1998 convention, Michael Moore showed a pilot then gave a long speech. By this 
point he had a few movies under his belt and had published a book. Before joining the LP, he 
spoke at an event at Boston University, where he stopped by Socialist Alternative’s table 
about the Labor Party outside afterward and talked with Jeff for a bit. He later contacted LP 
members in New York City. 
Speech at BU was “stupid,” Moore advocated for students to watch FRIENDS to identify 
with working class culture. Speech at the ’98 convention had similar themes. The pilot he 
showed in ’98 wasn’t very funny. It starred Chris Elliot and lasted over 20 minutes. 
Ralph Nader was at the Second Labor Party Convention. 
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Discussion moves to the second convention’s debate on running candidates. Most of the 
points made were identical to points made in the first interview and have been omitted, as the 
direct quotes are better. Booth mentions Mazzocchi’s quote about organizing over the 
backyard fence, and says there is some truth to it, that unions once had roots in communities. 
The discussion turns back to the general mood at the conventions. 
LP was larger by ’98, and as it gained steam, the pressure to run candidates was more acute 
due to the convention’s timing. 
“The conventions were big, with long tables at the front for the unions with the most power, 
the smaller union locals in the middle, and the activists pushed to the back.” 
Discussion moves on to NAFTA and some economic points. 
Clinton was an educational process for labor leaders due to NAFTA. It opened a degree of 
separation between organized labor and the Democrats. 
NAFTA led to a sharp decline for unions and living standards, but it was also a “slow bleed.” 
The more progressive unions and activists joined the Labor Party. 
Back to Convention Moods 
The conventions had different types of energy, ’96 had a march to support newspaper 
workers and was exciting because it was new. ’98 was exciting because it was bigger, more 
serious. 
Back to Economics 
There was a growing bubble from 1998-1999 which covered for Clinton’s failures. Low 
unemployment and the growth of tech jobs made it look like poverty was going down in the 
aftermath of Clinton and Congress slashing welfare and implementing the 1994 crime bill, 
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and deindustrialization due to NAFTA. 1999-2000 saw this bubble pop, but 9/11 covered up 
the recession. 
Decline of the Labor Party 
The 2000 election buried the Party. 
Mazzocchi was clearly the main leader, it would have been better to have collective 
leadership when he died. 
The election campaign run by the Labor Party in 2010 was more of a “curiosity” than 
anything else. Booth saw it in the news, but never saw the results. 
Booth says to look into the Pittston Coal Strike and the Jackie Stump campaign as an 
example of an independent labor electoral campaign. 
 
Notes from Interview on April 25th, 2021 
I asked about Left Factionalism in the LP. 
Golden Gate Chapter problems mentioned by Leopold may refer to Socialist Organizer. 
 
OCAW locals gatekept in MA when LP tried to talk to the locals. 
Better luck with speaking to UE. 
Some Maoists in the LP were also union leaders, but were paranoid about showing off their 
left politics. 
Sean Sweeney and Gloria Mattera led a faction within Socialist Alternative  advocating for 
the SA to become a tendency within the Labor Party, moving away from being an 
independent organization and possibly distancing itself from the CWI. Most of the New York 
Metro Chapter backed this faction. 
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Tensions often came to a head at SA’s National Committee meetings between Jeff and Sean, 
could get ugly at times. Jeff and Phillip Locker opposed the faction, on the grounds that SA’s 
student work and engagement with the anti-globalization movement—which the LP failed to 
capitalize on—was becoming more fruitful than work within the LP. 
Sweeney’s faction lost steam after the NY Metro Chapter’s expulsion. Sweeney and Mattera 
left Socialist Alternative, Mattera remained active in independent politics through the Green 
party.  
Discussed 9/11 in some detail. A transcribed quote is below. 
“You know Boston, it’s a liberal area (we can get into what that means), with some left 
presence. Imagine every house suddenly having an American flag in front of it. They would 
have these big standouts in towns where everyone would light candles on their porch. I was 
with Philip Locker at Breuger’s Bagel Place, and the television was on and—boom! 9/11 hit 
and we realized ‘Oh shit… we won’t be able to do anything after this.’ Every time we saw a 
house without a flag, we’d stare at it, we’d only see maybe one or two in any given 
neighborhood. At the time I remember talking to a coworker in the Harvard library about 
Marxism, and another coworker, a professional not in the union, came along and told us 
‘Now that’s quite enough of that.’ Nothing was going on for the left in the immediate 
aftermath, not until the anti-Iraq War moment sometime later. 2000 election knocked out the 
Labor Party, 9/11 buried it.” 
I forget the context of this next quote. 
“John Sweeney was an old school union bureaucrat, from McCarthyist times.” 
Booth’s Personal Anecdote about the Tech Bubble 
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 “5 People I was good friends with lost jobs, and 25 or thirty acquaintances I knew through 
them did as well.” 
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Appendix II: A Few Responses to Questions About the LP from Gary Olson 
Compiled from an email exchange on February 8th and February 17th, 2021. Olson’s 
responses have been aligned with the questions sent to him for ease of reference. 
What was your experience with labor and left-wing organizing prior to joining the 
Labor Party?  
I was active in the civil rights and anti-war movement of 1960s, until receiving my Ph.D. In 
1974. And in grad school I was active in organizing a chapter of the Students for Democratic 
Society (SDS) which resulted in an arrest and a lengthy FBI file. From then on, the bulk of 
my time was spent on teaching international politics and U.S. foreign policy at the college 
level and writing books, articles and op-eds, always with a radical focus.  
Were you involved with the Labor Party’s predecessor Labor Party Advocates? If so, 
what role did you play in that organization and the founding of the Labor Party in 
1996?  
I was member of Labor Party Advocates and an at-large delegate to the LP’s funding 
convention in Cleveland as a member of the National Writers Union. 
You were chair of the Lehigh Valley chapter of the Labor Party in Pennsylvania, one of 
the largest LP chapters in the country. What did membership in this chapter look like? 
Were members primarily workers organized by unions or unorganized workers and 
community members? What industries did members of your chapter tend to work in?  
We named ourselves the “Brennan Chapter of the Labor Party” in the Lehigh Valley, PA. 
The late John Brennan had been a local union activist, president of the Pennsylvania Labor 
History Society and a registered socialist. At its peak, we had 150 members with about 30 
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attending our monthly meetings which were held at Moravian College in Bethlehem. The 
composition was largely students, professors, unorganized workers, and retirees but also 
some 20 UE, Teamster, and USW members. 
What sort of activity did your chapter engage in? Did you organize public meetings, 
rallies, or protests? Were you involved in any strikes as part of the Labor Party?  
Our chapter was active on local picket lines including a large daily presence at the local UPS 
distribution center in Bethlehem during their national strike. We marched with and raised our 
LP banner at annual Gay Pride rallies in Allentown, organized a large protest against NIKE 
in Bethlehem, another on the need for national health with speakers from Physicians for 
Social Responsibility and frequent pop-up protests regarding worker’s rights a localmalls. 
We published opinion pieces in the region’s local newspaper, The Morning Call, that 
described our program and aspirations. We viewed labor films and had frequent guest 
speakers at our chapter meetings including, for example, Tony Mazzochi and officers from 
the NYC LP chapter.   
How did your chapter engage with unions in your area? 
Thanks to my friendship over the years with local members of the Steelworkers and 
Teamsters, we were invited to make presentations to their local meetings. At one point, I was 
welcomed to join the monthly meetings of the Lehigh Valley Labor Council, the umbrella 
group for all the locals that met at the USW’s Van Bittner Hall in Bethlehem. These 
combined a social function with political discussions and were fruitful for a time. Eventually, 
due to pressure from the local Democratic Party hierarchy —who were closely tied with the 
Labor Council and were uncomfortable with my presence — I was gently “disinvited” from 
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further attendance at these gatherings. This intransigent hostility from the Democratic Party 
presaged one of the most serious challenges faced by both the local and national LP.  
Did international events in the 1980s and 90s, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union or 
the rise of the Workers’ Party in Brazil, have an effect the Labor Party’s development? 
To what degree did the LP consider international politics in its work?  
I’m unaware of international events having a major effect on the LP unless you count red-
baiting.  
How many Labor Party national conventions did you attend? What were your thoughts 
on each of them? Did you notice any changes in tone or the general mood of each 
convention?  
I attended all the LP national meetings and took part in writing a few position papers. I must 
say that, for me, nothing compared to my emotional reaction to the Founding Convention in 
Cleveland in 1996. As the vote passed, marking the transition LPA to The Labor Party, I 
looked across the hall at several hundred diverse faces and felt that I’d been waiting for this 
moment my entire life. Upon returning home, a few of us set to work organizing a local 
chapter. 
 
While the next three bolded “questions” were originally three separate “questions” in the 
email originally sent, Olson responded to all of them together in his reply. Rather than parse 
out the response to address each question separately, the original answer has been left 
intact. 
I’ve read about tensions rising within the labor party around the 2000 election, 
particularly about whether or not to run candidates or to endorse Ralph Nader. In his 
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biography of Tony Mazzocchi, Les Leopold mentions Mazzocchi’s appearance at a 
Green Party convention around this time as a key moment in discrediting the LP in the 
eyes of AFL-CIO leadership. What did you think of the Labor Party’s approach to 
elections? How did the debate about running or endorsing candidates play out in your 
chapter?  
When did your involvement in the Labor Party end? What did you see as the main 
factors contributing to its decline? Could things have been done differently to ensure its 
survival, or did conditions guarantee its collapse?  
The LP ran candidates in South Caroline a few years after Tony Mazzochi’s death in 
2002. What did you think of the post-Mazzocchi Labor Party?  
It’s my strong sense that the refusal of the AFL-CIO hierarchy in Washington, DC to 
embrace the LP was the fatal blow to its demise. We could not move ahead without their vast 
organization and financial resources. And it was their masochistic relationship with the 
Democratic Party that accounted for their position and any talk of running LP candidates for 
office was anathema to them. For sure, Tony’s death in 2002 was also a serious blow as was 
the abysmally low level of class consciousness in this country. Further, I’m not sure how 
many LP members knew how many legal obstacles the corporate duopoly had set up against 
third parties gaining any traction. Finally, although it wasn’t an issue in our chapter, I was 
aware that tension between more traditional LP members and more militant “entry-ists” from 
various left sectarian groups was an issue in some chapters. I expect you have learned or will 
learn about this in your research. 
At the time when our chapter when on “hiatus” in 2005, we had not taken a position on 
running candidates but union members in our group took their cue from higher-ups and were 
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strenuously opposed to it. Had we attempted to do so, even with the needed LP national 
approval, I can well imagine it would have split the group and in any event, not been 
productive. 
Do you think the experience of the Labor Party has any relevance today? What can 
class conscious workers today learn from the history of the Labor Party?  
Lessons? For me, creating a mass movement must take precedence over a new party or at 
least they must occur simultaneously. I’m encouraged by the interest now in evidence about 
the first Rainbow Coalition in Chicago in the late 1960s. The Black Panthers, Young Lords 
(Puerto Rican) and the Young Patriots (poor white migrants from Appalachia) were able to 
put aside their differences in favor of their interests as a class. Alas, owing to COINTELPRO 
this was not to be but there’s no objective reason it can’t be attempted again on a larger scale. 
It was this type of vision that animated my original attraction to the Labor Party. 
